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Abstract
This thesis presents an analysis of the determinants of public sector productivity in the
Federal Government of Nigeria.
The first chapter introduces the thesis, with an emphasis on the creation of measure-
ment tools and methods for, and the collection of, the data that acts as the foundation
of the contribution of my thesis work.
The second chapter studies how management practices that bureaucrats in the Ni-
gerian Civil Service operate under, correlate to the quantity and quality of public ser-
vices delivered. For each of 4700 projects, I have hand coded independent engineering
assessments of each project’s completion rate and delivered quality. I supplement this
information with a survey to elicit management practices for bureaucrats in the 63 civil
service organizations responsible for these projects, following the approach of Bloom and
Van Reenen [2007]. I find that management practices matter: a one standard deviation
increase in autonomy for bureaucrats corresponds to significantly higher project comple-
tion rates of 18%; a one standard deviation increase in practices related to incentives and
monitoring corresponds to significantly lower project completion rates of 14%. I provide
evidence that the negative impacts of practices related to incentive provision/monitoring
arise because bureaucrats multi-task and incentives are poorly targeted, and because
these management practices capture elements of subjective performance evaluation that
further leave scope for dysfunctional responses from bureaucrats. The backdrop to these
results, where 38% of projects are never started, implies there are potentially large gains
to marginally changing management practices for bureaucrats.
The third chapter studies the causes and consequences of interactions between politi-
cians and bureaucrats in the Nigerian Civil Service along two key margins: which bur-
eaucrats a politician delegates the delivery of public projects to, and the incentives that
politicians provide to those bureaucrats. To investigate these issues, I combine data on
the political careers of politicians and measures of their interactions with bureaucrats with
the data presented in my first chapter. I find that politicians facing high levels of political
competition are more likely to (1) delegate the implementation of public projects in their
constituency to more autonomous organizations; and (2) provide informal incentives to
bureaucrats in those organizations. Guided by a moral hazard model, I assess the separate
impacts of the delegation and incentive margins using an instrumental variables strategy.
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I find that delegation to more productive bureaucrats is the key channel through which
politicians improve the bureaucracy’s output when faced with high levels of political
competition. The results have implications for the design of organizations that regulate
politicians’ interactions with the bureaucracy.
The final chapter presents some concluding comments.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Understanding bureaucracy
A nation’s bureaucracy is fundamental to the state’s capacity to protect its people,
regulate the economy and deliver public goods. Civil servants are a key link between
policy and implementation. Most countries rely heavily on government bureaucracies to
manage investments in social sector projects.
Bureaucracies in the developing world often fail to fulfil these duties. As World Bank
(2003) put it, “too often services fail poor people”. Social sector projects are produced
to a low quality, or not at all. The data from Nigeria that underlies this thesis indicates
that a third of all projects and programs budgeted for by Parliament are never initiated.
Another quarter are not completed. At the same time, my data implies that public
organisations like those in Nigeria can produce social sector projects, such as primary
health centres or rural roads, effectively under the right conditions. The question this
thesis aims to contribute to answering is what those conditions are.
The objective of this thesis is to expand our knowledge of the determinants of public
sector productivity in a developing country setting, with implications for the public sector
more widely. The particular focus of my research is the civil service, the body of officials
directly employed by the government to implement the policies of the executive arm of
government. Within the civil service, I concentrate on the social sectors - such as health,
education and agriculture - rather than non-social sectors - such as justice, police, the
foreign service and so on. Finally, I examine programmes and projects within these
sectors, rather than the process of creating new regulations for the sector. Thus, my
research aims to understand the productivity of civil service, social sector organisations
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in delivering programmes and projects to citizens.
I provide some of the first evidence on the extent to which bureaucrats respond to
formal incentives – those laid out in the laws governing an organisation – and informal
ones – pressures to take actions that are outside the commonly agreed rules governing
an organisation. This distinction is particularly important for the civil service, where a
detailed and comprehensive set of governing rules typically creates a highly formalised
structure. This rigid, formalised environment heightens the importance of both formal
and informal incentives. Formal incentives through the direct application of organisa-
tional laws. And informal incentives through the need to negotiate environments that
are either not optimally served by existing rules, or do not serve the interests of powerful
actors within the service, such as politicians.
1.2 Data on the civil service
Despite the significance of bureaucrats, little data exists on their characteristics, beliefs
and outputs. Our understanding of what drives public sector productivity has been
constrained by a lack of detailed data on public sector projects and the organizations
that implement them (Banerjee et al., 2007).
The largest data sets on officials in the civil service arise from the United States
Goverment Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey. The survey assesses federal government
employees’ perceptions of their organisation, its leadership, and their experience of work.
The survey, however, is not compulsory, and has a non-response rate of 48%. It is
not representative of the civil service as a whole. Less comprehensive surveys of public
officials, with similarly high non-response rates, can be found in other developed countries,
such as the United Kingdom’s Civil Service Staff Surveys.
In the developing world, the largest survey of government officials to date is the World
Bank’s ‘Public Officials Survey’. It surveyed 7,000 public officials across 15 countries. The
largest of these surveys was in Bangladesh (821 respondents), and it was representative
of the civil service as a whole. A similar initiative was undertaken by Miller et al. (2001)
investigated the experience of civil servants in Eastern Europe, but on a smaller scale.
Understanding the productivity of the civil service also requires assessments of how
well implemented is a representative sample of public projects. However, large-scale
independent assessments of how effectively government has implemented public projects
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are surprisingly rare. The United States’ General Accountability Office publishes inde-
pth reviews of small numbers of programmes and projects funded by public funds (see
www.gao.gov). Similar audit, monitoring, and evaluation commissions exist in many
countries. However, large-scale surveys of public projects comparing intended versus
final outputs are almost never made publicly available.
Importantly for an effective research exercise, there is no existing published data that
combines a representative public officials survey with assessments of a representative
sample of public projects, let alone that which includes additional important data such
as project and organisational characteristics, household surveys of the communities these
organisations serve, and characteristics of the politicians playing a role in the governance
of these organisations.
To address this deficiency, I have created an extensive data set on public sector
projects. The data comes from two years of public sector investments by the Federal
Government of Nigeria. In 2006 and 2007, the Federal Government of Nigeria channelled
US$1.5billion of debt relief gains to pro-poor capital expenditures through the Overview
of Public Expenditure in NEEDS (OPEN) initiative. OPEN tagged debt relief funds
channelled through standard institutions and processes. It then tracked, monitored, and
evaluated the effectiveness of their expenditure using independent engineers and civil
society groups. It therefore provides a snapshot of the productivity of public sector
organisations across the Federal Government of Nigeria.
To complement this data, I undertook the largest representative survey of civil ser-
vants to be performed to date, of 5630 civil servants across the Government of Nigeria.
These interviews included assessments of management at each of the organisations that
had implemented OPEN projects. I also organised the collection of data on the technical
complexities – the technical challenges faced by implementers – of each of the projects
in the OPEN data set. Finally, I added to this a host of administrative and household
survey data to produce a relatively comprehensive picture of the public service delivery
chain.
Banerjee et al. [2007] highlight two constraints restricting research on public good
provision in developing countries in particular: (i) the process of project implementation
is rarely quantifiable; (ii) public good quality is difficult to measure. The data I have
assembled and utilise here allows me to make progress on both issues.
I have used this data to write the following two chapters: the first on the impacts of
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management on public sector outputs, and the second on the role of political interference
in the bureaucracy. Chapter 3 contains a body of research equivalent to two papers. It
aggregates my work on politicians’ choices over the organisation that implements a public
project, and their choices over the extent to personally interact with these organisations.
As natural counterparts, they are most coherent as a single chapter.
1.3 Formal incentives
In chapter 2, I study how the formal management practices under which public sector
bureaucrats operate correlate to the quantity and quality of public services delivered.
These management practices are proxies for the provision of formal incentives by the
organisation to their staff.
The study of how formal incentives impact on public sector productivity has generated
a relatively large theoretical literature (recent examples include Burgess and Ratto, 2003;
Besley, 2004, 2006; Besley and Ghatak, 2003, 2005). An influential review paper, Dixit
[2002], outlines the varied ways in which formal incentives in the public sector may have
distinct effects on worker effort compared with the private sector. For example, many
public sector programmes and projects have been characterised as having significant
multi-tasking components. Public sector organisations do not specialise in the same way
as private sector ones, and so staff must work across tasks of varying nature. In the
presence of multi-tasking, performance pay can incentivise bureaucrats to work on the
more measurable aspects of their work at the detriment of the project as a whole.
Applied economic analyses of formal incentives in the public sector have largely
focused either on the selection and motivation of politicians (Besley 2004, Gagliarducci
and Nannicini 2013), or on the response to incentives of frontline staff such as teachers
and health workers (Glewwe et al. 2010, Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011, Duflo
et al. 2012, Ashraf et al. 2012, Miller and Babiarz 2013). In both rich and poor country
contexts, there is little evidence linking formal organisational incentives that the vital
middle-tier of bureaucrats operate under, to public service delivery. Similarly, the public
administration literature has also been relatively devoid of concrete evidence linking
practices in civil service organizations to public goods outcomes (Goldfinch et al. 2012).
It is this gap I begin to fill. Chapter 2 utilises the OPEN project evaluations as
measures of organisational productivity, which I supplement with a survey I conducted
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to elicit information about management practices. Bureaucrats from each of the 63 civil
service organizations responsible for these projects were surveyed, following the approach
of Bloom and Van Reenen [2007]. It is these management measures that I use as proxies
for formal incentives in the Nigerian public sector.
This is not the first time the Bloom and Van Reenen measures of management practice
have been applied to the public sector. Bloom et al. [2013] show that management plays
an important part in explaining the productivity of hospitals and McCormack et al. [2013]
do the same for university departments in the UK. In the developing world, Horak and
Sheng [2014] present evidence from a pilot study that measures management practices
in Chinese Hospitals. However, my work is the first time they have been applied to the
civil service more broadly.
My findings indicate that management practices matter significantly for the per-
formance of the civil service. However, the impact of different forms of management
differs from the existing literature that has arisen from Bloom and Van Reenen [2007],
mainly focussed on the private sector. Whilst I find that management practices related
to autonomy significantly increase project completion rates and project quality, I find
that management practices related to performance-based incentives significantly decrease
project completion rates and project quality. A one standard deviation increase in
autonomy for bureaucrats corresponds to significantly higher project completion rates
of 18%; a one standard deviation increase in management practices related to incentives
and monitoring corresponds to significantly lower project completion rates of 14%.
I provide evidence that the negative impacts of incentive provision/monitoring arise
because bureaucrats multi-task and incentives are poorly targeted, and because these
management practices capture elements of subjective performance evaluation that leave
further scope for dysfunctional responses from bureaucrats. Finally, I provide evidence
on how each dimension of management practice interacts with bureaucrat characteristics,
such as their tenure, intrinsic motivation and perceptions of organizational corruption.
These findings are among the first evidence that quantify the potential gains to pub-
lic service delivery arising from marginal changes in how civil service bureaucrats are
managed.
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1.4 Informal incentives
For the purposes of this thesis, I define informal incentives as ‘pressures to take action
that are outside the commonly agreed rules governing an organisation’. As a relatively
undiscussed topic in the economics literature, there are multiple approaches that could
be followed to investigate this phenomenon.
For chapter 3, these informal incentives take the form of politicians providing incent-
ives for bureaucrats that are outside the formal system of organisational incentives. To
measure the provision of these incentives, I included in my survey of civil servants meas-
ures of the intensity and nature of bureaucrat interactions with politicians. Specifically, I
ask the extent to which the surveyed officials are working on projects in which either they
know of political interference, or personally engage with politicians. I also investigate the
nature of these interactions, asking them the extent to which politicians pressure them
to change the specifications, location, or budget of a project.
This is some of the first data on the scale of political interference in the bureaucracy
in the developing world. Brollo and Nannicini [2012] have studied informal political
engagement with budgeting by showing how Brazilian politicians punish municipalities
from opposing parties in the allocation of federal transfers. Similarly, the World Bank
Public Officials Survey asked bureaucrats the extent to which corruption would fall in
the budgeting process if political interference outside of the formal budgeting process
was absent. Using the survey, Manning et al. [2000] find similar magnitudes of political
interference in Bangladesh and Pakistan to my data from Nigeria, of the order of 40% of
project budgets.
Callen et al. [2014] have looked at political interference in bureaucratic staffing,
and show how patronage politics in Pakistan leads to public jobs with limited work
requirements. They record how doctors are present at 42% of the health clinics they
study in constituencies that are politically competitive, whilst they are present at only
13% of clinics in uncompetitive constituencies. Iyer and Mani [2012] show how Indian
politicians shift staff around the civil service to serve their political ambitions.
My focus in chapter 3 is distinct from these papers in that it looks at the process of
project implementation, rather than financing or staffing. I add to a nascent literature on
how politicians involve themselves in bureaucratic process by looking at how politicians
change the working environment in which bureaucrat’s operate on a day to day basis.
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The chapter investigates whether political competition causes politicians to interfere
in bureaucratic decision-making along two margins: who implements public projects
and the incentives under which they do so. Specifically, I assess whether politicians in
closely-contested constituencies delegate to decentralized organizations of government,
and interact with the bureaucracy, differently to those in less competitive constituencies.
I do so under the assumption that the volume of resources channelled to a constituency
is relatively fixed, and provide empirical evidence that this is so. This is in contrast to
recent work by Aidt and Shvets (2012) and Aghion et al. (2005, 2009, 2010) that show in
a US setting when and how powerful politicians move funds to their district. The results
here thus provide evidence on a distinct method of political interference. Another way of
viewing this, is that by political interference I mean interference in the implementation
of programmes and projects, rather than interference at a policy-making stage.
Using a different sample of the OPEN projects to chapter 2 – those projects that
could be delegated to a centralised or decentralised organisation – I show that political
competition makes politicians more prone to delegating to decentralized organizations
and interacting with the bureaucracy.
I do this by writing a simple model of moral hazard, in which politicians must weigh
up the benefits of delegating a public project in their constituency to either a centralised
or decentralised organisation. They face a trade-off between the benefits of delegating to
higher performing, but more independent organisations and the cost of interacting with
bureaucrats there to provide them with incentives.
To investigate these two margins separately, I identify two features of the institutional
environment in Nigeria’s Government that independently vary the ability of a politician to
determine delegation decisions, and the cost of interacting with officials at the two tiers of
government. The first is whether a politician is a member of a Parliamentary committee
that makes budgetary decisions over the delegation of projects within a particular sector,
such as health and education. The second is the distance of the organisation implementing
a project to the Parliament, where politicians reside.
Using these instruments, I find that politicians in politically competitive constitu-
encies both delegate project implementation more frequently to decentralised organisa-
tions, and also interact more frequently with these organisations. This implies that the
distribution of resources across government is a function of political incentives, and the
environment in which bureaucrat’s work is defined by the political context of the project
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they are implementing.
1.5 Interactions between formal and informal incentives
The most significant gap in the existing literature on this field is on the interaction
between formal and informal incentives. To what extent do politicians or other actors in
the public service respond to existing formal incentives by offering a particularly distinct
set of informal incentives to bureaucrats? Very little can be found in the economics
literature that attempts to answer this question, and though I have dealt with the topics
separately, I have not attempted to answer this question rigorously here.
Chapters 2 and 3 are interconnected in the sense that they are both studying the
determinants of productivity in the Federal Government of Nigeria. My investigation
of the interaction between these two papers is partly limited by the fact that I do not
have management surveys for all the projects that are decentralisable, and vice versa,
and thus in the two papers I am looking at different samples. Chapter 2 utilises a
sample that uses all projects for which I have management surveys. Chapter 3 looks
only at those projects that are ‘decentralisable’ in the sense that a project could be
implemented by organizations at different tiers of government, and was not inherently
national in nature. The projects excluded are those projects whose scope is national or
multi-jurisdictional (across many states for example). The data appendix in chapter 3
provides more information on the selection of projects.
However, I find no evidence that politicians are sorting projects across tiers of gov-
ernment based on the management practices there. Thus, they do not interact in the
sense that management practice - the formal rules - plays a significant role in whether
politicians delegate to an organisation at the centralised or decentralised tier. As shown
in chapter 2, I find little evidence that management practice along the lines that I measure
it varies over tiers of government.
1.6 The contribution of this thesis
Chapter 2 is co-authored with my first supervisor, Imran Rasul. To make clear to my
examiners what role I played in this chapter, I detail my contribution here. I designed
the survey instruments that underlie the collection of the data used in this chapter,
organised and ran the surveys, and undertook the data cleaning process. Imran and I
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determined the analytical work to assess this data jointly. However, I undertook all of
the computation of the data analysis. We then wrote the chapter together.
The creation of the measurement tools and methods, and the collection of the data,
is a significant component of the contribution of my thesis work. However, the analysis
presented in the proceeding chapters provides some of the most novel evidence to date
on the workings of the bureaucracy of public sector organisations. This is true for both
formal rules, such as management practices, and informal interactions, such as politicians’
interactions with civil servants.
First, the research I have undertaken implies that the form and incentives of the public
sector play a key role in determining public sector outcomes. By bringing together data
from each part of the service delivery chain, I have been able to show that incentives
matter in a relatively comprehensive way relative to the previous literature. Second,
both formal and informal incentives matter in defining the productivity of government.
By collecting and analysing data on both formal and informal measures of incentives, I
have provided quantitative evidence indicating that both play an important role in public
service productivity. Finally, my thesis provides some of the first empirical evidence on
the optimal nature of incentives inside public bureaucracies that has not been available
to this point.
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Management of Bureaucrats and
Public Service Delivery
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we combine data sources linking the outputs of government bureaucracies
with details of how bureaucrats are managed so to look at how formal management
practices correlate with public service delivery. On outputs, we use project level data
measuring the completion, quality and complexity of over 4700 public sector projects
implemented by organizations in the Nigerian civil service, including government min-
istries and other federal agencies. On management, we adapt the methodology set out
in Bloom and Van Reenen [2007] to measure management practices for bureaucrats in
each organization, along multiple dimensions. Our study sheds light on the relationship
between the management practices for bureaucrats in each organization, and the quantity
and quality of projects delivered by the organization.
From a macroeconomic perspective, the effective functioning of the bureaucracy is an
important determinant of poverty, inequality, and economic growth as stressed by the
state capabilities literature [Besley and Persson 2010]. Effective public service delivery
also matters from a microeconomic perspective: program evaluations of micro-scale in-
terventions are often partly motivated by the assumption that successful interventions
can be faithfully scaled-up by governments.
However, despite the importance of government effectiveness for citizen welfare, the
public administration literature is almost devoid of concrete evidence linking practices in
civil service organizations to public goods outcomes [Goldfinch et al. 2012]. At the same
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time, economic analyses of incentives in the public sector have largely focused either on
the selection and motivation of politicians [Besley 2004, Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2013],
or on the response to incentives of frontline staff such as teachers and health workers
[Glewwe et al. 2010, Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011, Duflo et al. 2012, Ashraf
et al. 2012, Miller and Babiarz 2013]. In both rich and poor country contexts, there is
little evidence linking the managerial practices that the vital middle-tier of bureaucrats
operate under, to public service delivery. It is this gap we start to fill.
Banerjee et al. [2007] highlight two constraints restricting research on public good
provision in developing countries: (i) the process of project implementation is rarely
quantifiable; (ii) public good quality is difficult to measure. The data we utilize allows us
to make progress on both issues. More precisely, we exploit a unique period of history in
the Nigerian civil service, during which the activities of public organizations were subject
to detailed and independent scrutiny. As part of this process, quantitative information
was collected to measure the actual implementation success and quality of public sector
projects in various social sectors. The scrutineers were independent teams of engineers
and members of civil society.
We have hand coded this information to obtain potentially unbiased assessments
of individual project completion rates and their quality, for over 4700 public sector
projects that began in 2006/7. The bulk of project types we study are construction
projects, such as boreholes, buildings, dams and roads. We have also used the technical
documents available for each project, to work with engineers to construct measures of
each project’s complexity, following engineering best-practice [Remington and Pollack
2007]. The aggregate budgetary cost of the projects we study is US$800 million or 8% of
all social spending in Nigeria over this period.
To measure the management practices that bureaucrats operate under, we follow the
methodological approach set out in Nick Bloom and John Van Reenen’s pioneering work
[Bloom and Van Reenen 2007, 2010]. We adapt their management surveys to the Nigerian
public sector setting, taking account of insights from the public administration literature
[Rose-Ackerman 1986, Wilson 1989]. We collected data on management practices for
63 organizations of the Federal Civil Service in Nigeria, including central ministries and
regional development authorities. For each organization, we derive three measures of
management practices: one broadly related to the autonomy provided to bureaucrats; one
related to the provision of incentives and monitoring of bureaucrats; and one capturing
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multiple other aspects of management practices.
The autonomy index we construct captures the extent to which: (i) bureaucrats
can input into policy formulation and implementation processes; (ii) the flexibility with
which an agency can re-organize its bureaucrats to respond to best practice and project
peculiarities. There are long-standing views in the public administration literature on
the importance of autonomy. As Rose-Ackerman [1986] describes, at one extreme lies
the view that public agencies ought to delegate as much decision making to bureaucrats
as possible, relying on their professionalism and resolve to deliver public services [Simon
1983]. At the other extreme lies the Weberian view that, because the objectives of bureau-
cracies and society diverge, only an entirely rules-based system of public administration,
that leaves little to the individual judgement of bureaucrats, can ensure consistent and
acceptable levels of public service. The second reason to focus on autonomy stems from
the economics of organizations literature. Despite the early prominence of autonomy in
this literature [Simon 1951], and the recent contribution of Aghion and Tirole [1997] that
has revitalized interest in discretion in organizations, little evidence exists on the causes
and consequences of providing autonomy in organizations. Our analysis also starts to fill
this gap.
The incentives/monitoring based management index we construct captures the extent
to which an organization collects indicators of project performance, how these indicators
are reviewed, and whether bureaucrats are rewarded for achievements reflected in these
indicators. This is an important dimension of management practices given the literature
on incentive theory stressing the positive impacts performance incentives and monitoring
have on organizational performance. However, a priori the impacts of such incentives
in public sector settings is uncertain because: (i) bureaucrats might need to engage
multiple effort types, not all of which are measurable; (ii) the process by which inputs
are converted to outputs is uncertain; (iii) there can be competing views on the right
way to implement bureaucratic outputs; (iv) bureaucratic objectives are not clear cut;
(v) performance incentives might crowd out the intrinsic motivation of those self-selected
into the public sector [Perry and Wise 1990, Benabou and Tirole 2006, Francois and
Vlassopoulos 2008].1
1Positive impacts of performance pay for teachers have been documented using randomised control
trials in developing countries by Glewwe et al. [2010], Muralidharan and Sundararaman [2011], and
Duflo et al. [2012], although Fryer [2013] finds zero or even negative impacts in the US. In health, a
nascent literature documents positive impacts of performance pay in developing countries when provided
to frontline workers [Miller and Babiarz 2013]. In line with our findings, Ashraf et al. [2012] document how
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We probe these issues by exploiting a third data source: a survey we fielded to
a representative sample to over 4100 civil servants, corresponding to 13% of the total
workforce of the 63 organizations we study. This asked bureaucrats questions related to
their tenure and intrinsic motivation, their perceptions of corruption in the organization,
and their employment histories as bureaucrats. We use this evidence both to shed light
on how the impacts of management practice vary with bureaucrat characteristics, and
also to address econometric concerns related to non-random sorting of bureaucrats into
organizations as a function of the management practices in place, or the endogenous
determination of management practices as a function of bureaucrat characteristics.
Central to our empirical method is that, for any given project type, multiple orga-
nizations are observed conducting similar project activities. For example, small-scale
dams are constructed by the federal ministries of water, agriculture, and environment.
We therefore assess how the delivery of the same project type varies depending on the
management practices in place for bureaucrats in the specific organization responsible,
holding constant all other project characteristics, such as their complexity and scale, as
well as other characteristics of the organization and bureaucrats.
We present three core findings linking civil service management practices and public
service delivery in Nigeria. First, the management practices bureaucrats operate un-
der matter. Despite the measures of management practice related to autonomy and
performance incentives being positively correlated to each other, they have opposing cor-
relations with the quantity of public service delivery: a one standard deviation increase in
autonomy for bureaucrats corresponds to significantly higher project completion rates of
18%, and a one standard deviation increase in practices related to incentives/monitoring
corresponds to significantly lower project completion rates of 14%. Moreover, we find
management practices correlate to quality-adjusted project completion rates in similar
ways as documented for project completion rates. The backdrop to these findings in
Nigeria, where 38% of public projects are never even started, implies these magnitudes
are of economic as well as statistical significance. If these findings reflect causal impacts,
they suggest the potential gains to marginally changing management practices are huge.
At face value, the interpretation of our findings on autonomy for bureaucrats provide
non-monetary incentives elicit more effort than monetary incentives for such tasks. Perry et al. [2009] and
Hasnain et al. [2012] present literature reviews suggesting a lack of evidence that incentives positively
impact bureaucrat behaviors. Muralidharan [2012] provides extensive discussions of why performance
related pay might be specifically suboptimal in the public sector.
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support to the notion that public agencies ought to delegate some decision making to
bureaucrats, relying on their professionalism and resolve to deliver public services [Simon
1983]. The evidence is less supportive of the notion that when bureaucrats have more
agency or organizations are more flexibly structured, then they are more likely to pursue
their own objectives that diverge from societal interests, resulting in fewer public services
being delivered.
The robust negative correlation we document between project completion rates and
management practices related to the provision of incentives and monitoring of bureau-
crats, is far more surprising and counter to a large body of evidence from private sector
settings. The interpretation of this result is nuanced because we measure management
practices related to the provision of incentives and monitoring: we do not measure the
use of explicit compensation schemes based on output or project completion. As such,
the detrimental impacts of such practices for bureaucrats can be interpreted in at least
two ways.
First, bureaucrats might operate in a classic multi-tasking environment, in which
they exert multiple types of effort, only some of which generate productive outcomes
such as public projects being completed [Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991]. Other efforts
that bureaucrats engage in might be termed ‘processing’, or ‘ticking boxes’. In essence,
our management practice measure might then capture an incentive system that places
excessive regulatory burden or ‘red tape’ on bureaucrats, that has long been argued to
lead bureaucrats to mis-allocate effort towards such processing activities [Kelman 1990].
As management practices in bureaucracies become more overtly concerned with incen-
tivizing and monitoring such processing efforts (perhaps because they are much less costly
to specify or monitor than more productive types of bureaucrat effort), then bureaucrats
will optimally reallocate effort toward such activities, reducing project completion rates
overall.
A second interpretation of the negative impact management practices related to
performance incentives and monitoring have in this bureaucratic setting is that the
practices we measure pick up subjective performance evaluation (SPE), rather than
explicit incentives based on signals of productive effort/output. While SPE has the benefit
of being based on a more rounded set of assessments, it is well known that such subjective
assessments also give rise to other biases and dysfunctional responses, especially the desire
of agents to engage in influencing activities to curry favor with supervisors [Milgrom 1988,
31
CHAPTER 2. MANAGEMENT OF BUREAUCRATS AND PUBLIC SERVICE
DELIVERY
Milgrom and Roberts 1988]. If so, the increased use of such mis-targeted incentives and
key performance indicators can also lead to bureaucrats reallocating effort towards non-
productive tasks, thus reducing project completion rates overall.
To understand whether the incentive/monitoring related management practices we
measure capture elements of multi-tasking or SPE, our second set of results explores how
the impacts of management practices vary with project and organizational characteristics.
We document the negative impact of incentive based practices are even more negative
for: (i) more complex projects (that might reflect multiple effort types needing to be
exerted); (ii) for projects that organizations implement less frequently and might be less
specialized in; (iii) project types that our independent engineering assessments code as
being of inherently greater ambiguity or uncertainty in design and implementation. Also
in line with the interpretation that incentives are mis-targeted or subjectively determined
in this context we find that the negative impacts of performance-incentive practices are
ameliorated in organizations: (i) that give more discretion to bureaucrats as measured
by our index of management practices along this dimension; (ii) with better IT facilities,
that might capture their greater ability to measure and target incentives towards the most
productive efforts bureaucrats engage in; (iii) staffed by less experienced bureaucrats, that
might reflect that bureaucrats learn how to engage in influence activities with experience.
Our third class of results shed new light on the interplay between management prac-
tices and bureaucrat characteristics. We first address the literature suggesting performance-
based incentives might crowd out the intrinsic motivation of public sector workers. We
find the negative impact of performance-based incentives is offset by the share of bureau-
crats in the civil service organization that are intrinsically motivated. Hence, if anything,
our evidence suggests crowding-in of bureaucrat effort in the presence of practices related
to incentives/monitoring.
While the recent economics literature has emphasized the role of intrinsic motivation,
a long-standing literature in public administration emphasizes that civil servants pursue
their self-interest [Tullock 1965, Wilson 1989]. This more negative view of bureaucrats
spurs our final set of results, that explore how the impacts of management practices are
mediated through perceptions of corruption among civil service organizations, as elicited
in our civil servant survey. Clearly, in the context of Nigerian bureaucracies the issue of
corruption cannot be ignored, and it permeates throughout our analysis. We find a large
negative levels impact on completion rates of perceptions of corruption in organizations,
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but the negative impacts of performance-based incentives do not vary with perceptions
of corruption. This suggests that corruption is certainly prevalent in this environment,
but that there are few bureaucrats that are actually prevented from behaving corruptly
because of marginal changes in management practice.
To provide support for a causal interpretation of our results linking management
practices to project outcomes, we later tackle three econometric challenges: (i) projects
being assigned to organizations based on their management practices; (ii) unobserved
bureaucrat or organizational characteristics that are correlated to management practices
and also drive project completion rates; (iii) management practices being endogenously
determined.
The central contribution of the chapter is to provide novel evidence on how manage-
ment practices for bureaucrats in civil service organizations correlate to effective public
sector service delivery, and how the impacts of each dimension of management practice
vary across the characteristics of projects, organizations, and bureaucrats. Our results
point to new directions for theoretical research to better understand the contracting
environment in public bureaucracies, as well as highlighting specific areas in which the
better measurement of inputs and outputs of public sector organizations can aid our
understanding of public service delivery in the developing world.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 overviews relevant aspects of the
Nigerian civil service. Section 2.3 details our data sources and empirical method. Section
2.4 presents our core results linking public service delivery and management practices
for bureaucrats. Section 2.5 provides evidence to help underpin a causal interpretation
of our findings. Section 2.6 concludes by discussing implications of our results for
optimal management practices, and links our findings to the literature on improving
public services. The Appendix presents further data description and robustness checks.
2.2 Institutional Background
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, home to 160 million individuals, double the
size of any other African country and representing 20% of the population of sub-Saharan
Africa. It is a leading setting in which to understand the determinants of public service
delivery in the developing world, and also shares important characteristics with other
developing countries: government expenditures represent 26% of GDP, it has generally
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weak institutions holding government to account, and corrupt practices in public sector
organizations are commonplace. The British colonial government fashioned its Nigerian
administration after the British Parliamentary Civil Service System, and this is essentially
what passed to the independent government of Nigeria in 1960. Although there have been
a number of periodic reforms of the civil service, and despite the fact that Nigeria has
moved to a Presidential system of government, Nigeria’s civil service structure still largely
replicates its British colonial origins.2
2.2.1 Civil Service Organizations
The Nigerian civil service is organized into federal, state, and local government civil
services. Our analysis relates exclusively to federal civil service organizations. Various
organizations, including ministries, are established by statute to render specified public
services.3 Table A2.1 lists the 63 federal civil service organizations we study. These
include ministries of health, education, environment, and water resources, and organi-
zations that have regional bases (such as federal polytechnics, federal medical centres,
development authorities etc.). Table A2.1 highlights how these organizations vary in their
budget sizes, staffing levels, and decentralization. The federal ministries are typically the
largest in terms of budget, with regional organizations typically having fewer staff and
being deconcentrated from central government.4
Each civil service organization is tasked to provide various types of project. These
include construction projects: boreholes, buildings, roads and canals; as well as non-
construction projects such as procurement, training, and advocacy. Crucially for our
analysis, for any given project type, multiple organizations are observed conducting
2The constitution adopted since 1999 has many similarities with that of the United States Constitution.
Legislation is enacted by a bicameral National Assembly composed of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Each federal state has its own government headed by a Governor and a state parliament.
Although the introduction of a Presidential system of government in 1979 saw initial reforms to the civil
service, for example under the 1988 Civil Service Reorganization Decree No. 43, later decrees reversed
some of these changes.
3The Civil Service is governed by a set of Public Service Rules and Financial Regulations, ad hoc
Circular Instructions, decrees circulated across government, and Gazette Notices (decrees published in
the Government’s gazette). Together these outline the laws regulating the business of government, and
cover service appointments and exits, discipline, salaries, management of public funds, and other major
aspects of official assignments.
4Budget figures are averages for 2006-10. Staff numbers are taken from administrative data for 2010.
Decentralized organizations refer to those whose day-to-day running is largely independent of the central
authority. They have boards of governors that make decisions over policy and operation, and they have
a separate budget line to central ministries. In line with the literature, we refer to such organizations as
being ‘deconcentrated’. ‘Concentrated’ organizations have a direct line of responsibility to the President
and National Assembly.
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similar project activities. For example, small-scale dams are constructed by the federal
ministries of water, agriculture, and environment, and by all of the river basin develop-
ment authorities. We therefore assess how the delivery of the same project type varies
depending on the incentive structures in place for bureaucrats in the specific organization
responsible, holding constant other project and organizational characteristics.
Underlying our analysis is the notion that the objectives of civil service organizations
do not run entirely counter to raising project completion rates. Our analysis is informative
on the importance of management practices as long as organizations place some weight
on this outcome. Anecdotal evidence suggest senior management have sometimes been
removed on the basis of poor completion rates. Moreover the types of capital expenditure
on projects we focus on constitutes 46% of organizational budgets in total, on average, so
they undoubtedly represent an important element of what organizations are responsible
for overall.
2.2.2 The Assignment of Civil Servants and Projects to Organizations
The Head of the Civil Service of the Federation organizes the postings and conditions
of Nigeria’s federal civil servants. Our representative survey of 4100 individual civil
servants confirms this: 88% of civil servants said they had no influence over their initial
posting; 60% report their current posting being ‘at random’, with a further 22% reporting
being transferred across organizations on an impersonal basis. Hence it is unlikely that
bureaucrats self-select into organizations on the basis of the management practices in
place, as evidenced in greater detail later.
Once posted, civil servants enjoy job security. Our survey reveals mean tenure at
the current organization to be almost 13 years. For senior managers (those above grade
level 12) this rises to almost 16 years. The survey also reveals that movements across
organizations are rare: 67% of bureaucrats report never having moved organization.
This lack of mobility in the labor market for bureaucrats slows down the rate at which
best practices for management spread through the bureaucracy, and might also dampen
incentives for organizations to tailor management practices in order to attract certain
types of bureaucrat.
Projects are assigned to organizations centrally by the National Assembly, that enacts
a budget law specifying the projects to be implemented each fiscal year. The projects we
study were all established in law by Budget Appropriation Bills passed in 2006 or 2007.
35
CHAPTER 2. MANAGEMENT OF BUREAUCRATS AND PUBLIC SERVICE
DELIVERY
The passage of these bills is as follows. Having received inputs from the executive branch
of government, a draft Appropriation Bill is presented to the National Assembly. The
draft bill is then split into sectors (water, health etc.) and sent to sectoral committees
of the House and Senate. These committees are delegated to hold hearings with relevant
parties, to scrutinize the proposals, define budgets for each project and decide which orga-
nization is responsible for its implementation. These committees are staffed by politicians
with qualifications or experience in the relevant sector. These sectoral committees then
recommend a budget for the sector to an Appropriation Committee which merges the
recommendations into a single budget. This unified budget is then voted on by both
houses to form that year’s Budget Appropriation Bill. This legal document defines the
responsibilities of civil service organizations in terms of projects to be delivered.
2.2.3 Management of Bureaucrats
It is at this point that the management of civil servants becomes crucial for the trans-
formation of government plans into public service delivery. To better understand how
management practices evolve in organizations, we held structured interviews at four of
the federal organizations in Table A2.1. These revealed three common themes in how
management practices are determined in organizations: (i) the Public Service Rules of
the Nigerian civil service provide guidelines on how bureaucrats should be incentivized,
and these are common to all federal organizations; (ii) the history of senior management
staff that have worked in an organization might bring their own innovations to bear;
(iii) the role of external events such as demands of trade unions. Taken together, these
interviews consistently emphasized the nature of management practices in the civil service
organizations to be slowly evolving over time, and not necessarily tailored to maximize
public service delivery of the types of project organizations are used to being assigned.5
An econometric concern is the potential reverse causality from bureaucrat effective-
5The structured interviews took place more than two years after the other surveys were fielded. In
the Nigerian public sector, management practices are said to take the Public Service Rules as their
foundation. These rules provide the framework for the running of the public service, including rules
around the distribution of authority, the nature of discipline, the provision of training, and so on. In each
case, these were said to be central to determining management practice. However, we were repeatedly told
that a secondary influence on an organization’s management practices was the history of management
staff who had worked at the organization. Officials are promoted into management positions based
primarily on tenure. Views on management practices are said to be aggregated by committee, with the
chief executive marshalling, rather than defining, the direction of reform. This situation, we were told,
leads to a relatively slow changing management environment, but one that over the years can lead to
substantial divergence in management practice across organizations. Finally, external events, such as the
demands of trade unions, were said to have a third-tier influence and constrain management practices.
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ness driving the management practices in place. While we cannot rule this out entirely
given our data, we also reiterate that such processes for how management practices
were determined were not mentioned in any of the structured interviews conducted. We
address this issue in detail in Section 2.5.
2.3 Data and Empirical Method
2.3.1 OPEN Data on Project Completion and Quality
The Nigerian Government began a program of sweeping reforms in the major organs of
government in 2003 [Nkonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako 2007]. As a result, the Nigerian
Government received cancellation of its external debt to the tune of US$18 billion from
the Paris Club. At the federal level, the annual savings from debt interest were channeled
into the social sectors that we study. The Presidency also saw this as an opportunity to
track the effectiveness of government expenditures, and so in 2006 and 2007 the Nigerian
Government undertook the Overview of Public Expenditure in NEEDS, known as the
‘OPEN initiative’, in which it traced, at a project level, the use and impact of 10% of
all federal Government social sector expenditures approved between 2006 and 2007. The
projects selected to be part of the OPEN initiative were designed to be representative
of existing social sector expenditures, but also to be informative for those projects that
were most needed to be scaled-up nationwide.
Under the OPEN initiative, visits to public projects by expert teams identified the
extent to which they had been implemented as planned in the Federal Budget, and
embodied in each project’s technical document. The Presidency contracted national and
regional teams to undertake the monitoring process outside of the institutions of the civil
service. Hence the public sector projects were not evaluated by potentially biased civil
servants, but rather by teams of independent engineers and civil society. The engineers
evaluating the projects were not those working on the project sites and the civil society
groups were recognized third sector organizations.6
We consider projects traced under the OPEN initiative that were approved in the
2006 or 2007 federal budgets. Monitoring teams visited the relevant project sites around
6The teams were recruited in a competitive tendering process that was regulated by the government’s
procurement agency. The decision to use monitoring teams independent of government was a function
of the weakness of existing government systems as well as the need for impartiality [Federal Government
of Nigeria 2007]. Prior to the OPEN initiative, the government had its own monitoring and evaluation
systems in place (based on unannounced visits) but these were largely perceived to be ineffective.
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18 months after the project was centrally approved. All the projects we study had twelve
month completion schedules, so that even accounting for any delay in the disbursement
of funds, it is feasible for these projects to be completed by the time of the monitoring
survey.
The OPEN evaluation teams coded: (i) whether the project had started; (ii) its stage
of completion; (iii) the quality of the inputs and work. Our main outcome variable
is a continuous measure, from zero to one, of project completion rates. A recorded
completion rate of zero does not imply the organization never even attempted to work
on the project. Rather, the project might have been formulated and prepared, with
responsibility for implementation having been delegated to a department and bureaucrats
within the organization. At that point however, progress on the project halted, with funds
either being returned due to lack of use, or being lost. We cannot distinguish whether
this lack of implementation reflects active or passive waste [Bandiera et al. 2009]. A
completion rate of one implies the project matched its full specification.
To maximize data coverage on project quality, we are forced to utilize the most
aggregate formulation of quality reporting. A project was either of insufficient quality,
satisfactory, or commended for an ‘above average or high’ quality level. With this
definition, we obtain 2235 observations of project quality, 2206 of which also have project
completion data. We then define a project quality indicator equal to one if the project
is of satisfactory quality or above.
To further ensure the accuracy of monitoring reports, the Presidency put in place a
system of checks and balances. First, a centralized team of technocrats monitored the
evaluation teams, providing them with training and opportunities for standardization of
their methods at national conferences. Second, evaluators were asked to provide material,
photographic, or video evidence to support their reports. Third, the national teams and
Presidency performed random checks on evaluated sites, all of which were consistent with
the findings of OPEN monitors. Evaluations of the OPEN process indicate it successfully
achieved its aims [Eboh 2010, Dijkstra et al. 2011].
The reports of OPEN evaluators describe the fate of projects budgeted for execution
in the 2006 and 2007 federal budgets [Federal Government of Nigeria 2008, 2009]. We
hand coded the material from all projects recorded in OPEN initiative reports from the
federal civil service organizations listed in Table A2.1.7 Taken together, the coverage of
7We have a relatively broad sample of federal social sector organizations. In the water and power
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projects in our sample traces 8% of all Federal Government social sector expenditures
in 2006/7 budget years, corresponding to 4721 projects from 63 organizations, with an
aggregate budget of around US$800 million.
We also hand coded other project level characteristics such as its budget, whether it
was a rehabilitation project, and, as described in mode detail below, its complexity as
defined by engineer-approved measures derived from the project’s technical specifications.
Table 2.1 provides descriptive evidence on each project type studied. Boreholes
are the most common type, corresponding to 29% of all OPEN projects. Key to our
empirical method is that most project types are implemented by a range of organizations:
for example there are 18 civil service organizations that construct boreholes, as shown
in Column 2. Hence we are later able to study the impact of management practices
for bureaucrats, that vary across civil service organizations, on project implementation,
conditional on project-type fixed effects.
Column 3 highlights the scale of projects by project type: most constitute the ‘nuts-
and-bolts’ of rural infrastructure development: the median budget for dams is US$18,000,
and the median budget for a building is US$120,000. It is because projects are relatively
small scale that partly explains why multiple organizations are observed being tasked to
implement similar project types. Columns 4 to 7 show completion rates by project type.
Aggregating across all project types, 38% of projects are never started. Although this
might emphasize the role that corruption or passive waste might play, it is not a complete
explanation for bureaucrat behavior: 31% of projects are fully completed, and conditional
on being started, the average project completion rate is .75. Examining the data by
project type emphasizes the variation of completion rates across and within project types.
Conditional on being started, most projects are more than 50% complete. The final
column provides information on the percentage of projects rated to be of satisfactory
quality by the team of independent engineers and civil society: here we tend to observe
the majority of projects being ranked highly irrespective of project type.
Table 2.2 presents descriptive evidence on the public service delivery of the ten largest
civil service organizations in our sample, as defined by the total number of projects
implemented (although this maps closely to the size of organizations as measured by
sectors, we cover all the relevant federal organizations. In the health sector, we cover 28% of health
organizations, with the excluded a subset of the medical service providers such as a number of Federal
Medical Centres. Similarly, in education we cover 14% of education organizations, excluding a range of
institutions of learning such as some Federal Colleges of Education.
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total budget). This again emphasizes that, with the exception of the Federal Ministry of
Power and Steel, each organization is engaged in providing multiple project types. We
observe huge variation across these large organizations in the percentage of projects that
are never started (11% to 95%), and that are fully completed (3% to 89%). The final
column provides information on the percentage of projects rated to be of satisfactory
quality: here we observe far greater variation across civil service organizations (25% to
100%) than we previously documented in Table 2.1 across project types.
These statistics suggest there might be important factors at the organization level that
drive this variation in the quantity and quality of public sector projects. We next detail
how we measure one such factor: the management practices civil service bureaucrats
operate under.8
2.3.2 Measuring Management Practices
There has been a revival of research investigating the impacts of management practices
on the performance of private sector firms [Ichniowski et al. 1997, Black and Lynch
2001, Bloom and Van Reenen 2007, 2010; Bloom et al. 2012, 2013]. We follow Bloom
and Van Reenen’s (henceforth BVR) approach to measuring management practices in
organizations. We adapt their survey tool and practices to the Nigerian public sector
setting, taking into account long-standing views on the importance of autonomy in public
administration [Simon 1983, Rose-Ackerman 1986, Wilson 1989] as well as recent insights
from the ‘new performance management’ and ‘good governance agenda’ perspectives
[Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008, Goldfinch et al. 2012].
To obtain reliable information on management practices, we worked closely with
members of the OPEN office in the Presidency, as well as members of the Office of the
Head of the Civil Service of the Federation in undertaking the questionnaire development
process. A number of pilots using semi-structured interviews like those in BVR were held
to outline key similarities and deviations from the BVR methodology. After a number
of months of collaborative questionnaire design, civil servants from each organization
practised the survey with each other and identified where wording or phrasing was not
suitable for the Nigerian context.
The management survey enumerators were trained together for a number of weeks
8Regressing project completion rates on organizational fixed effects yields an R2 of .33, suggesting
that organizational characteristics such as management practices can plausibly play an important role in
determining such outcomes.
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including practice interview sessions before undertaking the first few interviews together.
The aim was to ensure a consistent interview engagement across sessions. To obtain
information on management practices, senior management staff from the key departments
of the organization, but not the chief executive officer, were brought together in a private
office to discuss managerial practice at the organization in confidence. While each
manager filled in their own questionnaire, the enumerator looked for a consensus and
recorded that in her own questionnaire. This is the underlying information we use to
construct management practice indices for each organization.9
From September to November 2010, our survey team held interviews at the orga-
nizations listed in Table A2.1. Following BVR, interviews were ‘double blind’ in that:
(i) managers were not told in advance they were being scored or shown a score grid; (ii)
enumerators were given no information on the performance of the organization. However,
the delay between the collection of the OPEN data set in 2006/7 and the Civil Servants
Survey in 2010 raises the question whether civil service structures changed significantly
in between data collection periods. For example, those organizations found to have
low completion rates might have instigated reforms to improve management practices for
bureaucrats. However, there is little evidence from other sources of any major civil service
reforms being implemented over this period, or of significant changes in the political
organization of federal agencies [Alabi and Fashagba 2010, Ogundiya 2011]. In addition,
we find little evidence of a spike in turnover of bureaucrats around 2007, coinciding
with the Presidential election: 80% of bureaucrats employed in 2010 were at the same
organization in 2007.
The BVR evaluation tool elicits management practices through a semi-structured
interview covering four topics: operations, targets, incentives and monitoring. We apply
the BVR approach in the context of public bureaucracies, extending the series of practices
elicited to cover those more relevant for managing bureaucrats. As a result, our manage-
ment survey covers nine topics: roles, flexibility, incentives, monitoring, culture, targeting,
facilities, skills and staffing. We then replicate the BVR method eliciting information on
9In this context, conducting management surveys via telephone was judged to be far less likely to
reveal true practices than conducting face-to-face group interviews. Second, given the interview format,
individual manager responses on management practices are available, but we cannot link individual
managers to specific projects and so do not utilize that information (each project is delivered by teams of
bureaucrats across sub-departments): rather we use the consensus measure recorded by the enumerator.
Managers were told their individual responses would remain confidential. Third, we checked whether
recorded practices are sensitive to the number of managers present at interview (that does vary across
organizations): we find no such relationship. Fourth, the mean interview time was 74 minutes, and we
include this as part of our noise controls in the empirical analysis.
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each of these broad topic areas from our civil service organizations, although we do so
using a more limited set of underlying questions related to each topic, and some of our
questions permit only yes/no replies, while others are based on a full scoring grid. Table
A2.2 details the questions that come under each of the nine topic areas, and how they are
aggregated into what we refer to as ‘autonomy’, ‘incentives’ and ‘other practice’ indices
(denoted CS-autonomy, CS-incentives and CS-other respectively).10
The questions on ‘roles’ assess the extent to which bureaucrats can input into policy
formulation and implementation processes. The questions on ‘flexibility’ aim to measure
whether a bureaucratic agency is able to re-organize its bureaucrats and adapt tasks to
respond to best practice and project peculiarities. We combine answers to the roles and
flexibility practices to construct an index of management practices capturing bureaucrats’
‘autonomy’ (CS-autonomy).
The questions on ‘incentives’ are designed to capture more familiar notions of incentive
provision for bureaucrats, both positively in terms of whether rewards are given for
some dimensions of service, and negatively in terms of punishments for poor service; the
questions on ‘monitoring’ capture practices related to the collection and use of perfor-
mance indicators. We combine the answers to the incentives and monitoring practices to
construct an overall index of management practices capturing the performance related
‘incentives’ bureaucrats operate under (CS-incentives).
The remaining topics cover the following practices: the ‘facilities’ questions relate
to how well-functioning the organization is, for example, by collecting information on
the availability of electricity and internet facilities to bureaucrats; the ‘skills’ questions
relate to the human capital of bureaucrats, especially their IT competencies, and the
trainings offered to them; the ‘staffing’ questions focus staff recruitment and retention,
as well as how workloads are spread across bureaucrats; the ‘targeting’ questions relate to
the existence and clarity of targets for bureaucrats, and finally, the questions related to
‘culture’ try to elicit information on how colleagues are collectively treated and interact
10Hence there are two important deviations from how we elicit management practices using the BVR
method. First, we tailored the precise wording of some questions to better fit our context. Second, we
did not use the same universe of questions from the BVR survey. In most cases this was because we
could not identify an analogous concept in the public sector that was relevant or not covered by other
questions. For example, the majority of questions on lean manufacturing in BVR (e.g. ‘What kinds
of lean (modern) manufacturing processes have you introduced?’) were not utilized. However, those
on improving manufacturing processes (‘How do you go about improving the manufacturing process
itself?’) were translated into the redefinition of procedures in response to new needs or challenges (‘Does
your organization make efforts to redefine its standard procedures in response to the specific needs and
peculiarities of a community?’).
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with others outside of the workplace. We combine the answers on all these topics to
construct a third index of ‘other’ management practices (CS-other).
We clearly recognize there is no definitive way to solicit management practices along
these various dimensions, nor a definitive way to collate them into more aggregate
indices. Our approach is primarily designed to reflect two broad areas of management
practice emphasized in the public administration and economics literatures as being first
order determinants of bureaucrats’ behavior: autonomy and performance incentives.
However we later consider two extreme cases by documenting the correlation between
project completion rates and: (i) a fully disaggregated specification showing the separate
impact of all nine dimensions of management practice; (ii) an aggregate measure of
management practice that collates all nine categories into a single index.11 Given these
indices measure broad practices, rather than reflecting specific compensation schemes or
workplace policies, there might be less concern that such broad practices can rapidly
endogenously respond to either past project completion rates, or to changing bureaucrat
characteristics.
The responses to each practice in Table A2.2 are converted into normalized z-scores
(so are continuous variables with mean zero and variance one by construction), where
in all cases, variables are increasing in the commonly understood notion of ‘better
management’. For the CS-autonomy index, we assume greater autonomy corresponds
to better management practices (our empirical analysis then assesses whether this is
positively or negatively correlated to project completion rates). For our core analysis,
we aggregate z-scores into the three CS- measures by taking the unweighted mean of
the underlying z-scores. We later show the robustness of our results to other weighting
schemes.
Two further points are of note. First, the CS-autonomy and CS-incentive management
scores are positively correlated. Hence in the cross section of federal organizations, the
provision of autonomy and performance incentives do not appear to be substitutes. Sec-
ond, these correlations are not high: the CS-based measures have a correlation coefficient
of .24. Combined with the underlying variation in each measure across organizations, this
opens up the possibility to precisely identify the separate relationship of each measure
11We have also used principle components analysis to assess the importance of individual practices
through factor analysis. For the matrix of all nine sub-indices, we find the first factor explains 28% of
the variation.
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to public service delivery.12 The marginal impacts of these two measures can also be
separately identified from that of the CS-other index: the CS-autonomy (CS-incentives)
index has a correlation of .17 (.43) with the CS-other measure.
These indices, and the underlying management questions, provide us with our core
explanatory variation. Following BVR, we also collected data on the interviewees for
each survey, interview characteristics and the quality of the survey session. These ‘noise
controls’ will also be conditioned on in our baseline empirical specifications as described
later.
2.3.3 Project Complexity and Other Variables
When relating project outcomes to management practices for bureaucrats, it is important
to condition on project complexity. To measure this we collaborated with a pair of
Nigerian engineers familiar with the OPEN initiative and a group of international scholars
with research interests in project complexity. The complexity indicators were based
on the detailed technical specifications specified for each project, and are constructed
following engineering best practice that emphasizes multiple dimensions of complexity
[Remington and Pollack 2007]. The Appendix: (i) details the construction of these
indices, and presents descriptive statistics for them; (ii) describes checks we put in place,
using multiple engineers, to establish the validity of these complexity measures.
These complexity indicators reflect the number of inputs and methods needed for
the project, the ease with which the relevant labor and capital inputs can be obtained,
ambiguities in design and project implementation, and the overall difficulty in managing
the project. Some of these features relate to the hallmark differences in goods supplied
between public and private sectors. Our empirical approach then aims to hold constant
the complexity of the project along these dimensions, including issues related to orga-
nizations needing to sub-contract project implementation to a private sector firm, for
example. This allows us to focus in on the correlation between managerial practices for
bureaucrats and project completion rates, all else equal.13
12Such substitution might have been observed if bureaucrats have strong career concerns, and so
performance incentives are not required once autonomy is given to individuals. Alternatively, if
bureaucrats are intrinsically motivated they might need only to be provided autonomy, and indeed,
the provision of explicit incentives might crowd out their intrinsic motivation.
13Our civil servant survey also helps to shed some light on the relationship between bureaucratic
organizations and such third party contractors/suppliers/consultants. For example, only 6% of civil
servants agreed with the statement that, the most successful contractors “are aligned with the government
in some way”; only 13% of civil servants reported having been offered a ‘small present’, ‘money’, or an
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The other project level controls include the project’s budget and whether it was a
rehabilitation project. Finally, organizational variables we control for include adminis-
trative data on the number of employees at each organization, the proportion of staff
with graduate/postgraduate qualifications, and the organization’s total budget. In some
specifications we also condition on controls for the state in which a given project is located.
We construct these state controls using aggregated data provided by the National Bureau
of Statistics.
2.3.4 Empirical Method
Our baseline empirical specification has as its unit of observation project i of type j in
organization n. The project types are listed in Table 2.1, and the federal civil service
organizations from which management practices have been elicited are listed in Table
A2.1. We estimate the following OLS specification, where yijn corresponds to the project
completion rate, or the assessment of project quality, as described in Table 2.1, and
the three main indices of management practice are the CS-autonomy, CS-incentives and
CS-other indicators described above,
yijn = γ1CS-autonomyn+γ2CS-incentivesn+γ3CS-othern+β1PCijn+β2OCn+λj+ijn,
(2.1)
PCijn includes project characteristics such as the project complexity, log project budget
and whether the project is a rehabilitation or not. OCn includes organization level
controls such as the log number of staff, log total organization budget, log capital budget,
and the proportions of officials with a college and postgraduate degree. Following BVR,
within OCn we also condition on ‘noise’ controls related to the management surveys.
These include four interviewer dummies, indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure
of the managers who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time
of day the interview was conducted, a dummy variable indicating whether the interview
was conducted during Ramadan, the duration of the interview, and an indicator of the
reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer, which is a simply a subjective
assessment as to whether the interview went well.
As typically many organizations are observed implementing the same project type j,
we control for project fixed effects λj in our baseline specification (2.1). Our parameters
‘expensive present’ by such contractors.
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of interest are γ1 and γ2: as each CS- measure is a standardized z-score, these coefficients
measure the effect size of a one standard deviation change in management practices along
the respective margins of autonomy and performance incentives. As our main specifica-
tion controls for project fixed effects, we allow the standard errors to be clustered by
project type-organization. In the Appendix we demonstrate the robustness of our results
to allowing standard errors to be clustered by organization (across all its project types).
Our working sample is based on 4721 projects from 63 organizations on which we have
data on management practices and project, organization and bureaucrat characteristics.
In specification (2.1) we are implicitly assuming that, within project type and con-
trolling for project and organizational characteristics, the underlying production function
is the same across projects. Specification (2.1) then corresponds to a reduced form
representation of an underlying production function in which management practices
convert the raw total of available bureaucratic labor into effective labor inputs in the
completion of public projects.
To provide support for a causal interpretation of the estimated partial correlations
linking management practices to project outcomes (γ̂1, γ̂2), we need to tackle three
econometric challenges: (i) projects are non-randomly assigned to organizations based on
their management practices; (ii) unobserved bureaucrat or organizational characteristics
that are correlated to management practices and also drive project completion rates;
(iii) management practices being endogenously determined by bureaucrat characteristics
or project outcomes. In the next section we present our OLS results on the partial
correlations between various dimensions of management practice and project completion
rates. Section 2.5 then provides evidence to address these econometric concerns.
2.4 Core Results
2.4.1 Project Completion Rates
Table 2.3 presents our main results on how civil service management practices correlate
with project completion rates. Column 1 only controls for the three CS- measures. We
find that higher levels of autonomy for bureaucrats correlate to significantly higher com-
pletion rates (γ̂1 > 0). The impact of greater use of performance incentives/monitoring
for bureaucrats on project completion is however negative and also significantly different
from zero (γ̂2 < 0). Columns 2 to 4 sequentially condition on noise controls and orga-
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nizational characteristics, project characteristics, and project fixed effects. Throughout,
we find both management practices have significant impacts on project completion rates
at the 1% significance level.14
Our preferred specification is in Column 4 with project fixed effects. This shows that
a one standard deviation increase in CS-autonomy corresponds to significantly higher
project completion rates of 18%. A one standard deviation increase in CS-incentives
corresponds to significantly lower project completion rates of 14%. The stability of both
coefficients of interest and their standard errors across Columns helps ameliorate the
concern that there likely remain other omitted controls that would cause large changes
in magnitude and significance of the coefficients of interest.
The estimated coefficient on the other dimension management practice of CS-other,
γ̂3, is less stable in magnitude and significance across specifications. This might be as
expected given that it is composed of the widest range of underlying components. In
all specifications, better management practices on this CS-other dimension are positively
correlated with project completion rates; in Column 4 the estimated coefficient is indeed
significant at conventional levels, although the effect size is significantly smaller than for
the two dimensions of management practice.
In Appendix Table A2.4 we show the robustness of these core findings to assuming
the disturbance terms ijn in (2.1) are clustered by organization (across all project types),
correcting p-values for potential biases due to a small number of clusters [Cameron et
al. 2008]. In Figure A2.2 and Appendix Table A2.5 we probe the robustness of our
baseline result along eight margins: (i) defining threshold completion rates that deem the
project usable and seeing how management practices relate to reaching these thresholds
(especially those related to completion rates of zero and one); (ii) restricting the sample
to the largest/smallest organizations; (iii) removing organizations at the tails of the
CS-autonomy and CS-incentives measures; (iv) considering the impacts of managerial
practices on construction and non-construction projects separately; (v) considering the
impacts of managerial practices on projects implemented by centralized and decentralized
organizations separately; (vi) controlling for characteristics of the state in which the
14Among the noise controls, neither the age, gender, or tenure of interviewees significantly impact
project completion rates. Nor do whether the interviews were undertaken in the morning, their length,
or the quality rating of the interview. Noise controls that are significant include whether the interviews
where undertaken on a Tuesday or Saturday (negative), or during Ramadan (positive). A few of the
interviewer dummies are significant. The exclusion of the noise controls does not change the qualitative
nature of the main results reported.
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project are located, and exploring how the results vary depending on whether projects
are located in the North or South of the country that defines the principal cultural divide
in Nigeria; (vii) alternative constructions of the CS- management practice indices (rather
than the equal weighting procedure); (viii) using a fractional regression model rather
than OLS.
One concern is that project completion rates may not be a useful outcome indicator:
projects may be almost completed but to a low quality standard. We therefore con-
struct a ‘quality-adjusted’ completion rate where the proportion completed is multiplied
by a binary quality indicator. Where quality is unsatisfactory, whatever the level of
completion, this variable is set to zero. As described in Section 2.3, the drawback of
using this outcome measure is that information on project quality is only available for
around half the projects for which we have project completion data, originating in 51
civil service organizations. To ease comparison of the samples used, we note that if we
re-estimate our main specification with the project completion rate as the dependent
variable, but for the sample in which quality data is available, the partial correlations of
each CS- measure with project completion rates are not much different to our baseline
specification in Column 4.
Column 5 then shows the relationship between management practices and quality-
adjusted project completion rates. We find the CS- measures to quantitatively impact
quality-adjusted project completion rates in a similar way to project completion rates:
higher levels of CS-autonomy are associated with significantly higher quality projects,
and higher levels of CS-incentive are associated with significantly lower quality projects.
2.4.2 Exploring the Negative Impact of Performance Incentives
Our results confirm that the two dimensions of management practice we focus on: au-
tonomy and performance incentives/monitoring, do indeed correlate to the quantity and
quality of public services delivered, as emphasized by the public administration and
economics literatures respectively. The overall positive correlation of CS-autonomy with
project completion rates provides support to the notion that public agencies ought to
delegate some decision making to bureaucrats, relying on their professionalism and resolve
to deliver public services [Simon 1983]. On average, the evidence is less supportive of
the notion that when bureaucrats have more agency or organizations are more flexibly
structured, then they are more likely to pursue their own, potentially corrupt, objectives
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that diverge from societal interests, resulting in fewer public services being delivered.
The robust negative correlation we document between project completion rates and
management practices related to the provision of incentives and monitoring of bureau-
crats, is far more surprising and counter to a large body of evidence from private sector
settings. As described in the introduction, the evidence on the impacts of performance-
related incentives in public sector settings is mixed (often focusing on the impacts of
specific compensation schemes to frontline workers).15 Ours is among the first evidence
to suggest the possibility that such management practices, broadly defined, have negative
impacts on the vital tier of civil service bureaucrats.
The interpretation of the negative partial correlation is nuanced because we mea-
sure management practices related to the provision of incentives and monitoring: we
do not necessarily measure the use of explicit compensation schemes based on project
completion. As such, the detrimental impacts of such practices for bureaucrats can be
interpreted in at least two ways. First, bureaucrats might operate in a classic multi-
tasking environment, exerting some types of effort that can be labelled as ‘processing’
efforts, that do not lead to project completion rates, and also exerting other more
productive types of effort that raise completion rates. Our management practice measure
might then capture an incentive system that places excessive regulatory burden or ‘red
tape’ on bureaucrats (say through the use of mis-targeted key performance indicators),
that has long been argued to lead bureaucrats to mis-allocate effort towards processing
activities [Kelman 1990]. Alternatively, our management practices related to performance
incentives and monitoring might well pick up subjective performance evaluation (SPE),
rather than explicit incentives based on signals of effort/output. While SPE has the
benefit of being based on a more rounded set of assessments, such subjective assessments
also give rise to other biases and dysfunctional responses, especially the desire of agents to
engage in influencing activities to curry favor with supervisors [Milgrom 1988, Milgrom
and Roberts 1988]. If so, the increased use of such mis-targeted incentives and key
performance indicators can also lead to bureaucrats reallocating effort towards non-
15In health, two recent Cochrane reviews have come to different conclusions on the efficacy of pay
for performance [Flodgren et al. 2011, Scott et al. 2011]. Perry et al. [2009] review 57 studies on
pay for performance in the public sector and conclude ‘pay-for-performance continues to be adopted but
persistently fails to deliver’. Hasnain et al. [2012] review over 60 public sector studies, and find the
vast majority are for tasks where outputs are more easily measurable such as teachers, health workers,
and revenue inspectors. They argue there is simply insufficient evidence of the impact of incentives on
bureaucrats.
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productive tasks, thus reducing project completion rates overall.16
To begin to shed light on these possible interpretations, Column 6 of Table 2.3
interacts the two CS- measures of management practices for autonomy and performance
incentives. We find evidence of an interplay between the two: the negative impacts of
performance related pay on project completion rates are offset when bureaucrats are
provided more autonomy and organizations are more flexible. This might be indicative
of the fact that with such autonomy and flexibility, bureaucrats can, on the margin, more
easily work around any poorly targeted elements of the incentive/monitoring environment
they face that might otherwise lead to dysfunctional responses such as them exerting
processing efforts or engaging in influence activities.17
To probe this further we now investigate how characteristics of projects, organizations
and bureaucrats interplay with management practices. By doing so we aim to shed light
on the extent to which our measured management practices might capture that multi-
tasking concerns are first order for bureaucrats, or that they are subject to SPE and so
might engage in influence activities.
2.4.2.1 Project and Organizational Characteristics
We first establish whether the impact of management practices related to performance
incentives vary with the complexity of projects, assuming that more complex projects
require more varied effort types to be exerted. If so, performance incentives/monitoring
might be especially hard to design for such projects. Column 1 in Table 2.4 takes this
prediction to the data by interacting the CS-incentives measure with the continuous
measure of project complexity. For expositional ease, this interaction term is defined in
terms of its deviation from mean, so the coefficients on CS-autonomy and CS-incentives
are interpreted as the marginal effect of these practices, evaluated at the mean of project
complexity. We see the negative impacts of CS-incentives related practices for bureaucrats
are exacerbated in more complex projects, in line with a multi-tasking interpretation.
16Baker [2002] develops a multi-tasking model to characterize how distortion and risk affect the value
and use of performance measures. The model highlights how in public bureaucracies, that cannot use stock
incentives and have nebulous objective functions, this leads to a fundamental difficulty in defining ‘good’
performance measures. Hence the potential for dysfunctional responses when high powered incentives are
utilized in such settings.
17Hence there are gains to organizations from coupling together good management practices along these
two dimensions. Indeed as discussed in Section 2.3.2, we do observe the two CS- measures in the cross
section of organizations having a correlation coefficient of .24, so better management practices along both
dimensions are weakly bundled together in most cases.
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To probe further the idea that it is difficult to target incentives/monitoring for
bureaucrats towards those efforts that aid project completion, we examine how the
impacts of this management practice vary across projects conducted by the organization.
More precisely, for each organization we define the modal project type assigned to it. We
then create a dummy equal to zero if project i is of this modal type and equal to one
if it corresponds to a more atypical project that the organization is tasked to complete.
Column 2 shows the impact of performance incentives to indeed be even more negative
among non-modal project types (the magnitude of the impact being around 40% of that
on modal project-types). This suggests management practices related to performance
are better tailored to the modal project type each organization is engaged in.
Our third approach to shed light on whether incentives/monitoring for bureaucrats
might be poorly targeted exploits information on the inherent riskiness/ambiguity of
projects as encompassed in their technical specifications. Again we might think of project
types with more inherent design ambiguity to be those for which incentives and moni-
toring are hardest to accurately target. To explore this, we consider projects of different
types j to be of systematically different levels of ambiguity, and then proceed in two
steps. First, we measure this design ambiguity using subcomponents of the complexity
indicator described in Table A2.3. In particular we construct a z-score based on the
design uncertainty, implementation uncertainty, design ambiguity and implementation
ambiguity components of the project complexity metric. We then take the average of
this over all projects of type j, denoting the average ambiguity of projects of type j by
σj .
Second, we estimate a specification analogous to (2.1) for a given project type j,
obviously excluding project fixed effects. In our sample, there are sufficient numbers of
projects implemented by enough organizations to estimate this for five project types:
boreholes, buildings, dams, procurement and training. For each project type j we
then obtain an estimate of the partial correlation between CS-incentives and project
completion rates, γ̂2j , conditional on CS-autonomy. Figure 2.1 then plots the five (γ̂2j , σj)
pairs, as well as a cubic best fit.
The evidence suggests a negative relationship across project types between inherent
design ambiguities, as assessed by engineering best practice, and the marginal impact
of management practices related to incentives and monitoring on project completion
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rates.18 In short, projects with the greatest ambiguities in design and implementation,
might be those for which incentives/monitoring schemes are hardest to design well, and
so illicit the most dysfunctional responses from bureaucrats. The heterogeneous impacts
documented across project types in Figure 2.1 might also shed light on why the existing
literature documents such mixed findings for the impacts of incentive provision in public
sector settings. Our findings highlight such impacts might well vary with the nature of
tasks/projects, such as their complexity and design ambiguity. Finally, we note that the
average ambiguity of project types σj correlates with the proportions of those projects
that have completion rates of zero. This mitigates against the idea that corrupt practices
are entirely the reason behind low project completion rates. Rather, bureaucrats might
simply shy away from implementing the most ambiguously designed projects.
Our fourth approach to understanding whether incentive/monitoring schemes might
be poorly designed in this setting uses the intuition that if the negative impacts of perfor-
mance incentives reflect the inability of organizations to correctly target such incentives to
the relevant types of bureaucrat effort, this problem might be ameliorated in organizations
with better IT facilities, who presumably have better capability to objectively measure
effort types. To explore this we interact our CS-incentives measure with the practices
captured in CS-facilities: as Table A2.2 shows, this relates to the availability of computing
facilities at the organization. In this specification we redefine CS-other to exclude the
CS-facilities component. The result in Column 3 of Table 2.4 indeed shows the impacts
of CS-incentives to be significantly less negative in organizations with better IT facilities.
Moreover, there is no significant levels impact of CS-facilities – the provision/accessibility
of IT facilities for bureaucrats only seem to matter in combination with management
practices related to performance incentives/monitoring.
2.4.2.2 Bureaucrat Characteristics
The remaining specifications consider how the impact of management practices related to
performance incentives vary with three bureaucrat characteristics: their tenure, intrinsic
motivation and perceptions of organizational corruption. To measure civil servant char-
acteristics along each dimension we use the survey we administered to a representative
sample of officials at each organization. We interviewed 4148 civil servants from the 63
18Given the CS-performance and CS-autonomy are positively correlated and have opposite signed
impacts on project completion rates, this negative relationship between risk and incentives would be
attenuated if we do not control for CS-autonomy when estimating γ̂2j [Prendergast 2002].
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federal organizations studied here, corresponding to around 13% of their total workforce.
As described in Section 2.2, Nigerian bureaucrats enjoy long tenure. Tenure can
interplay with the effectiveness of management practices. On the one hand, longer serving
bureaucrats might learn over time how best to respond to incentives by exploiting other
flexibilities. On the other hand, if bureaucrats are subject to SPE they might learn how
best to engage in influence activities. To check for this, Column 4 in Table 2.4 controls for
an interaction between the average tenure of bureaucrats in the organization (in deviation
from mean) with the CS-incentives measure, as well as the direct impact of tenure. We
find the negative impacts of performance-based incentives are even worse in organizations
staffed by more experienced bureaucrats, as might be consistent with bureaucrats learning
to engage in influencing activities. We also note there is no direct levels effect of tenure
on project completion rates, so that it is not the case that bureaucrats naturally reduce
effort over time as they become embedded within long-standing norms of poor standards
in civil service organizations. Rather, there appears to be a specific interplay between
bureaucrat tenure and the use of performance incentives/monitoring for bureaucrats.
A burgeoning literature suggests those attracted to public service might be relatively
more intrinsically motivated than those working in the private sector. Performance
incentives might then be detrimental if they crowd out such intrinsic motivation [Rose-
Ackerman 1986, Perry and Wise 1990, Benabou and Tirole 2006, Francois and Vlas-
sopoulos 2008]. To measure civil servant’s intrinsic motivation, we asked bureaucrats
which factor that had most influenced them to originally enter the civil service from the
following options: ‘I was interested in the type of work’, ‘income prospects’, ‘the prestige
associated with such a job’, ‘the stable career path that a job in the service affords’,
‘the chance to serve Nigeria’, ‘it was the only employment I could get’, ‘educational
opportunities’, ‘other’. We define those that answered, ‘the chance to serve Nigeria’ as
being intrinsically motivated. Roughly a third of officials state that they entered the
civil service to serve Nigeria (with the percentage being slightly higher among less senior
bureaucrats).19 For each organization, we then construct the fraction of intrinsically
19In the public administration literature, public service motivation is usually measured using the scale
developed in Perry [1996], based on statements related to politics, public service and pro-social activities.
This is the approach also followed in Dal Bo et al. [2013]. Alternative approaches employed in the
economics literature include: (i) dictator games to examine how many resources an individual transfers
to a pro-social task [Ashraf et al. 2012]; (ii) charitable contributions [Buurman et al. 2012]. In our civil
servant survey, ‘the chance to serve Nigeria’ was the modal answer given. The other two most frequent
reasons were ‘I was interested in the type of work’ and ‘the stable career path that a job in the service
affords’, that were each given by around 20% of individuals
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motivated bureaucrats.
Column 5 then shows how the impacts of CS-incentives varies by the intrinsic moti-
vation of bureaucrats in the organization. The previously documented negative impact
of providing performance incentives to bureaucrats, is significantly offset when a greater
share of bureaucrats are themselves intrinsically motivated. This suggests that although
on average providing performance incentives to bureaucrats has negative impacts on pub-
lic service delivery, this is less the case when such incentives are provided to intrinsically
motivated bureaucrats. Indeed, our evidence suggests incentives/monitoring crowd-in
the effort of intrinsically motivated bureaucrats. If our CS-incentives measure captures
SPE being in place for bureaucrats, the result highlights that intrinsically motivated
bureaucrats exert more productive efforts in organizations where such SPE are utilized
to a greater extent, rather than engaging in influence activities, say.20
While the recent economics literature has emphasized the importance of the intrinsic
motivation of bureaucrats, a long-standing literature in public administration emphasizes
that civil servants might pursue their own self-interest or be disinclined to exert effort
[Wilson 1989]. This more negative view of bureaucrats spurs our final set of results,
that explore how the impacts of incentives/monitoring are mediated through perceptions
of corruption among civil service organizations. Corruption in public bureaucracies is
a first order issue in Nigeria, and in many countries at similar stages of development
(although the fact that 31% of projects are completed fully also suggests corruption is
not all pervasive).
To elicit information on perceptions of corruption, we began by discussing vignettes
with bureaucrats, then made those scenarios closer to the bureaucrat’s actual situation,
and finally asked individuals about their own observations and experiences of corruption.
We asked on what proportion of recent projects the official had worked on, did they
observe ‘others breaking service rules for their own benefit’. On average, officials stated
that on 38% of projects such observations of corrupt practice had been made, that,
by chance, coincides with the proportion of projects with a zero completion rate. We
aggregate this to the organization level to construct the proportion of projects bureaucrats
report having observed corrupt practices on.21
20Ashraf et al. [2012] present evidence from a field experiment in Zambia for workers hired to engage
in a pro-social task that also documents how performance incentives crowd-in the effort of intrinsically
motivated workers.
21We also asked whether officials had themselves been put under pressure to: (i) change the project
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Column 6 shows how the impacts of our CS-incentives measure varies by perceptions
of corruption among bureaucrats. To begin with we note the robustly negative levels
impacts of our corruption measure on project completion rates. This affirms that our
measure is indeed capturing some element of civil servant behavior that is deleterious for
public service delivery. However, we see that the negative impacts of performance-based
incentives do not vary with perceptions of corruption among bureaucrats. In short, the
evidence suggests that corruption has a direct and quantitatively large negative impact
on project completion rates, but that marginal changes in management practices have
no impact on such behaviors.22
Finally, we note that we have also explored the heterogeneous impacts of management
practices related to autonomy. However, we place less attention on these findings because
economic theory is less developed to guide such an empirical analysis. For completeness
we note the impacts of management practices related to autonomy appear to be generally
more homogeneous than the impacts of incentives/monitoring: they do not significantly
vary with project complexity, non-modal project types, bureaucratic tenure, or the
prevalence of reported corrupt behavior by bureaucrats. This last result again emphasizes
that corrupt practices are unlikely to be affected by marginal changes in management
practice. We do however find that the positive impacts on project completion rates
of practices related to autonomy are significantly stronger when a greater proportion of
bureaucrats report being intrinsically motivated: providing more autonomy and flexibility
to bureaucrats might be especially beneficial when bureaucrats are socially minded. We
leave for future research the exploration of such heterogeneous impacts.
2.5 Econometric Concerns
To view the estimated partial correlations on our CS- measures as being informative of
causal impacts, we need to tackle three econometric challenges broadly related to the
location; (ii) change project specifications; (iii) help select particular contractors/suppliers/consultants;
(iv) divert some of the funds. Aggregating responses into an organizational average, officials stated that
they had experienced such pressures on 19% of projects. We prefer to use the measure related to observed
corrupt practices over this measure because officials are obviously cautious when potentially incriminating
themselves.
22We have explored whether there exists within-sample values of the interacted variables in Table 2.4
at which the marginal impact of CS-performance becomes positive. Generally, this is not the case: even
for the least complex projects or the most IT advanced organizations the marginal impact of management
practices related to incentives/monitoring is negative. The one exception is bureaucratic tenure: in 8%
of organizations average bureaucratic tenure is less than 7 years, and the coefficients from Column 4 then
imply that the total marginal impact of CS-performance on project completion rates is positive.
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following issues: (i) projects being non-randomly assigned to organizations based on
their management practices; (ii) unobserved bureaucrat or organizational characteristics
that are correlated to management practices and also drive project completion rates; (iii)
management practices being endogenously determined by bureaucrat characteristics or
project outcomes.
2.5.1 Project Assignment
The first class of concerns relate to the assignment of projects to organizations on the
basis of management practices in place. For example, if better managed organizations
are more likely to be assigned harder-to-implement projects, this creates a spurious
negative correlation between our CS- measures and project completion rates. This
suggests (γ̂1, γ̂2) are both biased in the same direction, and hence we note that a more
complicated explanation is required to imply that γ̂1 is both upwards biased and γ̂2
is downwards biased. This issue notwithstanding, we address concerns about the non-
random assignment of projects in two ways.
We first use a conditional logit model to estimate the factors determining the as-
signment of project i to organization n, including the management practices in place in
organization n. As described in the Appendix and Table A2.6, we find no robust evidence
of a correlation between the assignment of projects to an organization and any of the
three CS- measures. Our second approach conducts further analysis at the organization
level, estimating the following specification,
wn = θ1CS-autonomyn + θ2CS-incentivesn + θ3CS-othern + piXn + n, (2.2)
where observations are for the 63 organizations listed in Table A2.1, wn are measures
related to the set of projects assigned to organization n by Parliament, the CS- measures
are as previously described, and Xn includes the same organization level controls and
noise controls as previously described. Robust standard errors are reported.
The results are presented in Table A2.7 and show that: (i) θ̂1and θ̂2 are both positive,
so that better managed organizations in dimensions related to autonomy and performance
incentives are assigned more projects, but neither correlation is significantly different from
zero (Columns 1); (ii) the unique number of project types assigned to an organization is
also not significantly related to the management practices in place (Column 2). Taken
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together, the results in Tables A6 and A7 suggest that whatever the bargaining game
between various stakeholders in the lengthy Parliamentary procedure that assigns projects
to civil service organizations, there is not much evidence to suggest it is based on
management practices in those organizations.
2.5.2 Unobservables
The second class of econometric concern is that our measures of management practice
are correlated to unobserved factors captured in ijn in (2.1), and these unobservables
directly determine project completion rates thus biasing our coefficients of interest. To
develop some intuition on the direction of bias, we consider the simplest case where we
only condition on the constant term and the two CS- measures of interest in (2.1). It is
then straightforward to show that the parameters of interest are functions of the variances
of the two management practices, denoted σ2CS-a and σ
2
CS-i, their covariance with each
other (σCS-a,CS−i) and with the outcome (σCS-a,y, σCS-i,y):
γ̂1 =
σCS-a,y.σ
2
CS-i − σCS-i,yσCS-a,CS−i
σ2CS-a.σ
2
CS-i − [σCS-a,CS−i]2
. (2.3)
γ̂2 can be analogously defined. Given both CS- measures are standardized z-scores and
their covariance is .24, the denominator in (2.3) is .9424. Substituting in for y in σCS-a,y
and σCS-i,y in the numerator in (2.3), the bias depends on the following term:
γ̂1 − γ1 = cov(CS-a, )− σCS-a,CS−icov(CS-i, ). (2.4)
To fix ideas we assume the unobserved factor is positively correlated with management
practices. In this case the impact of CS-autonomy management practices on project
completion rates is actually underestimated (so γ̂1 ≤ γ1), and so in truth, even more
positive than our baseline findings suggest, if cov(CS-a,)cov(CS-i,) ≤ σCS-a,CS−i = .2366. Following
a similar logic, the impact of CS-incentives management practices on project completion
rates is actually overestimated (γ̂2 ≥ γ2), and so, in truth, even more negative than our
baseline findings suggest, if cov(CS-i,)cov(CS-a,) ≥ σCS-a,CS−i = .2366. Figure A2.1 shows the
parts of the (cov(CS-i, ), cov(CS-a, )) parameter space where each condition can be
met. This makes precise that if both management practices are approximately equally
positively correlated with the unobserved factor (so cov(CS-a, ) ≈ cov(CS-i, ) > 0),
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γ̂1 > γ1 and we would overestimate the positive impact of CS-autonomy, but it would
still be the case that γ̂2 > γ2 so that, in reality, the impact of CS-incentives is even
more negative than estimated. For the remainder of the discussion, we classify such
unobserved factors as arising from other features of organizations, management practices,
and bureaucrats.
2.5.2.1 Organization Features
We address this concern in Table A2.7 by continuing to probe the data at the organi-
zational level using specification (2.2) to check whether management practices in place
correlate to other organizational outcomes beyond project completion rates. Two natural
checks follow. First, in Column 3 we construct the average complexity of projects assigned
to organization n as our dependent variable, and then regress this against our measures
of management practice and other organizational characteristics. Neither CS- measure is
significantly correlated to the average complexity of projects the organization is tasked
to implement. Hence it is not the case that organizations with better practices related
to autonomy are assigned easier projects, and those with more performance incentives
are assigned harder to implement projects. Second, in Column 4 we use the log of the
organization’s aggregate budget as our dependent variable: again we find no correlation
between the management practices in place and the resources provided to an organization.
Hence it is not the case that organizations that have better practices towards their
bureaucrats also command larger budgets overall, that might otherwise have indicated it
was easier for the organization to complete their assigned projects.
2.5.2.2 Management Practices
Our management survey tool elicited management practices along nine dimensions in each
organization: roles, flexibility, incentives, monitoring, culture, targeting, facilities, skills
and staffing. We have thus far aggregated these into three measures. We now estimate a
specification analogous to (2.1) but where we condition on the nine separate dimensions
of management practice. This disaggregated specification serves two purposes: (i) by
breaking up the CS-other measure into its components, it highlights if there are likely
to be wider aspects related to how organizations are functioning, that the CS-autonomy
and CS-incentives measures might pick up; (ii) it underpins the validity of the three-way
classification of management practices in our baseline specification.
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To begin with in Table A2.8 we focus on estimating the impact of each dimension
separately. The roles and flexibility subcomponents that formed our CS-autonomy mea-
sure are individually positive and significantly different from zero (Columns 1 and 2).
Columns 3 and 4 show that each subcomponent that formed the CS-incentives index is
negatively and significantly related to project completion rates. Columns 5 to 9 then split
the remaining management practices that were previously subsumed within the CS-other
measure. We see that most of these have no significant impact on project completion
rates.
In Column 10 we simultaneously control for all nine CS- components, and find: (i) both
roles and flexibility components remain positive and individually significantly correlated
to project completion rates, with the impact of roles being significantly larger than for
flexibility; (ii) the incentives component is negative but not significantly different from
zero (the point estimate hardly changes from Column 3 but the standard error almost
doubles), while the monitoring component remains negative and significantly correlated
with project completion rates; (iii) the impacts of the other dimensions of management
practice remain rather weak, with four out of five of these measures not being significantly
different from zero.23
The fact that different elements of management practice have positive, zero, or neg-
ative impacts on project completion rates helps allay the concern that the CS- measures
used in our core results simply pick up some unobserved element of management practice.
If organizations that employed the most resourceful and skilled bureaucrats were also
those best able to provide autonomy to their bureaucrats and adapt to new scenarios, then
we would be concerned that the partial correlation between CS-autonomy and project
completion rates was being partly confounded by these other (potentially unobserved)
factors. That other dimensions of management practice related to culture or staffing are
uncorrelated with project completion rates, suggests this is not the case.
In Column 11 we aggregate all nine indices into a single metric for ‘good management’,
as considered by BVR for manufacturing firms. In our setting such aggregation leads
to the wrong conclusions being drawn: we find no significant relationship between the
aggregate CS-management measure and project completion rates. The reason for this is
clear: the underlying components of the aggregate index do not all have the same signed
23Another split of practices we considered was to subdivide the practices in CS-incentives into those that
refer to rewards and punishments separately: we find conditional on CS-autonomy and CS-other measures,
these sub-components both have significantly negative partial correlations with project completion rates.
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impacts on project completion rates. Hence management of bureaucrats does matter, but
different dimensions of management practice have very different impacts on outcomes in
this civil service setting.
2.5.2.3 Bureaucrat Characteristics
If bureaucrats sort into organizations based on management practices in place, then
the impacts of management practices are confounded by any direct relation between
bureaucrat characteristics and project delivery. In Section 2.2 we highlighted there
are frictions in the labor market for bureaucrats that limit the scope for individuals
to freely join or move across organizations, and hence this also limits the ability of
organizations to use management practices to attract certain types of bureaucrat. Such
selection mechanisms have been argued to be important when evaluating the impacts of
compensation schemes in private sector settings.
In Table A2.10 we present additional characteristics of bureaucrats elicited in our
civil servant survey to shed further light on this issue. We aggregate each response to
an organizational average. Column 1 shows the mean and standard deviation of the
bureaucrat characteristic for the average organization. Columns 2 and 3 then show some
of the regression coefficients from a specification analogous to (2.2), so estimated at the
organization level, where the dependent variable is the organizational average for the
reported bureaucrat characteristic, and the reported coefficients are (θ̂1, θ̂2), the implied
effect sizes from the CS-autonomy and CS-incentives management practices, and their
corresponding robust standard errors in parentheses.
The first batch of characteristics probe further the specific social connections bu-
reaucrats might have with senior staff in the organization to which they are appointed:
almost no bureaucrats report knowing their direct boss, or other managers, prior to
their appointment. The lack of variation in this response precludes it being regressed
against the CS- practices. Where there is more variation is in terms of the number of
close colleagues that were known to the individual prior to their assignment: on average,
bureaucrats report knowing 4.40 other colleagues. However, we find this degree of linkage
across bureaucrats, when averaged to the organization level, to be uncorrelated with the
management practices in place related to autonomy and performance incentives, as shown
in Columns 2 and 3.
Our next question uses a more subtle means through which to elicit information
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on personal connections among bureaucrats. We asked individuals whether they were
the first family member to join the civil service: 48% of bureaucrats in the average
organization report being the first in their family to be part of the civil service. We
find no correlation between this measure of bureaucrat networks and the management
practices in place.
2.5.3 Endogenous Management Practices
The final set of concerns we address relate to endogenous management practices. If
for example some organization completes projects because they employ more dedicated
civil servants, they might then endogenously choose to give those bureaucrats more
autonomy, and be less reliant on the use of incentives/monitoring. On the other hand,
in those organizations staffed by less reliable bureaucrats, the organization might choose
to monitor and incentivize them along some margins (even if those turn out to be poorly
targeted), and allocate them less autonomy. This is the econometric concern that most
plausibly generates the pattern of positive and negative partial correlations in our core
results. We use four strategies to make some headway on this issue.
Our first approach is to consider additional bureaucrat characteristics that might
be indicative of the ‘reliability’ of bureaucrats, as shown in the lower half of Table
A2.10. Throughout, we split bureaucrat characteristics into those of senior and low-tier
bureaucrats, as these different tiers might differentially impact the management practices
in place. Two points are of note: (i) there is no significant correlation between manage-
ment practices related to autonomy or performance incentives and the average tenure of
bureaucrats, the proportions of them that report being intrinsically motivated, or that
report observing corrupt practices on projects; (ii) this is the case for characteristics of
senior and lower-tier bureaucrats.24
A second approach to measuring bureaucrat ‘types’ and examining whether the
distribution of types in organizations correlate to the management practices in place,
is based on responses to vignettes on scenarios bureaucrats face in service. For example,
one vignette we use relates to a bureaucrat being faced with the following scenario: an
official in an organization like theirs is told by her manager to take funds from a certified
24These results suggest that it is not the case that organizations limit the provision of performance-
based incentives to attract intrinsically motivated workers [Delfgaauw and Dur 2010], or that the matching
of intrinsically motivated workers to public sector organizations limits the need to use performance-based
incentives [Besley and Ghatak 2005]. Both findings are partly driven by the rigidities in the assignment
of bureaucrats to organizations.
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project and give them to a contractor/supplier for projects that the government has yet to
complete due process on, against public service rules. The contractor then does not do the
work he was paid for. We asked bureaucrats whether they agreed/disagreed with various
statements related to the vignette: whether the bureaucrat acted correctly, whether the
bureaucrat’s manager acted correctly, whether bureaucrats should sometimes go against
rules and so forth. We find little evidence of any significant relationship between the
proportion of bureaucrats that agree with each such statement and the management
practices in place in the organization. If such vignettes are informative of bureaucrat
‘types’, this evidence suggests that typically harder to observe measures of bureaucrat
reliability are not much correlated with management practices in place.25
Our third approach identifies those organizations that have the greatest incentives to
fine tune their management practices to maximize project completion rates. We think of
these organizations as being those in which the completion of projects is relatively more
important in the set of overall activities the organization is tasked with. We measure this
using the share of the organization’s total budget that is assigned to capital expenditures
(such as those on OPEN-style projects). We then estimate a specification analogous
to our baseline model in (2.1) and additionally interact each CS- measure with this
measure of ‘project importance’ (for expositional ease, this interaction term is defined
in terms of its deviation from mean), also conditioning on the organization’s log total
budget. If management practices are endogenously determined, their impacts might
be attenuated for organizations in which it is more important to fine tune practices to
maximize completion rates. The result in Column 1 of Table A2.10 finds no evidence of
such heterogeneous impacts.
Our final approach builds on the results in Figure 2.1 and identifies those organizations
that have the most similar portfolio of projects to implement, as measured by the
projects ambiguity. Such organizations might have the greatest ability to set their
25Enumerators stressed there were no right answers to the vignettes, and the question was not
an exam, but an exercise in obtaining the opinions of bureaucrats. The vignette was phrased
in reference to a bureaucrat in the third person (Ngozi). Officials were asked whether they
agreed or disagreed with the following statements: (i) ‘Ngozi should have refused to divert the
funds and paid the contractors/suppliers/consultant for the certified project’ (76% agreed); (ii) ‘The
contractors/suppliers/consultant should not have accepted the funds given that Due Process had not
been followed’ (68%); (iii) ‘The boss was wrong to direct Ngozi to share the funds of a project with
others’ (81%); (iv) ‘Sometimes it is right to go against strict rules, as Ngozi did, so to make things fairer
or more efficient’ (28%); (v) ‘Bureaucrats should be given more space to interpret what the best action to
take in a given situation is’ (59%). We then check whether there is a significant correlation between the
proportion of bureaucrats that agree with each of the five statements and the two management practices
in place: we find that nine out of ten correlations are not significantly different from zero.
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management practices optimally. For each organization we construct the variance in
project ambiguity over all projects the organization is tasked to implement. We then
estimate whether the impacts of the two CS- measures of interest are attenuated among
those organizations that have the most similar projects in terms of their design and
implementation complexity. The result in Column 2 of Table A2.10 shows there to be no
evidence of such heterogeneous impacts.
2.6 Discussion
We have studied whether management practices for bureaucrats correlate with effective
public service delivery in an important developing country context: Nigeria.26 We
do so by combining novel project level data measuring the completion, quality and
complexity of over 4700 projects implemented by various civil service organizations, with
a management survey in each organization. Our primary contribution is thus to provide
among the first evidence on whether and how the management of bureaucrats matters for
public service delivery. The relevance of such investigations is first order, given the large
number of developing countries engaged in reforming public bureaucracies along the lines
of the ‘good governance’ agenda of the World Bank and United Nations [Goldfinch et al.
2012, Hasnain et al. 2012].
Our results confirm that the two dimensions of management practice we focus on:
autonomy and performance incentives/monitoring, do indeed correlate to the quantity
and quality of public services delivered, as emphasized by the public administration
and economics literatures respectively. Our findings provide support to the notion that
public agencies ought to delegate some decision making to bureaucrats, relying on their
professionalism and resolve to deliver public services [Simon 1983]. The evidence is less
supportive of the notion that when bureaucrats have more agency or organizations are
more flexibly structured, then they are more likely to pursue their own objectives that
diverge from societal interests, resulting in fewer public services being delivered.
The interpretation of the negative correlation of project completion rates with in-
centives/monitoring is more nuanced because we measure management practices related
to the provision of incentives and monitoring: we do not necessarily measure the use
of explicit compensation schemes based on project completion. Our extended results
26We also add to a nascent literature utilizing the BVR approach to measure management practices in
non-profits including hospitals [Bloom et al. 2013] and universities [McCormack et al. 2013].
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provide evidence consistent with two interpretations of why such management practices
have detrimental impacts in this setting: bureaucrats operate in a multi-tasking environ-
ment, and the measured management practices capture an incentive system that places
excessive regulatory burden or ‘red tape’ on bureaucrats (say through the use of mis-
targeted key performance indicators), that has long been argued to lead bureaucrats
to mis-allocate effort towards processing activities [Kelman 1990]. Alternatively, our
management practices related to performance incentives and monitoring pick up elements
of subjective performance evaluation, that lead to other dysfunctional responses among
bureaucrats, especially engagement in influencing activities to curry favor with senior
management.
To the extent that the day-to-day work of bureaucrats in other contexts is also
characterized as multi-tasking environments in which processing and productive efforts
can be exerted, our results will have some external validity to those settings. Moreover,
there will nearly always be scope for the use of SPE in bureaucratic environments in
which it is difficult to measure outputs, or to attribute outputs to the inputs of specific
individuals. As such, our results sound a word of caution to the good governance agenda:
the provision of incentives and monitoring will be effective only if such schemes are well
tailored to the specific bureaucratic context. The simple import of practices from private
sector settings might lead to dysfunctional responses among bureaucrats of the nature
we document. Moreover, the broad design of management practices needs to be jointly
considered with reforms to wider civil service practices along margins that might prevent
such practices being fine tuned to their optimal designs, as discussed below.
Our results point to new directions for theoretical research to better understand
the contracting environment in public bureaucracies, as well as highlighting specific
areas in which better measurement of inputs and outputs can aid our understanding
of public service provision in the developing world.27 In this final Section we discuss
the implications of our findings for understanding optimal management practices in
public bureaucracies, and highlight two important directions for future research: on
the methodology of collecting management practices for bureaucrats, and the interplay
between such practices and other mechanisms to improve public service delivery.
27Dixit [2002] discusses that optimal management practices can differ in public and private sectors
because of the existence of multiple principals, multiple tasks, a lack of competition, and motivated
agents.
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2.6.1 Optimal Management Practices
Our core results suggest there are potentially huge gains to be made from marginal
changes in management practices. This naturally begs the question of why civil service
organizations are not optimizing over management practices to begin with. In our
context, a fundamental source of this inefficiency arises from organizations being tasked
to implement many project types (Table 2.2). As Figure 2.1 highlights, project types have
very different characteristics and so it is unlikely that there exists a unique set of optimal
management practices any organization could have in place. This lack of specialization in
tasks across civil service organizations is an underlying reason why management practices
still matter on the margin.
A second explanation is based on a Weberian view, that organizations might well
be optimizing their management practices according to whatever is their true objective,
and our evidence merely suggests this objective is only weakly aligned with maximizing
project completion rates. To check for this, we have investigated whether the man-
agement practices correlate to the frequency with which bureaucrats report performing
other functions, such as engaging with politicians, or engaging with citizens/civil society
groups, but we find no such correlations. Moreover, we have previously noted that the
type of projects we study constitute almost half the total budgets of these civil service
organizations, so their completion is likely to be weighted to some extent in the objectives
of the organization, but it is by no means their sole objective.28
As discussed by BVR for private sector firms, suboptimal management practices might
also persist in equilibrium despite the resultant loss of efficiency because: (i) the fixed
costs of adopting better practices; (ii) best management practices might be heterogeneous
across organizations. On the first point, to derive an estimate of the required fixed cost of
changing management practices, we note the sum of capital expenditures for all projects
from the 63 organizations studied is $3,694mn. Focusing on the impacts of management
practices on those 38% of projects that never start, assuming a linear relationship between
costs and completion rates, and taking the marginal impacts from Table 2.3 of a one
standard deviation change in each management practice, implies there would need to be
28To further assess the degree of alignment in organization with project completion rates, we regressed
the log of project budgets on each of the 16 subcomponents of the project complexity indicator, as shown
in Table A2.3. The residuals from this regression, that might capture the rents to be gained from the
project if it is completed, are found to be weakly positively correlated with actual project completion
rates, with a correlation of .13.
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fixed cost per organization of around (.38 × .32 × 3, 694)/63 =$7.13mn for such a move
not to occur for this reason alone.29
The second point has been examined when we explored the heterogeneous impacts
of management practices in Section 2.4.2. Those results imply the optimal performance
incentives in place should partly reflect the complexity and ambiguity of projects in
an organization’s portfolio, the use of IT facilities, as well as the tenure and intrinsic
motivation of its bureaucrats. However, in contrast to this evidence, these issues were not
at the fore during the semi-structured interviews we conducted at organizations to better
our understanding of what drives management practices in reality. These all highlighted
how practices evolve slowly over time as a function of ground rules laid out in the Public
Service Rules of the Nigerian civil service, the history of senior management staff in an
organization, and external events such as trade union demands. As further discussed in
BVR, inefficient management practices might also persist for dynamic reasons: learning
and adjustment costs might cause best practice to diffuse over time. This is in line with
the evidence discussed throughout on the frictions in the labor market for bureaucrats
related to the initial assignment and immobility across organizations of bureaucrats.
Finally, a particularly acute concern is that a lack of competitive pressure enables
poorly managed public sector organizations to survive. This might especially be true
in developing country contexts where mechanisms are rarely in place to allow citizens
to choose across alternative public providers of a given good or service. We return to
this issue below when discussing alternative mechanisms through which public service
delivery can be improved.30
2.6.2 Other Mechanisms To Improve Public Sector Delivery
Our analysis fits within a broader literature documenting mechanisms to improve public
service delivery in developing countries. There are at least two additional mechanisms
that can interplay with the management practices for bureaucrats within organizations.
First, there remains much scope to combine and jointly test models of selection into, and
turnover of bureaucrats between, public sector organizations. On selection into the civil
29This is a lower bound estimate because, as discussed in the Appendix, the impacts of management
practice on project completion rates apply not only at the margin of ensuring projects are started, but
have similar impacts at all thresholds of project completion rate.
30In the private sector, Bloom et al. [2012] provide evidence that product market competition drives
innovations towards more better management practices. Bloom et al. [2013] find evidence that hospitals
that face competition for patients from rival hospitals do indeed adopt better management practices.
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service, our findings highlight there can be an interplay between the intrinsic motivation of
bureaucrats and how they respond to management practices. On turnover, bureaucratic
tenure is important both because longer serving bureaucrats shape the management
practices in place, but they might also react differently to any given set of incentives,
as highlighted in Table 2.4. A recent contribution in this direction is Dal Bo et al.
[2013] who present evidence from Mexico, exploiting experimental variation in salaries to
identify their impact on the selection of public sector officials. They find higher wages
attracted more able workers, and that there are no adverse selection impacts in terms
of motivation. This evidence complements our findings on the impact of management
practices once bureaucrats are hired.
Second, the role of grass roots monitoring or accountability of public service providers
is important and likely interplays with management practices in place. Bjorkman and
Svensson [2009] present evidence from a randomised control trial in Uganda on how
community based monitoring of primary health care providers led to large increases in
utilization of services and improved health outcomes: in part these findings are driven by
changes in the behavior of health providers themselves. Reinikka and Svensson [2011] and
Duflo et al. [2012] provide other examples of the gains to public service delivery to be had
from bottom-up monitoring of frontline public sector workers. On the other hand, such
findings are not uniform: Olken [2007] finds more muted impacts of community based
monitoring on reducing corruption in road infrastructure projects in Indonesia. Rather,
top-down audits are effective in reducing corruption on such locally organized public
works projects. Along the same lines of top-down monitoring, Besley and Burgess [2002]
and Ferraz and Finan [2008] have documented the significant role that media scrutiny
can play for public service provision.31
We view there to be a rich future agenda for understanding public service delivery –
in rich and poor countries – that effectively links incentives and practices in civil service
organizations, the selection and retention of bureaucrats, and public monitoring and
accountability of organizations.
31Evidence from our civil servants survey confirms that bureaucrats do regularly engage with community
groups and so such bottom-up approaches might well interplay with management practices in place. For
example, 24% of surveyed bureaucrats reported personally engaging with community/religious groups;
11% reported engaging with members of the National Assembly.
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Appendix
Data Appendix
DA.1 Measuring Project Complexity
Data on the complexity of government projects is not directly part of the OPEN data set.
We thus worked with a pair of Nigerian engineers familiar with the OPEN projects and a
number of international researchers working on technical complexity to define a relevant
set of indicators based on the technical documents for each OPEN project. We followed
the perspectives on complexity suggested by Remington and Pollack [2007], by asking
the engineer-assessors to individually assess projects along the following five topics, each
with their own set of indicators.
Structural complexity stems from the scale of different interconnected tasks and activ-
ities. The indicators associated with this topic capture structural aspects such as project
size and the number of inputs required for production. They also capture issues in raw
material and labour supply, and the ease with which any necessary specialized skills and
equipment can be sourced. Temporally complex projects are those whose production
involves uncertainties. Hence there are indicators for uncertainties in design and imple-
mentation. Technically complex projects are those whose production have ambiguous
risks, namely their uncertainties are not well understood. Hence some indicators capture
ambiguities in design and implementation. Directional complexity refers to the potential
for preferences over the project to diverge. The engineer assessors are thus asked to rate
the managerial complexities of the project. Finally, there is a subjective assessment as to
the overall complexity of the project. This allows any unassessed aspects of complexity
to be measured and provides a coherent picture of project complexity.
Two qualified and independent Nigerian engineers were then contracted to assess each
project in the OPEN data set along these margins. The process of aggregation between
engineers used in this project aimed to build a consensus. The first engineer coded
indicators for the entire data set. The codings of the first engineer were then provided to
the second engineer who then constructed his own codings with reference to the codings
of the first. The aim was to anchor the coding of the second engineer in that of the first
but give him freedom to disagree where he felt the coding was incorrect. Other methods
would have been to have them code independently and average the two data sets or to
have them work together. We decided our approach was a balance between consensus
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and subjectivity.
The two engineers were provided with project details and documents and asked to
code a value for each indicator. The documents only contained information available
before implementation such that there was no bias from the coding being done after the
projects were implemented.
Table A2.3 provides descriptive statistics for all 16 indicators from which the com-
plexity index is constructed, as well as how each is correlated with the other indicators.
Aggregate complexity is a subjective assessment of the overall complexity of the projects
by the two engineers, that includes ‘all factors that might influence the difficulty of
implementing the project, not only those assessed [by the other indicators]’. We asked
the engineers to take the distribution of complexity in the OPEN data set as a whole,
with the least complex project in the data having an aggregate complexity of zero and
the most complex project having an aggregate complexity of 100, and place each project
within this distribution.
We undertook a number of measures to check the complexity of the OPEN indicators
coded by the engineers. First, we inserted 200 randomly chosen repeated projects into
the data set provided to the engineers. Since the project characteristics of the original
and repeat projects are identical, we would expect that the codings of the two sets of
projects would be similar. Reassuringly, we find that in general the original and duplicate
projects are coded in similar ways. We compare the differences between these two sets
by looking at group and paired means, and distributional tests for each variable. The
differences are only statistically significant at conventional levels in a few cases, and the
magnitude of the differences are relatively small. For example, the only variable that
is statistically significantly different below the 10% level in the mean-comparison t-test
relates to raw material storage. Here, despite a standard deviation of 0.2 in the originals,
the difference is 0.07 between the originals and the duplicates.
Second, we looked at the similarity of the codings of the two engineers. We find
that the second engineer’s codings are not dramatically different from the first engineer’s
efforts. Whilst there are a small number of differences, they are relatively small and
rarely significant, indicating that the re-coding left the overall picture relatively stable.
Finally, over a year after he had completed the prompted codings, we asked the second
engineer to re-code a sub-sample of projects from scratch, this time without prompting.
The differences between these independent codings and the consensus data we rely on
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are again relatively minor. It seems that once he had become accustomed to the broad
parameters of the coding framework, the second engineer’s coding was not dissimilar to
the consensus generated by the two engineers working one after the other.
We therefore have evidence of similar projects within the data set being coded in
a similar way, of the two engineers coding in similar ways both when prompted and
unprompted, and when there were deviations, of the deviations not being particularly
quantitatively large. Taken together these checks reassure us that the complexity mea-
sures pick up meaningful variation across projects, rather than merely picking up noise
that should have led to the multiple reports (either across engineers or over time) being
uncorrelated.
Results Appendix
RA.1 Standard Errors
Our baseline specification assumes the disturbance term is clustered by project type-
organization. This might capture best the nature of unobserved factors that relate to
project completion rates, such as the quality of the sub-departments in each organization
that are tasked with the same project types. In Table A2.4 we show the robustness of
our results to alternative assumptions on the error structure. The table is structured
to cover the same specifications as in Columns 1 to 4 of Table 2.3, but where we now
report standard errors based on alternative assumptions: (i) robust standard errors; (ii)
errors clustered by project-type and organization as in Table 2.3; (iii) standard errors
clustered by organization. One concern with such clustered standard errors is that they
may be downwards biased when the number of clusters is small (and in our specification
the number of clusters corresponds to 63) [Cameron et al. 2008]. They propose various
asymptotic refinements using bootstrap techniques, finding the wild cluster bootstrap-t
technique performs particularly well in Monte Carlo simulations. We have implemented
this method on our baseline specifications and show in brackets in Columns 1 to 4 the
resulting p-values. This correction does not alter the significance of any of the coefficients
from our preferred specification with project fixed effects shown in Column 4 of Table
A2.3.
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RA.2 Robustness Checks
We conduct a range of robustness checks on our core result on project completion rates,
shown in Column 4 of Table 2.3. To begin with we note that the results in Table 2.3 used
our continuous measure of project completion rates (from zero to one) as the dependent
variable. However, an alternative approach is to define a threshold of completion that
would deem the project usable. To do so we consider all potential thresholds from 1%
to 100% in increments of 1% and then estimate a specification analogous to (2.1) where
yijn is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the project completion rate is above
the given threshold p%, and zero otherwise. For any given threshold p the coefficients of
interest are denoted γ1p and γ2p. Figure A2.2 then plots each pair of (γ̂1p,γ̂2p) estimates,
for each threshold and their associated 95% confidence interval.
Two points are of note. First, at the extreme left of the figure where we consider a 1%
threshold, we are essentially using a linear probability model to assess the relationship
between management practices in civil service organizations and whether projects are
started in some way. Here we find marginal impacts of each type of management
practice to be qualitatively similar to those documented earlier for the average completion
rate, although the point estimate on CS-autonomy seems to be lower than the baseline
specification.32 Second, we cannot reject the null that the sign and significance of the
coefficients are the same for every threshold of project completion. Taken together, the
results imply that managerial incentives along both margins have similar impacts on the
extensive margin of public service delivery (namely whether projects are started at all)
and the intensive margins of project completion (namely the extent to which projects are
completed).
The checks detailed in Table A2.5 all verify the robustness of our main finding
to alterative samples of organizations and projects: Column 1 excludes those projects
implemented by the largest organization in terms of total expenditures. Column 2
excludes projects implemented by the largest organization in terms of total expenditures.
Columns 3 and 4 remove the 10 smallest organizations by expenditures and number of
projects respectively. Columns 5 and 6 exclude organizations at the top and bottom of
the CS-autonomy and CS-incentives management scales respectively. In each cut of the
32The result needs to be interpreted carefully. There is not continuous mass in project completion rates
over the [0,1] interval: hence we do not expect the marginal impact of the each management practice to
be sensitive to marginal changes in threshold p where there is little mass in project completion rates.
This explains why the marginal impacts shown in Figure A2.2 jump at a small number of points.
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data, the core results remain stable, so that our findings do not appear to be drive by
outlier or specific organizations.
The third series of robustness checks in all probe the core results in alternative
subsamples of data (with the caveat that such splits of the data inevitably lead to less
precise estimates). Columns 7 and 8 in Table A2.5 break down the project types listed
in Table 2.1 into two groups: those related to construction projects (borehole, building,
electrification, dam, road and canal) and those related to non-construction projects. We
find that for construction projects, the results closely replicate the baseline findings.
Indeed, for construction projects as a whole the point estimates on each management
practice index is slightly larger in absolute value than the baseline result in Column 4 of
Table 2.3. For non-construction projects, the results show that CS- autonomy continues
to have a positive and significant impact on project completion rates; CS-incentives has a
negative correlation with project completion rates that is significant at the 10% level. As
suggested by Figure 2.1, this might be because non-construction projects such as training
and procurement, are inherently less ambiguous in design.
The next split considered in Columns 9 and 10 is between centralized and decen-
tralized civil service organizations, where centralized agencies correspond to government
ministries. We see the impacts of CS-autonomy to be similar in both, although the CS-
index only has negative impacts in the centralized agencies. This latter result is worth
exploring in future work.
The next robustness check addresses the concern that different management practices
might be spread across the country in a way that is correlated with characteristics of the
organization’s local geographies. Indeed, it is well understood that the characteristics of
local populations interplay with them being able to solve collective action problems, and
thus are an important driver of public goods provision [Banerjee et al. 2007]. To address
this issue, Column 11 additionally controls for a wide variety of state-level controls for
each project and finds almost no change in the coefficients of interest. In short, local
area characteristics do not seem to be driving our results.33 Columns 12 and 13 split the
sample into projects that are located in the Northern and Southern regions of Nigeria
respectively, that characterizes the first order cultural divide in Nigeria, and provides a
relatively even split in the number of projects. We find the impacts of both management
33The sample drops slightly in this specification because the state in which the project is located (or
should have been located for those projects that are never started) is missing for around 450 projects.
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practices to remain significant in both regions. This suggests that cultural differences
across regions do not much interact with responses to these management practices.
The final two robustness checks relate to methodological issues. First, we consider
alternative constructions of the CS- management practice indices. As described in Section
2.3.3, following BVR, we aggregated responses to individuals questions to construct
our indices of management practices giving equal weight to all questions. A natural
alternative is to cluster the variables into the various management topics described in
Table A2.2 and weight each topic (rather than each variable) equally. We re-construct our
CS-autonomy and CS-incentives measures along these lines and reestimate our preferred
specification (2.1). The result, in Column 14 of Table A2.5 is qualitatively in line with
our baseline results, although the absolute magnitude of each measure of public sector
management is larger : a one standard deviation increase in CS-autonomy corresponds
to a significantly higher project completion rate of 23%, and a one standard deviation
increase in CS-incentives corresponds to a significantly lower project completion rate of
14%.
The analysis has so far estimated (2.1) using OLS. The final robustness check es-
timates this specification using a fractional regression model that accounts for the de-
pendent variable being a continuous variable between zero and one. To do so, we utilize
Papke and Wooldridge’s [1996] fractional logit model in which the conditional expectation
function is modelled as a logistic function that can take all values in the unit interval.
The interpretation of the marginal effects are the same as in the binary logit model and
evaluated at sample averages, the partial effects are approximately comparable to the
coefficients from a linear regression. The result in Column 15 of Table A2.5 shows our
core findings to be robust to this alternative estimation model.
RA.3 The Assignment of Projects to Organizations
A central econometric concern addressed in Section 2.5.1 is that the assignment of projects
to organizations might correlate to the management practices in place. For example,
projects for which there is concerted political pressure to complete might be allocated to
better managed organizations, all else equal. To investigate the issue we use a conditional
logit model to directly estimate the likelihood of project i being assigned to organization
n conditional on the management practices for bureaucrats in place in the organization,
and other project and organizational characteristics exploited in our analysis.
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To do so we first reshape our data as follows: for each project we created a binary
variable with 63 values corresponding to our 63 organizations. The variable, denoted
Din, takes the value one for the organization at which that project is actually assigned,
and zero otherwise. Thus, the data-set is at the project-organization pair level (in),
with a total of 4721 × 63 = 297, 423 project-organization paired observations. To each
observation, we attach the relevant organization-level characteristics used in our analysis
(that were denoted OCn in (2.1)), such as our management indices, capital controls and
organizational averages of bureaucrat characteristics. We then also consider whether
specific project-organization interactions, denoted Zin, correlate with the assignment of
projects to organizations. We estimate a conditional logit specification for Prob(Din = 1),
based on both sets of characteristics;
prob[Din = 1] =
exp(β′OCn + γ′Zin)∑
n exp(β
′OCn + γ′Zin)
(2.5)
Note that in this modelling framework project characteristics play no role as these do
not vary within a given project i over the organizations n it could potentially have been
assigned to.
We run three sets of specifications. The first takes the perspective that each project
could have been assigned to any of our 63 organizations. The second takes the perspective
that projects can only be implemented by organizations of the same sector. Thus, health
projects could only be implemented by health sector organizations for example. When
we impose this restriction on the permissible project-organization pairs, we lose 847
projects as there is only one organization of that sector in our data, and there are
44, 429 potential within sector project-organization pairs. The third specification further
imposes the assumption that projects can only potentially be assigned to organizations
in the same sector that are observed being tasked to implement a project of the same
complexity. This further reduces the sample to 33, 480 feasible project-organization pairs.
In all specifications we cluster standard errors by organization as there are likely to be
unobserved characteristics of organizations that determine project assignments.
Table A2.6 presents the results. Column 1 utilizes the entire set of project-organization
combinations and uses only our management scores in the regression. Unconditional on
other organization characteristics, neither management practice related to autonomy or
performance-based incentives significantly predicts the assignment of projects to organi-
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zations. When we restrict the sample so that each project can only feasibly be assigned
to organizations in the same sector, Column 2 shows the coefficient on CS-autonomy to
become significant at the 10% level, but this result is not robust. In Column 3 where we
restrict the feasible pairs also using information on the complexity of projects, we find
the probability of projects being assigned to organizations do not significantly correlate
with the management practices in place in the organization.
Column 4 extends the specification to include all the organizational controls utilized
in our baseline specification in Table 2.3 (capital, general and noise), as well as the full
set of organizational controls that we use elsewhere in the chapter. The coefficients on
the management practices remain insignificantly different from zero at the usual levels.
Moreover, we find no evidence that any of these other organizational characteristics
predict the assignment of a given project to that particular organization rather than
other organizations it could feasibly have been assigned to.
In Column 5 we additionally control for a series of interactions between project
characteristics (scale, complexity) and organizational characteristics (total staff, total
budget). Some of these project-organization interactions do predict the assignment of
projects. As is intuitive, we find that the interactions between the number of staff at an
organization and the project budget, and the organization’s total budget and the project
complexity, both are positive and significant predictors of project assignment. Over and
above these interactions, we continue to find no impact of management practices on
project assignment even once we allow for specific matched pairs to be assigned in this
way.
Overall, these results suggest our results are not reflecting the non-random selection
of projects to organizations based on their management practices. While there is no
doubt some complex bargaining process between Parliament, civil service organizations
and other stakeholders that determined the assignment of projects to locations and
organizations, on the margin, this assignment is uncorrelated with the management
practices in place in implementing organizations.
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Chapter 3
The Causes and Consequences of
Political Interference in
Bureaucratic Decision Making
3.1 Introduction
How do politicians get bureaucrats to deliver public projects that might win them votes?
This chapter provides some of the first evidence of the informal channels through which
politicians facing high levels of political competition increase the productivity of the
bureaucracy.
Public projects are often left uncompleted or delivered to a poor quality (World
Bank, 2004). Failure to deliver these projects undermines citizen welfare and leads to an
estimated loss of US$150 billion per year in public resources (World Bank, 2007). The
extent of these failures varies within and across countries, driving national and global
inequalities (Banerjee et al., 2007).
Both politicians and bureaucrats are viewed as critically important agents in the
delivery of public projects. Politicians are elected by citizens to decide public policy,
including the delivery of public projects, whereas bureaucrats are employed by the gov-
ernment to implement these policies. When faced by high levels of political competition in
their constituencies, politicians may be incentivized to improve the quality of potentially
vote-winning public projects. Consequently, they may seek to overcome barriers such as
bureaucrats’ inefficiency, inertia, or corruption.
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Existing evidence suggests political competition can improve the delivery of public
projects.1 The outstanding puzzle is how politicians are able to influence the bureaucratic
arm of government, and raise bureaucratic productivity, to satisfy short-term electoral
concerns.2 Typically, politicians do not undertake public projects themselves, but must
delegate these tasks to bureaucrats, whom they then incentivize. Our understanding of
the interactions between politicians and bureaucrats is very limited, both in terms of their
causes and their consequences (Iyer and Mani, 2012). More broadly, there is a limited
empirical literature on bureaucrats, despite their importance as the main producers of
public projects in many countries. To understand the delivery of public projects, it
is important to understand the incentive environments in which bureaucrats operate:
both formal incentives in a bureaucrat’s contract, and informal interactions she has with
powerful actors such as politicians.
This chapter contributes to our understanding of (1) how political competition affects
politicians’ decisions about their interactions with the bureaucracy along two key margins:
which bureaucrats a politician delegates to, and the informal incentives that politicians
provide them; and (2) the consequences of these choices in terms of the delivery of public
projects. The key constraint to empirical progress on these issues has been a lack of
adequate data. We rarely observe whether the bureaucracy delivers what was intended,
in terms of the technical specifications of a project, but rather what they did deliver. This
is a first-order constraint on the empirical study of public sector productivity. A second
binding constraint is that we almost never directly measure the personal interactions of
politicians with bureaucrats, which is the mechanism of informal incentive provision that
I study (Banerjee et al., 2007). I make progress along both margins by collecting detailed
data that address these constraints.
The novel data set that I have assembled follows the delivery of a representative set of
public projects in the Federal Government of Nigeria, from their initiation in Congress,
through the organizations that produce them, to independent evaluations of output. The
1See, for example, Foster and Rosenzweig (2004), Besley et al. (2010) and Ferraz and Finan (2011).
2The focus in this chapter is how politicians influence the bureaucracy within a fixed institutional
environment. In what follows, I fix the policy environment, staff and resource distribution, implying that
politicians lack the power to recruit, dismiss, demote or change the formal wages of appointed bureaucrats,
or modify the legislation governing how their organization functions. These are reasonable assumptions in
the current context. Public sector recruitment is delegated to an independent organization that fiercely
guards its independence. The modification of legislation governing an organization would require the
agreement of a majority of politicians who are likely to have distinct political preferences across the
constituencies served by an organization.
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data contains details of the politicians of Nigeria’s 5th National Assembly, surveys of a
representative sample of bureaucrats at each of the organizations to which politicians
delegate, and evaluations of how effectively each of 3,009 public projects - roughly 7
percent of the government’s budget - were delivered by these organizations. Overall, it
is a detailed profile of the key actors in the delivery of public projects and how they
interact.
To guide the empirical work, I develop a theoretical framework that implies that
delegation and informal incentive provision are simultaneously determined. The basic
intuition is that a higher cost of providing incentives at an organization discourages
politicians from delegating there, and incentives can only be provided to organizations
to which politicians delegate. The model maps into equations for the three variables
of interest: delegation, incentive provision, and the level of delivery of public projects.
Separating the impacts of delegation and incentive provision requires instruments that
independently vary each.
The first instrument drives variation in delegation independently of incentive provi-
sion. It is based on a congressional procedure along the lines of Aghion et al. (2005,
2009, 2010) and Cohen et al. (2011) which varies the extent of delegation power that
a politician has. The procedure allocates power to delegate projects to a subset of
politicians by making them members of congressional standing committees, but excludes
others. My approach indicates that politicians from closely-contested constituencies,
facing high levels of political competition, are 21 percent more likely to delegate to more
autonomous organizations - those at the decentralized tier of government - than politi-
cians in safe seats. When a politician faces little political competition in her constituency,
she centralizes the delivery of public projects to ministries. Thus, this chapter provides
the first microeconometric evidence that the decision as to which bureaucrat should
deliver a public project is a function of political incentives.
To assess the impact of political competition on a politician’s choice of personal
interactions with bureaucrats, I use an instrument correlated with the transaction cost
of undertaking personal interactions with bureaucrats: the distance from the capital city,
where politicians primarily reside, to the organization implementing the project. To
ensure the instrument is not correlated with the capacity of organizations to build basic
public projects, I control for the distance of the organization to the nearest state capital,
where much of Nigeria’s building infrastructure for producing public projects resides.
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This approach indicates that politicians in closely-contested constituencies personally
interact with bureaucrats roughly 13 percent more than politicians in safe seats. I take
this as a proxy for their providing bureaucrats with higher informal incentives.3
Estimation of the full instrumental variables specification evaluates the separate
impacts of delegation and incentive provision on the delivery of public projects. I
find that the key margin driving positive impacts of political competition on public
productivity is delegation: decentralized organizations have project completion rates that
are 40 percentage points higher than those of centralized organizations. Once politicians
delegate to the most effective organizations, their interactions with the bureaucrats there
are of second-order importance at best.
The results highlight the importance of organizational design as a driver of public
sector productivity. They suggest that in Nigeria, politicians delegate to those orga-
nizations they know to be most effective when public good provision has the highest
electoral returns, which requires them to relinquish a degree of formal influence over
project delivery. They then try to regain some of this influence by offering informal
incentives outside of the formal contracting structure of the civil service, but this has
limited effect. Providing politicians with options to delegate to organizations that can
effectively deliver public projects ensures a mechanism by which political competition
translates into bureaucratic output.
These results provide some of the first evidence as to how political competition
impacts on the choices of politicians in their interaction with the bureaucracy. An
emerging literature links political competition to improved government performance. For
example, Ferraz and Finan (2011) find that re-election incentives push Brazilian mayors
to reduce misappropriation of resources in their municipality of 27 percent compared to
mayors without such incentives.4 For a comparable differential in political competition
3Relative to the view that the executive should be independent of the legislature (Weber, 1922), the
magnitudes of political interference reported here are large. My data shows that Nigerian politicians
have a significant impact on the outcomes of 50 percent of public projects. Bureaucrats claim that they
have personal interactions with members of the legislature on 14 percent of the projects they implement,
with the nature of these interactions varying according to the political competition the politicians face.
Comparing my findings with data from the World Bank’s Public Officials Surveys (Manning et al., 2000),
these orders of magnitude appear relatively typical across the developing world.
4Similarly, Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) use panel data on governance in India to show that politicians
facing greater political pressures are more responsive to the needs of their citizens in the provision of public
goods. Besley et al. (2010) show how political competition leads state politicians across the US to adopt
pro-growth policies. Martinez-Bravo et al. (2012) find that democratization in China leads to an increase
in the provision of public goods. Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley (2006) review the literature on
political agency models which highlights the importance of elections as a disciplining device.
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in Nigeria, I find an increase in bureaucratic productivity of 16 percent. However,
the key contribution of this chapter is to provide evidence of the mechanisms through
which political competition impacts on bureaucratic performance. I assess the margins
along which political competition alters the decisions of politicians, in ways that have
subsequent impacts on the productivity of the bureaucracy.
This chapter also provides some of the first micro-level quantitative evidence on the
interaction between politicians and bureaucrats. Iyer and Mani (2012) use administrative
data on the careers of Indian civil servants to show how politicians affect the process of
bureaucratic assignment across public organizations. I document a related margin of
interaction: keeping bureaucrats in the same organizations, politicians delegate project
implementation to different bureaucratic organizations. The World Bank’s Public Offi-
cials Surveys (Manning et al., 2000) provide descriptive evidence that political interac-
tions with bureaucrats are significant across the developing world. I show that political
competition is a key driver of this relationship, and quantify its impacts on government
productivity.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 overviews the relevant aspects of
the Nigerian government that define the environment in which politicians and bureau-
crats interact. Section 3.3 outlines a simple model of moral hazard that guides the
empirical work. Section 3.4 then describes the data used to test the predictions of this
model. Section 3.5 outlines my empirical strategy for each stage of the analysis and
the corresponding results. Section 3.6 provides concluding comments and discussion.
The Appendix presents derivations of the model, further data description and robustness
checks.
3.2 Institutional Background
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with a population of 160 million people,
or 20 percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa. United Nations (2013) predicts
that Nigeria’s population will be larger than that of the United States by 2050. Nigeria
represents a leading setting in which to understand the determinants of public sector
productivity in the developing world.
Nigeria also shares important features of its economy and polity with other developing
countries. Its income per capita is roughly equivalent to that of India, or to that of
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sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (World Bank, 2012). Its government makes up a similar
proportion of economic activity as those of many other developing countries, representing
26 percent of gross domestic product.5 Its political history is marked by colonial origins
preceding a string of military dictatorships, much like other developing nations. Thus,
Nigeria presents a window into the workings of government in the developing world.
The country returned to civilian rule with Presidential elections and a new constitu-
tion in 1999. Its constitution has many similarities to the United States, and its Congress
shares many of the functional components of the United States Congress. Nigeria is
a Federal Republic, with an elected two-chamber National Assembly composed of the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Its three branches are the legislative, executive,
and judiciary, and its three tiers are the federal, state, and local government levels. This
study will focus on the House of Representatives and on public organizations at the
federal government level only.
The House of Representatives is made up of 360 representatives, each with their
own constituency. Each politician can therefore be associated with public projects
implemented in their constituency. Representatives serve four-year terms, and there
are no limits on re-election. I study the representatives of the 5th National Assembly
which was elected in 2003 and lasted until 2007.
3.2.1 Role and composition of standing committees
A core feature of the House of Representatives is the use of standing committees to
consider policies relevant to their sector of expertise (such as water, health, etc.). For each
sector, the relevant standing committee defines the public projects to be implemented in
the coming year and determines which bureaucratic organization should implement each
one. For example, the House Committee on Health will consider all issues relevant to
health in Nigeria, including how many health centers should be built within a fiscal year,
and by whom.
The standing committees play a crucial role in the design of the federal budget. The
projects I study were all established in law by budget appropriation bills passed in 2006
or 2007. The committees are designated to hold hearings with relevant parties, scrutinize
the proposals, and define budgets for each of the organizations I study. Membership
5According to the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database (October 2012),
government expenditures as a percentage of GDP are 21 percent in China, 27 percent in Kenya, 28 percent
in India and 30 percent in South Africa.
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of a standing committee provides a congressperson with significantly greater capacity
to influence the details of that sector’s budget than a non-member.6 While there is
a complex congressional bargaining game that defines the broad features of a sector
budget, committee members have broad powers to determine which projects should be
implemented and by whom, and thus are most able to influence which organization
implements projects in their constituencies. This margin of delegation will be one of the
key outcome variables.7
The delegation powers conferred by membership of House committees is the basis
of one of the instrumental variables used in this chapter. I will compare the delega-
tion decisions of committee members to those of non-members. In doing so, I aim to
compare politicians with greater delegation power to those with less. This allows us to
observe what politicians do with these additional powers. How members of the standing
committees are selected is thus an important element of my identification strategy.
To understand the process in the Nigeria context, I gathered information from the
rules governing the House, from academic and committee secretary assessments of com-
mittee composition, and from newspaper reports. The Standing Orders of the House
of Representatives states that the ‘Committee on Selection’ is the single authority for
the determination of committee composition. The Committee on Selection states that
it weighs up macro-political factors, made up of a need to represent geo-political zones
and parties in proportion with their size in the Congress, and a guiding principle that
members should be allocated to sectors in which they have relevant qualifications or
experience. This implies that politicians who qualified as doctors are placed on the
health committee, educationalists on the education committee, and so on.8 I present
evidence that demonstrates that these rules are being followed in section 3.5.1.9
6The significant power of standing committees has long been recognized for the US Congress. Woodrow
Wilson asserted that committees dominate congressional decision making, stating that ”we are ruled
by a score and a half of ‘little legislatures’” (Wilson, 1887). Richard Fenno, in his magisterial book
on committees in congress, states that committee decisions are usually accepted and ratified by the
other members of the chamber, giving members of a committee significant influence over the sector they
represent (Fenno, 1968). Shepsle and Weingast (1987) and Krehbiel et al. (1987) elaborate theories of
why the congressional committees are so powerful.
7Delegation decisions for projects in a representative’s constituency have limited effect on the projects
in other constituencies, nor impact on the total quantum of resources available to other politicians. There
is little, if any, political discourse around delegation. As such, representatives on a standing committee
should be little constrained in their ability to delegate to their preferred organization.
8As the Speaker of the House has confirmed in the House Hansard, “In the composition of Membership
and Leadership of Committees, special attention will be paid to the skills and relevant experiences of
Members in order to achieve greater efficiency” (House Hansard, 2011).
9More discussion on the process used by the Committee on Selection to select committee members is
provided in the Appendix.
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3.2.2 Delegation to bureaucratic organizations
Members of the standing committees must decide which organizations within the bureau-
cracy to delegate to. Each of the projects funded by the federal budget must be assigned
to an organization of the Executive. The National Assembly itself does not implement
social sector public projects.
To analyze this delegation decision, I split the Executive into two ‘tiers’: centralized
ministries and decentralized agencies.10 This is the major categorical division of public
organizations in Nigeria, and the one most closely aligned to the delegation decision faced
by the politicians I study. A centralized organization is a ministry, the central organizing
authority for a sector. For example, the Ministry of Health is the central organizing
authority for the Health sector. It defines the long-term strategy for the sector and
interacts regularly with the National Assembly, and its Standing Committee on Health,
on the legislative aspects of healthcare in Nigeria. The centralized ministries are the first
point of contact for politicians interested in a sector designated by the Public Service
Rules, the rules that govern the public sector.
A decentralized organization is an agency, which is an independent body, established
by law as a self-accounting entity with a budget line in the federal budget. Agencies
are run by a chief executive with boards of long-term governors chosen by the President.
Bureaucratically, they are more autonomous from the legislature than the centralized
ministries are. Decentralized organizations are also geographically more distant from
Parliament. Centralized organizations are all based in Abuja less than a kilometer from
the politicians. The decentralized agencies are on average hundreds of kilometers from
the capital, making personal interaction with decentralized organizations more costly for
politicians.
For every project I study, politicians have a choice between a centralized ministry
and a decentralized agency. Since the ministries are national in scope, they provide a
centralized option for every project in their sector. There are also decentralized options
for every project, since the decentralized agencies provide a contiguous coverage of Nigeria
within each sector. A comparison of measures of project delivery across centralized and
decentralized organizations implies that decentralized organizations are more productive
10In the broader literature on decentralization, such a split is known as ‘bureaucratic decentralization’
or ‘deconcentration’. This is in contrast to political decentralization where distinct tiers are governed by
distinct politicians.
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than centralized ones. A key contribution of this chapter will be to assess whether this
is causal or a function of politicians sorting projects across tiers.
Whilst each of the projects is implemented by a single organization, projects alike
in terms of type, budget, scale and complexity, are implemented by both centralized
and decentralized organizations. For example, the Federal Ministry of Water Resources
implements projects in districts throughout the areas covered by the (decentralized) River
Basin Development Authorities. In many districts, water projects are implemented by
centralized and decentralized organizations. Similar arguments can be made for other
sectors. Table 3.2 shows that whilst there are differences in the mean levels of budget
and complexity across tiers, there is significant overlap in these characteristics. To ensure
that I am not picking up differences in project characteristics across tiers, I use control
variables that reflect the budget, existing investment, and technical complexity of a
project. There is significant overlap across tiers in the nature of projects implemented:
the range of project complexity is almost identical at the centralized and decentralized
organizations that I study.
3.2.3 Interactions between politicians and bureaucrats
Once a project in a particular politician’s constituency has been delegated to an organiza-
tion, politicians must choose whether to interact with the bureaucrats there and provide
them with informal incentives. The formal incentive structure in the Nigerian Civil
Service are rigidly defined by the Public Service Rules. These rules are for all bureaucrats
working across all political constituencies. Thus, varying the formal contracting structure
for a specific constituency is difficult if not infeasible.
If a politician wants to motivate a bureaucrat on a particular project in her con-
stituency, she would have to provide these incentives informally. This requires personal
interactions between politicians and bureaucrats.11 Politicians can then offer an incentive
contract made up of both elicit transfers and coercion.
11In the qualitative interviews I held in conjunction with the data collection described in this chapter,
bureaucrats stated personal interaction was required for informal contracts to be credible.
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3.3 A Model of Delegation and Informal Incentive Provi-
sion
To understand what determines the choices of politicians across these organizations, I
develop a model of delegation and informal incentive provision. The model serves two
purposes. First, it delivers a series of predictions about the response of politicians to
changes in political competition along the margins of delegation and the provision of
informal incentives. Second, it provides a clear empirical specification that takes into
account the implied simultaneous nature of delegation and informal incentive decisions
by politicians.
3.3.1 Model
The polity consists of a single constituency represented by an incumbent politician A. The
politician faces single-member district electoral competition in an upcoming (stochastic)
election, and she prefers to stay in power than to lose the election.
The politician can increase her chance of being re-elected by providing a public
project to her constituency. The legislature has provided the politician with funds, Q, to
implement a public project in her constituency. She can use Q to make an investment
in the public project, q, or for her own consumption, κ. The greater project output, the
higher will be the politician’s expected probability of winning the election.
The implementation of the project must be delegated to a bureaucrat. The politician
can choose bureaucrat C or D (centralized and decentralized, respectively). To facilitate
the implementation of the project, the chosen bureaucrat can exert costly effort, e. Effort
can take two possible values: e ∈ {0, 1}. Exerting an effort of 0 or 1 implies disutility to
the bureaucrat of ψ (0) = 0 and ψ (1) = ψ respectively.
Implementation of the public project is uncertain, with effort affecting the output
level as follows: if Q is invested in the project, the stochastic output level q˜ can only take
two values,
{
q¯, q
}
with q¯ > q = 0, and the stochastic influence of effort on implementation
is characterized by the probabilities, pr (q˜ = q¯ | e = 0) = pil and pr (q˜ = q¯ | e = 1) = pih,
with pih > pil. If Q− κ is invested in the project, the higher output becomes q¯ − κ.
The politician cannot observe the effort of the bureaucrat, but she can observe the
level of public project output. The politician can offer utility transfers contingent on the
observed output; t¯ if a high output, q¯ (or q¯ − κ), is observed and t if a low output, q, is
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observed. The politician must deliver these transfers through personal interaction with
the bureaucrat. The intensity of politician interaction measures the degree of reward,
t > 0, or punishment, t < 0 (elicit transfers or coercion, respectively). For a politician to
provide bureaucrat k = {C,D} with transfers personally, there may be a transaction cost,
represented by αk. For example, a politician may be required to travel a large distance
to personally provide those incentives. A high α implies a relatively large transaction
cost in the provision of informal incentives.
Political competition determines the extent to which the politician is concerned with
delivering public goods. I address the feature of a politician’s utility being dependent
on her probability of re-election by adding a parameter to her utility, γ ∈ [γ, γ¯], the
range of which strictly contains 1. γ is a reduced form way of representing the positive
relationship between the provision of public projects and the winning of citizen votes.12
It is increasing in political competition as it corresponds to the additional electoral gains
to the incumbent politician from a high-level of public project output.
The residual of the project budget that is not invested in the project is utilized for
personal consumption (corruption) by the politician.13 She must decide how much of the
budget to consume. The utility from consuming project funds is subject to diminishing
marginal returns.
Turning to bureaucrats, I assume that they are risk neutral, and their utility is
separable in the utility from informal transfers from politicians and effort. Their utility
function takes the form,
Uk = t− ψ (e) (3.1)
where k = {C,D}. If the politician prefers to provide no incentives, (3.1) implies that
t¯? = t? = 0. The bureaucrat will then optimally exert no effort.
The timing of the contracting process is described in Figure 3.1. The politician
determines the optimal contracts for both bureaucrats and the level of rents to consume at
each tier and compares the utilities of delegating to each. She then offers the appropriate
contract to the bureaucrat with whom she can realize the highest utility. The bureaucrat
12There is a broad literature that shows a positive link between the provision of public projects and
electoral gains for the incumbent politician. For the US, see Levitt and Snyder (1997) and for Africa see
Weghorst and Lindberg (2013).
13Since there is no incentive to increase transfers to the bureaucrat from their minimum level required
to induce high effort, the politician optimally consumes whatever rents are generated.
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Figure 3.1: Time line for contracting under moral hazard
accepts or rejects the contract, and chooses whether or not to exert effort. The stochastic
output realization occurs, which determines the nature and intensity of interaction of the
politician with the bureaucrat. Finally, the politician faces the election and campaigns
on the basis of the amount of public project provided.
The risk neutral politician gains an expected utility for the case of the bureaucrat
exerting effort (V k1 ≡ V k1 (e = 1)) and not exerting effort (V k0 ≡ V k0 (e = 0)),
V k1 = pi
k
h
(
γ
(
q¯ − κk
)
− αk t¯k
)
−
(
1− pikh
)
αktk +
(
κk
) 1
2
(3.2)
V k0 = pi
k
l γ
(
q¯ − κk
)
+
(
κk
) 1
2
(3.3)
For the case with effort, with probability pikh output is high, yielding γ
(
q¯ − κk) of
benefits from output and αk t¯ of costs. With probability
(
1− pikh
)
output is low, with
associated costs. Both yield κk of rents.
I differentiate between the bureaucrats C and D in two ways, both motivated by
the descriptive statistics presented in section 3.4. The decentralized bureaucrat is more
productive than the centralized bureaucrat, in the sense that piDh > pi
C
h , whilst pi
D
l = pi
C
l .
Second, I assume that the transaction costs for politicians interacting with centralized
bureaucrats are less than for interacting with the decentralized bureaucrats. I set α = 1
for centralized organizations and α > 1 for decentralized organizations. This assumption
stems from the institutional and geographical distance that decentralized organizations
have from the National Assembly.
The politician who wants bureaucrat C or D to exert effort faces the following
maximization problem,
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max
{t¯,t,κ}
pikh
(
γ
(
q¯ − κk
)
− αk t¯k
)
−
(
1− pikh
)
αktk +
(
κk
) 1
2
(3.4)
subject to pikh t¯
k +
(
1− pikh
)
tk − ψ ≥ pikl t¯k +
(
1− pikl
)
tk (3.5)
pikh t¯
k +
(
1− pikh
)
tk − ψ ≥ 0 (3.6)
The constraints reflect incentive and participation constraints respectively. The opti-
mal levels of politician interaction with the bureaucracy are determined by re-organizing
the constraints. They are therefore (all proofs provided in the Appendix),
(
t¯k
)?
=
(
1− pikl
)(
pikh − pikl
)ψ (3.7)
(
tk
)?
= − pi
k
l(
pikh − pikl
)ψ (3.8)
The optimal contract is where the politician rewards the bureaucrat with a positive
transfer if the output is high, and punishes her if the output is low. The politician
will only induce high effort using this incentive scheme when the utility of doing so is
greater than the utility from the bureaucrat exerting no effort. For the centralized and
decentralized organizations respectively, the relevant condition is,
V C1 ≥ V C0 ⇒
(
piCh − piCl
)
γ
(
q¯ − κC) ≥ ψ (3.9)
V D1 ≥ V D0 ⇒
(
piDh − piDl
)
γ
(
q¯ − κD) ≥ αψ (3.10)
The politician prefers to induce a high effort when the multiplier representing the
degree of political competition, γ, is high enough that the marginal benefit of public
project implementation is greater than the marginal cost of incentive provision. Since
the left-hand sides of (3.9) and (3.10) are increasing in γ, a politician is more likely to
personally interact with a bureaucrat as political competition rises. Thus, interaction
is more likely to be characterized by (3.7) and (3.8) (positive in absolute magnitude)
than by the no-inducement equilibrium, t¯? = t? = 0. The model predicts a positive
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relationship between political competition and the absolute levels of incentives.
By substituting the optimal transfers into the maximization problem, and taking first
order conditions with respect to κk, we gain the optimal levels of corruption at tier k,
(
κk
)?
=
(
1
2pikhγ
)2
(3.11)
Since piDh > pi
C
h ,
(
κD
)?
<
(
κC
)?
, and corruption is lower than at the decentralized
tier. It is costlier in terms of foregone output for the politician to steal from the project
implemented at the decentralized tier. Thus, the underlying performance differential
leads to higher corruption at the worse performing tier, amplifying the difference in
outputs.
Having determined the optimal level of incentives and corruption at each tier, I
can turn to the conditions under which the politician delegates to the decentralized
organization over the centralized organization,
V D1 − V C1 ≥ 0⇒
(
piDh − piCh
)
γq¯ − (α− 1)ψ − pi
D
h − piCh
4piDh pi
C
h γ
≥ 0 (3.12)
The differential of the middle expression of (3.12) is positive with respect to γ.
Thus, increasing competition implies an increasingly higher utility from delegation to
the decentralized agent. The model predicts a positive relationship between political
competition and decentralization. This result arises from two sources. First, the reward
to the politician from output, which is higher at the decentralized tier, increases. Second,
the relative attractiveness of corruption falls, reducing the incentive to implement projects
at the centralized tier where corruption is higher.
Equations (3.9), (3.10) and (3.12) together imply that more projects for which the
politician induces high effort from the bureaucrat will be implemented by the decentral-
ized bureaucrat. The model therefore predicts that more projects will be completed by
decentralized bureaucrats than by centralized bureaucrats.14
14One way to interpret differences in pih−pil across tiers (in the sense that pikh−pikl > pik
′
h −pik
′
l ) is that
they can be seen as one bureaucrat having superior information about project delivery than another. In
this case, the model predicts that projects that are characterized by information more easily available to
the decentralized (centralized) bureaucrat are more likely to be delegated to decentralized (centralized)
bureaucrats. Similarly, the set of equations we describe here jointly imply that projects with lower pih,
implying a higher technical complexity, will be more likely to be centralized and to induce a lower level
of interaction. We will test these additional predictions in the set of robustness checks we undertake for
the analysis of delegation and incentive provision.
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3.3.2 From theory to empirics
Equations (3.9), (3.10) and (3.12) describe how politicians determine their choices over
which bureaucrat to delegate to and the extent to which to interact with them to provide
informal incentives. Together, they imply that delegation and incentive provision are
simultaneously determined. Delegation is a function of the cost of incentives, ψ, whilst
incentives are a function of who has been delegated to (the choice between equations 3.9
and 3.10). At the same time, they both enter the production function for public output,
q˜.
This indicates a direct mapping from the theoretical model into a simultaneous
equations regression model in which delegation choices and the level of informal incentives
are simultaneously determined. Conditional on project characteristics (represented in the
model as pi), public output, q˜, delegation, {C,D}, and informal incentives, ψ, make up
a three equation system. The latter two variables are driven by the degree of political
competition, the transaction cost of providing incentives, the cost of incentives, and the
level of corruption (or conversely the productivity of the bureaucrats). These then feed
into the probability of observing a high output.
To test the predictions implied by the model, I require variation that separates
the delegation and informal incentives margins. In other words, I require instruments
that enter into the structural equations of delegation and incentives alone. With these
instruments, I can estimate equations (3.9), (3.10) and (3.12) separately.
3.4 Data
To test the causes and consequences of delegation and incentives, I require proxies for
each of the components of my model from the context under study, the Nigerian public
sector. This requires data from across government. I have assembled a data set that
combines characteristics of politicians with their positions in the National Assembly.
Based on a representative sample of projects from the Federal Government of Nigeria’s
2006 and 2007 budgets, I have details of the projects that these politicians delegate to
organizations, surveys of the organizations that implement these projects, and evaluations
of how effectively they do so. Overall, I have a detailed profile of the delivery of public
projects from initiation to implementation.
I begin by describing the core explanatory variables that relate to politicians, their
90
CHAPTER 3. THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL
INTERFERENCE IN BUREAUCRATIC DECISION MAKING
constituencies, the characteristics of projects that are implemented in those constituen-
cies, and the bureaucratic organizations which implement them. I then describe the
dependent variables in the final sub-section.
3.4.1 Politicians and Political Competition
A politician in this chapter is a Nigerian House of Representatives member. Nigeria’s
5th National Assembly was inaugurated in May 2003, and consisted of 109 senators
and 360 representatives. My focus will be on the House of Representatives because of
the significance of standing committees and public projects in that chamber relative
to the Senate.15 The data used here covers 350 of the 360 constituencies, with 10
pairs of constituencies in this set aggregated to the local government level, leaving 345
constituencies under study.16
For each of the 345 representatives I study, I have assembled biographies that outline
their demographic and political characteristics (such as their party affiliation), their
educational qualifications and work experience, and the results of their election in 2003.17
Tables 1 and A1 in the Appendix provide descriptive statistics for the politicians and their
constituencies. The vast majority of the politicians under study are men, with a mean
age of 48, and 16 years of education (equivalent to a Bachelor’s degree). The average
population of a constituency is 370,000. This population is split, on average, between two
local governments, which is the most basic administrative unit of government in Nigeria.
The local nature of congressional politics implies that local public project provision is
central to the success of a representative’s time in office. National Assembly politicians do
not face term limits, implying they have an ongoing incentive to provide public projects
15Richard Fenno’s famous 1973 study comparing the US Senate and House argued strongly that decision
making inside the Senate is much less of a committee-dominated process than in the House. “In the House,”
Fenno writes, “the individual member’s influence on chamber decisions is exerted, almost wholly, within
and through his committees. Senators operate with no such constraints.” A corollary of this is important
for the current exercise. Fenno continues, “That is, a Senator’s committee membership adds far less to
his total potential for influence inside his chamber than a Representative’s committee membership adds
to his potential for influence in his chamber.”
16I do not have evaluations of project outcomes for 10 constituencies, so I exclude these constituencies in
the analysis. I describe the sampling of projects in the Appendix. The constituencies of 10 representatives
are smaller than a local government area, the smallest administrative unit in my data. I therefore
aggregate constituencies to their local government, leaving 345 federal constituencies to be studied. The
characteristics and winning vote shares of the representatives who share local governments are very similar.
I therefore allocate the constituency to that one of the two representatives who is first on the nominal
roll of the election records. The core results of the chapter are qualitatively unchanged if I include or
exclude the projects located in local governments with multiple representation or use the second of the
two representatives.
17The Appendix details the construction of these biographies.
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to bolster their re-election chances. A quarter of the politicians whom I study are already
serving a second term.
To understand the political dynamics of the constituencies under study, I collected
data from the Independent National Electoral Commission on the returns for each of the
elections in 2003 (when the politicians I study were voted into power). This is data that
was published as the official roll of the national elections.
My main measure of political competition (proxying γ, the weight on the provision
of public projects in the politician’s preferences) is a function of the margin of victory,
defined as the winner’s vote share minus the runner’s up vote share. It represents the
proximity of the runner up to the winner. My measure subtracts the margin of victory in
a constituency from 1 so that it is increasing in competition. Thus, a value of 0.4 implies
that the winner of the constituency election has a vote share 60 percentage points larger
than that of her opponent. Such a measure is used by Besley and Burgess (2002), Lee
(2008), and Da Silveira and De Mello (2011).
The political competition faced by representatives is relatively heterogeneous across
constituencies. While the mean margin of victory is 0.33, there is substantial heterogene-
ity across the country. As Figure 3.2A shows, I observe constituencies subject to the full
distribution of levels of political competition, providing sufficient variation from which
to estimate parameters. This also allows for interpretations of coefficients that describe
competition at very low and very high levels.18
The heterogeneity in competition is not concentrated in one area of Nigeria. As Figure
3.2B indicates, there are large differences in competition between proximate constituen-
cies. The average differential in margin of victory across neighboring constituencies is 20
percentage points. Thus, political incentives vary substantially across constituencies with
similar geographic characteristics. This implies that competition is not pre-determined
by geographic or socio-economic characteristics.
To further characterize a representative’s constituency, I use the largest household sur-
vey ever undertaken in Nigeria, the 2005 Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ).
18The distribution of political competition across constituencies in other countries is similarly diverse.
For the US, the most recent election data is surprisingly similar to that of Nigeria. The average margin
of victory for House elections in 2012 was 0.32, and constituency contests spanned the full distribution
of political competition. For the UK, the margin of victory varies continuously between 0.01 and 0.58,
with a mean of 0.19. There is substantial heterogeneity across neighboring constituencies, as in my data.
Comparing this context to other developing country democracies, India is closer to the UK context, with
the margin of victory spanning 0.01 to 0.61, with a mean of 0.12. Ethiopia, the second largest democracy
in Africa after Nigeria, has an average margin of victory of 0.5 and varies between 0.01 and 0.96. (All
figures are authors calculations based on election statistics from relevant election bodies).
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This was a cluster-randomized household survey run by Nigeria’s National Bureau of
Statistics, representative at the local government level. The CWIQ survey was imple-
mented at the end of 2005, at the same time as politicians were making delegation
decisions in the first round of standing committees, and it therefore provides a baseline
profile of the constituencies that I study. Using this survey, I create constituency-level
averages for indicators of poverty, access to existing public projects and local economic
dynamics. These will be used as controls in the core specifications and are described in
detail in the Appendix.
Table 3.1 describes the constituencies under study in terms of the socio-economic
characteristics for which I control. Nigeria’s citizens are generally poor, with a high
proportion of the population in extreme or relative poverty. The average years of educa-
tion is five years, equivalent to less than primary school completion. Only 48 percent of
Nigerians have potable water, and the average number of hours of electricity available per
day is 4.5. There are plenty of opportunities for public projects to have significant welfare
impacts across the constituencies that I study. These potential impacts support the direct
link between public project provision and the votes that a representative receives.
Table 3.1 also compares the characteristics of politicians and their constituencies at
the top and bottom 10 percent of competitive constituencies as defined by my measure
of political competition. The table implies that the politicians are not particularly
different. However, there are a small number of statistically significant differences to
note. Politicians in the most competitive constituencies have roughly half a year more
education. Similarly, there are no clear patterns of difference between the constituencies
in terms of deprivation, although the most competitive constituencies seem to have a
little less access to water and a slightly longer walk to the nearest primary school. I
control for all of these variables in the main specifications to take account of any impacts
of these differences.
The bottom of Table 3.1 looks at the difference in OPEN funds allocated to the top
and bottom 10 percent of constituencies in terms of political competition. It shows that
in this context, politicians faced by significant competition are not able to realize signifi-
cantly higher levels of public funding for their constituencies. For the full distribution of
constituencies, the correlation between the volume of OPEN funds (number of projects
a constituency receives) and political competition is 0.02 (0.06).19
19One concern in Nigeria is that politicians of the ruling party have very different behaviors to those
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Table 3.1 does imply that political competition is positively associated with the
completion of projects. It shows that projects in the most competitive 10 percent of
constituencies have a significantly higher level of progress than those in the bottom
10 percent. In the full data, a standard deviation increase in political competition is
unconditionally correlated with a six percent increase in the proportion of public projects
delivered. Together, these simple correlations support the approach of this chapter, which
fixes the distribution of resources across constituencies and looks for the mechanisms
through which political competition impacts on bureaucratic output.
From the set of politicians voted into power in 2003, the Committee on Selection
chose members for the standing committees that provided politicians with delegation
power (giving them the powers of politician A in the model). For each of the relevant
committees of the 5th National Assembly, I coded the membership of the committee using
data from Nigerian Congress, a web site that provided details of all the House Committees
set up in 2003. I also gained information on membership for the relevant period from
secretaries of the appropriate committees. The committees I study are agriculture,
appropriation, education, environment, Federal Capital Territory (city building), finance,
health, housing, power, water, women, and youth. I then matched each representative to
the committee membership records, and noted their position as member, chair, or vice-
chair.20 The mean and median number of committees under study that a representative
sits on is one. All representatives in the House are expected to serve on a committee.
We now turn to those projects that the committees made decisions over.
of other parties. Roughly two-thirds of constituencies are governed by a politician of the ruling party. I
investigated the extent to which politicians of the ruling party have very different outcomes to members
of other parties. The correlations imply that they are not able to secure higher funds per constituency
or more projects. Overall, ruling party politicians are not operating in a substantially different context
to other politicians.
20The US literature on standing committees I take as the guide for this study (Aghion et al. (2005,
2009, 2010) and Cohen et al. (2011)) conditions quantitative regression specifications on the ‘grade’ of the
standing committee. Congressional committees are typically seen as having a hierarchy of importance,
and the grade of the committee reflects the standing of the committee within that hierarchy. The rationale
for following this practice is that in politically important committees, the dynamics of delegation may be
distinct from other committees. I follow this practice by including a binary indicator of the grade of the
committee under which the project falls in all specifications. This is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the
committee is perceived to be of high political weight or 0 otherwise. I follow Ojeifo’s (2007) delineation
of grade A (agriculture, water, education, power, housing, environment, Federal Capital Territory) and
grade B (health and women) committees. The core results are all qualitatively the same when I do not
include this variable.
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3.4.2 Public projects
In 2006 and 2007, the 5th National Assembly legislated a Federal Budget of US$12.7
billion and US$15.1 billion respectively, or US$27.8 billion in total over the two years.
The focus in this chapter is social sector capital projects, which account for roughly 35
percent of the total, or 73 percent of capital expenditures.
In both of these years, Nigeria’s Presidency undertook a unique monitoring and
evaluation initiative that tracked the implementation of a representative sample of social
sector projects. The ‘Overview of Public Expenditure in NEEDS’ (OPEN) monitoring
initiative arose out of Nigeria’s receipt of debt relief in 2005. As a result of sweeping
reforms across major organs of government (for an overview see Nkonjo-Iweala and
Osafo-Kwaako, 2007), Nigeria received cancellation of its external debt to the tune of
US$18 billion from the Paris Club. At the federal level, the annual savings from debt
interest were channeled into the social sectors (health, education, water etc.) that are
the focus here. The Presidency viewed this as an opportunity to track the effectiveness of
government expenditures, and so in 2006 and 2007 the Nigerian Government traced, at
a project level, the use and impact of 10 percent of all Federal Government social sector
expenditures.
The OPEN projects were designed to be a representative set of government social
sector expenditures, providing me with data on a representative sub-set of the federal
social sector budget.21 Since I am investigating delegation, I am only interested in those
projects that can be feasibly delegated to either tier of government. In other words, I
studied only those projects that could be implemented by either centralized ministries
or decentralized agencies. I therefore exclude all projects from the full set of OPEN
expenditures that have national or inter-jurisdictonal scope, such that a single decentral-
ized organization does not have the mandate to implement such a project. Examples
of these projects are those that require engagement with international organizations or
that are implemented nationwide. This leaves us with a representative set of social sector
projects that could be delegated to both centralized and decentralized organizations. All
projects therefore have an organization at the centralized and decentralized tier that
could implement them, and that implement comparable projects in terms of budget and
21In the survey of bureaucrats I use in this chapter, I was not able to undertake a survey at the
decentralized organization to which electrification projects can be delegated. I therefore have to exclude
all electrification projects for this analysis. This means that I have a representative set of delegatable
projects for social sector projects that are not electrification infrastructure.
95
CHAPTER 3. THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL
INTERFERENCE IN BUREAUCRATIC DECISION MAKING
technical complexity.
These projects are typically small-scale infrastructure projects (84 percent), with
some procurement and other programmatic projects (16 percent). Descriptive statistics
for the projects across constituencies are provided in the bottom half of Table A3.1. Note
that constituencies typically have multiple projects, of multiple project types, covered
by multiple sectoral committees. The projects are small in terms of budget, with a
mean budget of US$130,000, and complexity, with a mean of 27 percent on the index of
complexity spanning the distribution of projects observed in the wider OPEN data set.
They can be thought of as the ‘nuts and bolts’ of village economies. There is heterogeneity
across project types (boreholes, buildings, dams, procurement, roads, financial projects,
canals, training, advocacy, and research) in terms of the quality of output. I therefore
control for project type fixed effects throughout the analysis.
For each of the projects studied here, I have evaluations of how effectively they were
implemented (proxies of q˜, the level of output in the model). Under the OPEN initiative,
expert teams were sent to visit the selected projects and identify the extent to which they
had been implemented as planned in the Federal Budget, and embodied in each project’s
technical documentation. The Presidency contracted national and regional teams to
undertake the monitoring process outside of the institutions of the civil service. Thus,
the public sector projects were not evaluated by potentially biased civil servants, but
rather by teams of independent engineers and civil society representatives. The engineers
evaluating the projects were not those working on the project sites, and the civil society
groups were recognized third sector organizations.
Evaluations of the OPEN process indicate it successfully achieved its aims (Eboh
2010, Dijkstra et al. 2011). To ensure the accuracy of monitoring reports, the Presidency
put in place a system of checks and balances. First, a centralized team of technocrats
monitored the evaluation teams, providing them with training and opportunities for
standardization of their methods at national conferences. Second, evaluators were asked
to provide material, photographic, or video evidence to support their reports. Third, the
national teams and Presidency performed random checks on evaluated sites, all of which
were consistent with the findings of OPEN monitors.
The reports of OPEN evaluators describe the fate of projects budgeted for execution
in the 2006 and 2007 federal budgets (Federal Government of Nigeria 2008a, 2009a). I
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hand-coded the material from all projects recorded in OPEN initiative reports.22 Taken
together, the coverage of projects in the sample I study traces 7 percent of all Federal
Government social sector expenditures in 2006/7 budget years, corresponding to 3,009
projects from 54 organizations, with an aggregate budget of around US$560 million.23
The OPEN evaluation teams coded: (i) whether the project had started; (ii) its stage
of completion; (iii) the quality of the inputs and work. The main outcome variable is
a continuous measure, from zero to one, of project completion rates: zero refers to the
project never having been started, one corresponds to the project being completed as
specified in the original project description, and intermediate scores reflect part comple-
tion. I have this ‘proportion completed’ variable for all of the 3,009 projects I study, and
that will be my proxy for organizational productivity.
Table A3.1 provides a summary of my proxy of q˜, the proportion completion rate,
across constituencies. Roughly 40 percent of projects are never started, while a third are
completed.24 Conditional on being started, therefore, a project has a 53 percent chance
of being completed.
A politician’s delegation decision may be a function of a project’s characteristics. In
my model, politicians’ decisions were sensitive to pih and pil, the technical uncertainties
of public projects. I therefore hand-coded data on project-level characteristics such as
the budget allocated to the project, whether it was a rehabilitation project, and a brief
summary of its technical specifications from project documentation. I also coded which
of 10 project types the projects fell into, with categories in both construction (water
wells, buildings, and so on) and non-construction fields (procurement, financial projects,
and so on). The project technical specifications were used to form engineer-approved
measures of the technical complexity of each project and informational characteristics,
in the sense of whether centralized or decentralized tiers had an informational advantage
22The OPEN reports comprised of roughly 21,000 evaluation reports, photo and video files, and recipient
testimonies. I personally reviewed each of these documents and entered the appropriate evaluations into
a single database according to a set of specified benchmarks agreed by the OPEN engineers and civil
society teams.
23I consider projects traced under the OPEN initiative that were approved in either the 2006 or 2007
federal budgets. For projects funded in the 2006 (2007) federal budget, monitoring teams visited the
relevant project sites around June 2007 (2008). Therefore, project implementers were given roughly 18
months from the time the project was centrally approved until when it could be used by the community.
All the projects I study had twelve month completion schedules, so that even accounting for any delay in
the disbursement of funds, it is feasible for these projects to be completed by the time of the monitoring
survey.
24It is not possible for me to distinguish between whether projects were not started due to active or
passive waste (Bandiera et al., 2009). Rather, the focus of this chapter is on whether the decisions and
actions of politicians can overcome bureaucratic inefficiency, whatever its nature.
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in project delivery. The Appendix: (i) details the construction of these indices, and
presents descriptive statistics for them; (ii) describes checks I put in place, using multiple
engineers, to establish the validity of these complexity measures.
3.4.3 Bureaucrats
A bureaucrat in this chapter is a civil servant of the Federal Government of Nigeria.
The 3,009 projects I study in this chapter were implemented by one of 54 bureaucratic
organizations. These are split into 7 centralized ministries (represented by bureaucrat
C in the model) and 47 decentralized agencies (represented by bureaucrat D). For
each project I study, the politician always has a choice between a centralized and a
decentralized organization.
For all of these organizations I collected data on their budgets, staffing, and location.
Table 3.2 provides descriptives for the organizations under study. On all the margins
presented, centralized organizations differ from decentralized ones. They are larger in
terms of budget, staffing, and the number of federal constituencies they serve. The
key difference for the current setting is the difference in productivity. The bottom half
of Table 3.2 describes how along multiple margins, centralized organizations seem less
productive than decentralized ones. Whilst I aim to better understand whether this
correlation is an artifact of political sorting across tiers (as modeled above) or a reflection
of underlying productivity differences, it is this that motivates me to set the likelihood
of high output of the effort-exerting decentralized bureaucrats above that of centralized
bureaucrats.
To gain measures of the utility transfer that arises from interactions between politi-
cians and bureaucrats, t in the model, I undertook surveys of a representative sample
of roughly 10 percent of the staff at each of the organizations I study.25 As part of this
survey, I collected some of the first systematic measurements of interactions between
politicians and bureaucrats. Such interactions are typically not observed. My main
measure of politicians’ incentive provision is a question from this survey that proxies
the degree to which a politician was involved in project implementation. Each of the
officers I surveyed was asked the following question, which I use as the core measure of
politician-bureaucrat interactions,“Rate the influence you think [members of the National
25There is an emerging literature in political science on informal politics, such as the research described
in Helmke and Levitsky (2006). This chapter adds to that literature by providing large-scale and detailed
measures of informal political pressures, embedded in a model that relates those measures to output.
98
CHAPTER 3. THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL
INTERFERENCE IN BUREAUCRATIC DECISION MAKING
Assembly] have on the success of a typical project implemented by your organisation”,
where responses were categorical and divided into ‘Most influence’, ‘Significant influence’,
‘Some influence’, ‘Less influence’ and ‘Least influence’. For each bureaucrat, I determine
a binary variable that takes the value 1 if they responded ‘Most influence’ or ‘Significant
influence’, and 0 otherwise.
Table 3.3 describes means and standard deviations for the average answers to this
question. To gain reflections of the intensity of politician interactions, I weight the
averages by the number of projects implemented at an organization. On average, roughly
50 percent of officials state that politicians have significant or most influence over the
projects they implement. There is significant heterogeneity across organizations, with
only 26 percent of officials stating such influence at the least influenced organization and
84 percent stating such influence at the most influenced. As predicted by the model, I find
higher levels of interaction with bureaucrats at the decentralized tier, and the difference
is significant at the 1 percent level.
I present descriptive statistics separately for managers and non-managers. The pat-
tern of interactions across seniority of bureaucrat differs across centralized and decen-
tralized organizations. In centralized organizations, managers state that politicians have
a higher influence on the projects at the organization than non-managers. However, at
decentralized organizations, this pattern is reversed. Non-managers state politicians have
a more significant impact on the success of projects at their organization than managers.
I also asked bureaucrats, “Think about recent projects and/or programs you worked
on for this organisation. How often, if at all, do you personally engage with [member(s) of
the National Assembly] in the work that you do?” [italics in original]. I present descriptive
statistics for the answers to this question in Table 3.3. They imply that members of
the National Assembly personally engage with bureaucrats on the implementation of 14
percent of public projects. I again find significantly higher levels of interaction between
politicians and decentralized bureaucrats. Both of these measures are organizational
averages, which take the approach that projects are impacted on equally by politicians
at an organization.26
26Survey data on politician interaction with bureaucrats around project implementation is rare. The
closest numbers I have for comparison to my research come from the World Bank’s ‘Public Officials’
Surveys’ (Manning et al., 2000). These surveys covered 16 countries, and there is significant heterogeneity
in the average level of bureaucrat’s perception of politicians’ interference. Evidence from Bangladesh
shows that when politicians stop interfering in day-to-day decisions, the perception of corruption in that
organization will fall by 31 percent (Mukherjee et al., 2001). A similar impact of political interference
was found for Bolivia (Manning et al., 2000). In Guyana, 42 percent of officials interviewed stated that
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3.5 Empirics
I begin by examining what determines whether a project is delegated to a decentralized
organization. I then turn to the determinants of politicians’ interactions with bureaucrats.
Finally, I look at the consequences of these decisions on project output.
3.5.1 Causes of delegation
To assess the drivers of political delegation separately from those of incentive provision,
I exploit a congressional procedure that provides exogenous delegation power to a subset
of politicians. Membership of a sectoral standing committee in the Nigerian House of
Representatives provides its members with significantly greater power to delegate projects
in that sector than non-members. For each project, I construct a membership dummy
that takes the value 1 if the project is in a constituency in which the representative is on
the sectoral committee of the same sector as the project.
Using committee membership as a binary indicator of additional delegation power, I
interact this dummy with my measure of political competition to test whether members
are more prone to delegating to decentralized organizations of government when they
face political competition. The levels effect of the membership variable measures the
impact of membership for constituencies with zero political competition. The interaction
measures the impact of membership for higher levels of political competition.
In summary, I use the following specification:
decentralizationicn = γ1membershipic + γ2competitionc + γ3membershipic ∗ competitionc
(3.13)
+ γ4PCij + γ5CCc + λj + icn
where I estimate for the ith project, implemented in constituency c by organization
n.
Decentralizationicn is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the project is
implemented by a decentralized organization and 0 otherwise. Membershipic is a dummy
variable indicating whether the congressperson of the constituency in which the project is
politicians’ interference is frequently or very frequently a “significant problem” (Gokcekus et al., 2001).
Thus, whilst these figures reflect varying contexts and survey questions, they are indicative that the
magnitude of the issues studied here are of widespread significance.
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implemented is a member of the sectoral committee relevant to the project; competitionc
is a continuous measure on the unit interval of one minus the margin of victory in the
constituency; membershipic ∗ competitionc is an interaction between membership and
competition and thus also measured on the unit interval; project controls (PCij) are
the key project characteristics described above; constituency controls (CCij) are the
key congressperson characteristics and socio-economic characteristics of the constituency
described above; and, project type fixed effects (λj) absorb 10 project type level effects.
My strategy relies on the membership variable being uncorrelated with constituency-
level factors that might determine which organization the politician delegates to. Par-
ticularly, it should be uncorrelated with factors that might influence how effectively an
organization is able to implement the project. I therefore investigate how membership of
sectoral committees is determined, to assess the validity of its exogeneity.
Both the politician members of the Committee on Selection and their administrative
secretaries state that selection decisions are based on the geo-political factors and quali-
fications I have described in section 3.2.1.27 To empirically test these claims, I can assess
the factors that determine the sector/s in which a politician has been selected to serve.
Table A3.2 provides motivating evidence that politicians are similar across committees. It
reports regressions of characteristics of politicians and their constituencies, including the
political competition they face, on dummies for each of the sectoral committees we study.
I find no evidence of sorting across committees on politicians’ observed characteristics,
such as the level of political competition they face, sex, age, years of education, or the
extent of poverty in their constituency.
A formal test of which observable characteristics explain selection into committee
membership is reported in Table A3.3. I estimate a seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR) model across indicators of committee membership. For each constituency-level
regression in the SUR system, the dependent variable is a binary variable reflecting
whether a representative is a member of the committee for the named sector. I regress
these indicator variables on the politician and constituency controls described above,
and a series of dummy variables that indicate the politician’s geo-political region. I then
display the coefficients for those variables relevant to all the sectors. Table A3.3 indicates
27For example, the vice chairman of the Committee on Selection states, as reported in This Day
newspaper, “The Selection Committee ... considered cognate experience, areas of specialization and zonal
representation in order to ensure that the chairman and vice chairman of a committee do not come from
the same geopolitical zone.” (This Day, 2007)
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that for all bar one of the committees, there is strong evidence that qualifications play the
major role in determining which politicians are allocated to a particular committee. There
is also little correlation in error structure, implying there is no evidence of underlying
unobservables selecting politicians across sectors. There is evidence that other factors
play a role in the membership of the agriculture committee, and I will check the robustness
of the results for this deviation.
One concern is that constituency characteristics indirectly influence committee mem-
bership by determining the sector of a representative’s qualifications and experience.28
For example, a politician from an arid region of Nigeria may enter into the water sector.
It may then be more challenging to implement water projects in that region, and so the
politician experienced in the water sector delegates to decentralized organizations, who
better understand her constituency’s needs. Table A3.4 investigates the determinants of
a politician’s sector of qualifications and experience by estimating a SUR model of sector
expertise on constituency characteristics. I create dummies for each of the sectors into
which a politician could have specialized. These take the value 1 when the politician has
specialized in that sector, and zero otherwise. I present coefficients on variables relevant
to all sectors, as well as those variables most relevant to each sector from within the
set of controls used in my core specifications. I find that there is almost no evidence
that constituency characteristics determine the sector into which a politician specializes.
Almost none of the coefficients are significant at the usual levels.29
Another quantitative check comes from comparison between the Senate and House.
If constituency-level characteristics determined the sectors into which representatives
28As complementary to the formal tests of this, I note that Nigeria only became a democracy in 1999,
such that almost all of the qualifications on which the Selection Committee made their decisions were
gained well before the standing orders were even conceptualized. When they made their career decisions,
politicians would not have known how the House standing orders would be designed or perhaps whether
Nigeria would have a National Assembly at all.
29Another perspective on this test is that it may be of greater interest to assess the extent to which
past constituency characteristics explain the sector of politician qualifications and experience. They act
as a secondary check on whether constituency characteristics determine the context of implementation
today as well as politician’s career sector, and link the analysis to the context in which politicians made
their career decisions. Table 3.1 states that the mean politician is 48 years of age in 2006, implying that
they made primary career decisions during the late 1970s. In 1980, Nigeria undertook its first systematic
household survey, the National Integrated Survey of Households. I therefore coded state-level averages
from this survey for the variables closest to those in the core analysis. I then associated them with the
corresponding politician in the data set. Where new administrative units have formed, I matched the
politician to the data that most closely corresponded to their constituency. Using this data, I re-estimated
the regressions described here to assess how constituency characteristics in 1980 impacted on the sector
decisions of the politicians I study. They had little explanatory power, mirroring the findings in Table
A3.4. The 1980 variables are, however, strong predictors of contemporary constituency characteristics,
providing a validation of both sets of household data, collected a quarter of a century apart.
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selected, I should find that senators from the same areas have selected into the same
sectors. I find this is rare. Only 13 percent of representatives are on a committee of
the same sector as their senator. For any particular committee, that figure is at most 3
percent.
The totality of the evidence points towards the House Selection Committee deter-
mining committee membership based on factors that are exogenous to constituency-level
characteristics that might have significant impacts on project implementation or the
choice of organisation delivering public projects.30 Thus, as Payne (2001) finds sub-
stantial evidence for arbitrariness in the makeup of US congressional committees, I find a
similar phenomenon in Nigeria with respect to local political conditions. Relative to local
factors that determine project implementation, the granting of committee membership
for a particular sector is an arbitrary allocation of additional power to delegate public
projects within that sector. Having identified a feature of the chain of public project
implementation that is plausibly exogenous, I can observe what committee members do
with the projects under their remit versus projects in the constituencies of non-members.
I can therefore turn to estimating specification (3.13). Table 3.4 presents the baseline
results on how politicians delegate to the two tiers of government under study. The
dependent variable in all specifications is a binary variable reflecting whether a project
is decentralized or not, which takes the value 1 when the project is implemented by a
decentralized organization. Thus, a positive coefficient implies a greater likelihood to
delegate a project to a decentralized organization. The baseline proportion of projects in
the data used here that are decentralized is 0.73. Throughout I will control for project
characteristics, as motivated by the model, and to keep the focus on political incentives.
Column 1 includes the ‘relevant committee’ dummy, project characteristics, and
project type fixed effects only, and none of the other controls. The relevant committee
dummy takes the value 1 when a project from a particular sector is implemented in a
constituency in which the politician is on the relevant sectoral committee. For example,
it would take the value 1 for a health project in the constituency of a member of the
health committee, and 0 for health projects in other constituencies.
30To what extent would unobservable factors not picked up in the tests be able to play a significant
role in the analysis? I can explore the potential for unobservable factors to reduce the estimates in this
section to 0 using the correction for unobserved heterogeneity described by Altonji et al. (2005) and
Oster (2013). Based on an intended R-squared of 0.8, I find that explanatory variation in unobserved
factors would have to be roughly 4 times as large as the observed variation in the controls. Given that we
see almost no evidence of sorting in the observables, this provides additional assurance that membership
is a valid instrument in this setting.
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The coefficient on committee membership is a precisely estimated zero. This implies
that the mean effect of committee membership on delegation is zero. Since I have
motivated my analysis by the differential effects of levels of political competition, this is
not unexpected. Politicians’ electoral concerns imply that politicians facing low and high
levels of competition will make opposing delegation decisions.
I test this idea in column 2 by including a measure of political competition and an
interaction of this measure with the indicator of committee membership. The interaction
variable is centered at zero competition, so the coefficient on committee membership
describes the behavior of committee members faced by zero political competition.
The coefficient on committee membership is significantly negative (γ1 < 0), implying
that when competition is low in a constituency, politicians centralize projects. In contrast,
the coefficient on the interaction term is significantly positive (γ3 > 0), implying that
when a politician faces strong competition in her constituency, she is more prone to
decentralization. The coefficients on committee membership and the interaction with
political competition are both significant at the 1 percent level.
These findings imply that the distribution of projects across government is determined
in part by political factors. The tendency to decentralize in response to pressures of
political competition seems to be of a similar magnitude to the tendency to centralize
when faced with limited political competition. A test of the null that the coefficient
on committee membership, γ1, is of equal and opposite magnitude to the sum of the
coefficients on political competition and on the interaction term, γ2 + γ3, has a p-value
of 0.18. This fits with the finding of a zero coefficient in column 1. Columns 3 and 4
test the robustness of these specifications to controlling for politician and constituency
characteristics.
The analysis in this chapter focuses on the delegation and informal incentive decisions
of politicians, keeping constant the resources available to each constituency. I can test the
validity of this assumption by undertaking a similar analysis as that undertaken in this
section on the volume of resources a representative is able to secure for her constituency.
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 3.4 provide results of constituency-level regressions of total
resources and number of projects similar to the analysis in the baseline specification.
Specifically, I regress the sum of project budgets in a constituency or the number of
projects I observe, on the proportion of projects for which the congressperson is a member
of the relevant committee, political competition, and their interaction, as well as project,
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politician and constituency controls.
I find that in both specifications there is little evidence that a congressperson is
able to secure greater resources for their constituency by being a member of a standing
committee. Neither of the coefficients corresponding to γ1 or γ3 are significant at the
usual levels. In contrast to Aghion et al. (2005, 2009, 2010), I find that members of the
Nigerian House of Representatives have influence over delegation, rather than resource
control, when they are members of a standing committee. These findings support the
approach taken in this chapter.
The implication of the results in Table 3.4 is that if you are a member of a standing
committee and you face zero political competition in your constituency, you are 11
percentage points more likely to centralize a project than a non-member. On the other
hand, if you are a member of a committee and you face significant political competition
in your constituency, you are more likely to decentralize a project. A 1 percentage point
increase in political competition leads to a 0.15 percentage point increase in the proba-
bility of decentralization. Together, these coefficients imply that members in marginal
constituencies will decentralize 21 percent more projects than those in constituencies with
100 percent of the vote. I observe the full distribution of competition levels in my data,
and so this is a valid comparison. For the projects that I study, this implies an average
shift of resources across tiers of government of US$231,000 per constituency.
To assess the robustness of the baseline results in column 4 of Table 3.4, I undertake
a number of checks of the preferred specification in Table A3.6. These are described
in the Appendix. The checks probe the robustness of the results along the following
margins: (i) clustering at the politician level; (ii) including organization-level controls
thought to be of significance to the delegation decision; (iii) including a dummy variable
that absorbs the impact of the committee chair; (iv) excluding projects implemented in
the constituencies of committee chairs; (v) including a dummy variable that absorbs the
impact of two-term politicians; (vii) excluding projects implemented in constituencies
governed by two-term politicians; (viii) excluding projects implemented in constituencies
where a politician does not have relevant qualifications or experience in the agriculture
sector; and, (ix) whether the results fit the information-oriented predictions of the model
of the model of moral hazard presented in section 3.3. The results are robust to each of
these checks.
105
CHAPTER 3. THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL
INTERFERENCE IN BUREAUCRATIC DECISION MAKING
3.5.2 Causes of informal incentive provision
To assess the drivers of informal incentive provision by politicians separately from those
of delegation, I need to observe differences amongst politicians in terms of the costs they
face in interacting with bureaucrats. The distance to the National Assembly in the capital
city of Nigeria, Abuja, to the organization, where bureaucrats can be interacted with, is
a proxy for the costs of interaction. Using distance to organization as a proxy for the cost
of interaction with bureaucrats, I can interact this dummy with my measure of political
competition to test whether members are more prone to interacting with - and providing
informal incentives to - bureaucrats who are further from Abuja when they face political
competition.
The perspective taken here is that politicians face higher transaction costs when
interacting with bureaucrats a greater distance from the capital city. Whilst politicians
spend part of their time in their constituencies, closer to the organizations that may be
far from Abuja, they are based in Abuja. The assumption here is that the monitoring
process requires sufficient personal interaction that their residence in Abuja creates costs
to interacting with organizations a greater distance from the capital.
However, for this variable to be a valid instrument, it should not be correlated with
other factors that determine project implementation or the necessity to provide addi-
tional incentives. I therefore condition this variable on the distance of the implementing
organization to the local state capital. The majority of building capacity (such as markets
specializing in building materials) are based in state capitals distributed across Nigeria.
Therefore, once I control for distance to the nearest state capital, distance from the
organization to the National Assembly is only a measure of the transaction cost to
the politician of providing informal incentives there. To create the relevant variable,
I undertake an unconditional regression at the organization level of distance to Abuja on
distance to the nearest state capital. I then take the residuals of this regression to be
the new variable reflecting distance to Abuja net of the variation explained by distance
to the local state capital. It is a demeaned variable in the spirit of a z-score.
In summary, I use the following specification:
Informal incentivesicn = γ1distancen + γ2competitionc + γ3distancen ∗ competitionc (3.14)
+ γ4PCij + γ5CCc + λj + icn
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where I estimate for the ith project, implemented in constituency c by organization
n.
Informal incentivesicn is a continuous measure of the proportion of officials at an
organization who state that politicians have a significant influence on their implementa-
tion of public projects. Distancen is a continuous variable, centered at zero that signifies
the extent of transaction costs faced by the politician as defined above; competitionc
is a continuous measure on the unit interval of one minus the margin of victory in the
constituency; distancen ∗ competitionc is an interaction between my distance measure
and competition; project controls (PCij) are the key project characteristics described
above; constituency controls (CCij) are the key congressperson characteristics and socio-
economic characteristics of the constituency described above; and, project type fixed
effects (λj) absorb 10 project type level effects.
My strategy relies on the distance to the capital net of distance to the local state
capital being uncorrelated with constituency-level factors that might determine which
organization the politician interacts with. Particularly, it should be uncorrelated with
factors that might influence how effectively an organization is able to implement the
project. I therefore investigate how the distance variable I create varies with constituency
characteristics to assess the validity of its exogeneity.
Abuja was an artificial creation of a Nigerian military dictator who designated it
the capital in 1991. The decision to situate Nigeria in its present day location (the
geographic center of the country) was based precisely on its lack of any significant pre-
existing population or economic institutions. There are therefore no historical institutions
that relate Abuja to the capacity to produce small scale infrastructure projects like those
I study.
Figure 3.3 displays this argument graphically. It is a map of Nigeria’s local govern-
ments, each colored by the extent to which building markets locate there. The deeper
the color, the higher the index. The capital city, Abuja, is highlighted by stripes. As
can be seen, centers of building capacity are located across Nigeria in a way uncorrelated
with their distance to Abuja. Abuja continues to be a political rather than an economic
capital for Nigeria. Whilst building infrastructure has grown up around the capital, the
historical locations for building infrastructure are in the state capitals, which defines my
choice of distance to local state capital as measures of building capacity access for an
organization.
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I can empirically test these claims by creating an index of building capacity across
the country. Using data on Nigeria’s market infrastructure, I aggregate the number of
building markets in each local government (the basic administrative unit in my data) to
create an index of ‘building capacity’. I can regress this variable on distance to Abuja net
of distance to state capital, and as one might expect from a visual inspection of Figure
3.3, it is not significant at the usual levels.
I also generate an aggregate index for each organization from this building capacity
index by averaging the building capacity of all the local governments in which they are
implementing an OPEN project. I then regress this on my distance variable, and again
see that an organization’s distance to Abuja does not predict this index.
The evidence therefore points towards the distance to Abuja net of distance to state
capital being uncorrelated with constituency-level characteristics that might have signifi-
cant impacts on project implementation. Relative to local factors that determine project
implementation, the variation in an organization’s distance to Abuja not explained by the
distance to the local state capital reflects the transaction cost of a politician interacting
with a bureaucrat at that organization.
I can therefore turn to estimating specification (3.13). Table 3.5 estimates specifica-
tions similar to those in Table 3.4, but with the core measure of political influence over
the bureaucracy as the dependent variable and distance as my instrument of interest. The
dependent variable is a continuous proportion varying between 0 and 1 representing the
organization-level average of bureaucrat’s responses to the extent of influence politicians
have over projects in the organization. I am therefore estimating the likelihood of a
project being implemented by an organization with high levels of politician influence.
On average, 54 percent of bureaucrats state that politicians have significant or most
influence on their implementation of projects.
Since a zero value of the competition measure in the interaction corresponds to zero
competition, γ1 estimates the interaction decisions of politicians who face low levels of
competition in their constituency. γ3 estimates the interaction decisions of members who
face high levels of competition in their constituency. These are the core coefficients of
interest for specification (3.13).
Column 1 of Table 3.5 estimates the impact of distance to organization on politician’s
likelihood of interacting with a bureaucrat implementing a project, conditional on project
characteristics and project type fixed effects. I find that organizations far from Abuja
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have higher levels of interaction, summarizing the finding in the model that decentralized
organizations, distant from Abuja, will have generally higher levels of interaction with
politicians, despite the transaction costs they must face.
However, the main interest here is whether interaction varies with the degree of
political competition that a politician faces. In column 2, I introduce the measure
of political competition and an interaction of this measure with an indicator of my
transaction cost variable. The interaction variable is centered at zero competition, so
the coefficient on committee membership describes the behavior of committee members
faced by zero political competition.
The coefficient on the measure of political competition is positive (γ2 > 0), indicating
that at higher levels of political competition, politicians are more likely to engage with
bureaucrats, as the model predicts. Secondly, the coefficient on the interaction term
is positive (γ3 > 0), implying that when a politician faces strong competition in her
constituency, she is more prone to engaging with bureaucrats on projects, even when the
cost to doing so is higher. The coefficient is again significant at the 1 percent level.
I find similar results when controlling for politician characteristics (column 3) and
constituency controls (column 4). All coefficients on the interaction are significant at the
1 percent level. The results in column 5 undertakes a specification with all controls for
the decentralized tier only. Here, at low levels of political competition, transaction costs
do indeed reduce the likelihood of interaction. At high levels of political competition,
political interaction increases.
Together, the results in Table 3.5 indicate that political competition also affects
a politician’s interaction with bureaucrats on public projects. Taking politicians as
motivated by electoral concerns, a natural interpretation of these findings is that in
closely-contested constituencies, politicians are incentivized to personally interact with
bureaucrats to ensure that projects are delivered. Whether this interpretation finds
support in project implementation data will be assessed in the next section.
Before that, I note a similar set of robustness checks on the results on interaction
as those described for delegation. Taking a similar approach to Table A3.6, Table
A3.7 provides specifications that assess potential drivers of the baseline results. These
extended specifications are described in the Appendix. They probe the robustness
of the results along the following margins: (i) clustering at the politician level; (ii)
including organization-level controls that may be important determinants of the cost
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of interaction; (iii) including a dummy variable that absorbs the impact of the committee
chair; (iv) excluding projects implemented in the constituencies of committee chairs;
(v) including a dummy variable that absorbs the impact of two-term politicians; (vi)
excluding projects implemented in constituencies governed by two-term politicians; and,
(vii) excluding projects implemented in constituencies where a politician does not have
relevant qualifications or experience in the agriculture sector; and, (viii) whether the
results fit the information-oriented predictions of the model of moral hazard presented in
section 3.3. The checks are again supportive of the results in Table 3.5.
3.5.3 Consequences of delegation and incentive provision
Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 provide evidence that the distribution of public projects across
tiers of government, and the political pressures faced by bureaucrats implementing them,
is a function of the political competition faced by politicians. I now turn to how
these two margins of politician-bureaucrat interaction impact on the outputs of public
organizations.
The analysis continues to be at the project level, and the dependent variable is now
the proportion of project completion, a continuous variable that takes values between 0
and 1. A project that never started has a completion level of 1, one that was half-way
completed of 0.5, and one that is fully completed of 1.31 This is my proxy of public
output. The mean level of completion in the data is 0.5.
Given the simultaneity between delegation and incentives implied by the model of
section 3.3, we require independent variation in our proxies of these margins to evaluate
their independent effects. The instruments described in sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 provide
such independent variation. To explain the variation in project completion, I therefore
include the decentralization dummy I used to assess delegation, the continuous measure
of political interaction I used in (3.13), my measure of political competition, as well as
the battery of project and constituency controls I describe above. In summary, I use the
following specification:
31The utility of a project at various degrees of completion will vary across project types. To check
the robustness of the following analysis to the stage of project completion, I performed the following
specifications. For all potential thresholds from 1 percent to 100 percent in increments of 1 percent, I
define a dummy variable equal to one if the project completion rate is above the given threshold p percent,
and zero otherwise. I then re-estimate the core instrumental variables regression used in this section for
each of these thresholds. Across the full distribution of project completion rates, I find the results very
similar to the baseline results.
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proportion completedicn = θ1 ̂decentralizationn + θ2 ̂informal incentivesn + θ3competitionc+
(3.15)
+ θ4PCi + θ5CCc + λi + icn
where I again estimate for the ith project, implemented in constituency c by organi-
zation n.
Proportion completedicn is the proportion completed of the public project. ̂Decentralization
is the instrumented projection of a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the project is
implemented by a decentralized organization and 0 otherwise; ̂informal incentives is the
instrumented projection of a continuous measure on the unit interval that signifies the
extent of politician interaction at the organization in which the project is implemented;
competition is a measure of one minus the margin of victory in the constituency; project
controls (PCij) are key project characteristics; constituency controls (CCij) are key
congressperson characteristics and socio-economic characteristics of the constituency;
and, project type fixed effects (λj) absorb project type level effects.
The instrumented projections of decentralization and informal incentives arise from
estimating equations (3.13) and (3.14) with both sets of instruments. The results of these
reduced form equations are provided in column 5 of Table 3.4 and column 6 of Table 3.5
respectively. In both cases, the reduced form equations reflect the qualitative patterns of
the baseline specifications in those tables.
Before I build up to the full estimation of (3.15), I motivate the analysis by look-
ing at the direct impact of the (uninstrumented) proxies for delegation and incentive
provision. Table 3.6 presents OLS estimates of the impact of decentralization and
political interaction with bureaucrats, conditional on the level of political competition.
Column 1 estimates a regression of project completion rates on a decentralization dummy
reflecting the tier of the organization implementing the project. In all specifications I
include project, politician, and constituency controls, and project type fixed effects. The
coefficient on the decentralization dummy, θ1, is positive, implying that decentralization
increases project completion rates. It is large, explaining roughly a quarter of project
completion rates, and significant, at the 1 percent level.
In column 2, I introduce the core measure of politician interaction, the proportion
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of projects at an organization in which bureaucrats state politicians have significant
influence. The coefficient on this variable, θ2, is 0.51, and is significant at the 1 percent
level. Since the mean level of politician influence is roughly 50 percent, this implies the
average impact of politician interaction with bureaucrats implementing a project is an
increase in that project’s completion rate of 25 percentage points, a very similar figure
to the impact of decentralization.
Column 3 then looks at the two variables together. The coefficients on decentralization
and political interaction are still positive, but the coefficient on politician-bureaucrat
interactions has now fallen significantly to 0.17. The coefficients imply that if the OLS
results are correct, the impact of delegation is on average three times more significant
for government productivity than incentive provision. Moreover, one interpretation of
the fall is that politicians are interacting with decentralized organizations when they
want to increase project completion rates, and the variable is simply a noisy proxy for
decentralization.
To investigate this possibility, I require independent variation in both delegation
and incentives. I therefore turn to the instrumental variables results. I estimate the
full instrumental variables specification described by (3.13), (3.14), and (3.15) by two
stage least squares. Column 4 of Table 3.6 presents this specification using my core
proxy for politician interactions with the bureaucracy, the proportion of bureaucrats
at an organization who state politicians have a significant impact on the success of a
typical project at that organization. As a robustness check, I also estimate the full IV
specification using a second proxy for politician interactions, the proportion of projects
on which bureaucrats state they personally engage with politicians at an organization.
This specification is presented in column 5.
I see that the two columns present similar estimates of the separate impacts of
decentralization and the provision of informal incentives. I begin with the coefficient
on decentralization, which in both cases is positive, significant, and large. The coefficient
implies that for a project of a particular type, and of a given budget and complexity, the
impact of being implemented by a decentralized organization rather than a centralized
one is an increase in the completion rate of at least 40 percentage points.
These results provide estimates of the impact of decentralization conditional on po-
litical sorting leading to the non-random distribution of projects across tiers. To assess
the plausibility of the findings, I can compare this figure to the existing literature on
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decentralization. Fisman and Gatti (2002) study decentralization across countries, defin-
ing it as the ratio of local government expenditures over total government expenditures.
They find that a one standard deviation in their measure of decentralization leads to a
30 percent reduction in corruption. Galasso and Ravallion (2005) study a Bangladeshi
transfer program and find that the maximum targeting differential between tiers of
government is 20 percent. Both of these figures are of a similar order of magnitude
as the impacts I find here, despite measuring quite distinct concepts of decentralization
in distinct contexts.
Second, I can look at the impact of the provision of informal incentives by politicians,
using both measures of political interaction. By comparing columns 4 and 5 of Table
3.6, I see that once I take account of the impact of decentralization, the impact of politi-
cian interference falls to basically zero. Once a politician chooses the more productive
decentralized bureaucrat, marginal changes in incentives have limited effects.
Taking broad interpretations of these coefficients, the delegation decision is explaining
the response of bureaucratic productivity to political competition. In terms of magnitude,
I can relate these findings to the literature that motivated this chapter. Ferraz and Finan
(2011) estimate the impact of Brazilian mayors facing election incentives, and show how
such incentives lead to a reduction in the share of resources found to involve corruption of
roughly 27 percent. For a similar differential in political competition in Nigeria, I find an
increase in bureaucratic productivity of 10 percent. In contrast to the existing literature
however, this chapter has documented changes in politicians decisions that explain this
relationship.
The model of section 3.3 also allows us to explain the pattern of bias in the OLS
coefficients: a downwards bias in the decentralization coefficient and an upwards bias in
the coefficient on my proxies for informal incentive provision. The system of equations
requires us to understand the biases within the context of the system as a whole. The
model shows how political competition drives politicians both to delegate public projects
to decentralized organizations and to provide greater informal incentives simultaneously.
The OLS coefficient on incentive provision therefore absorbs some of the impact of
decentralization on project output, and is therefore upwards biased.
At the same time, I do not observe an appropriate counterfactual for projects in
more competitive constituencies implemented at the centralized tier when estimating by
OLS. The separation of the delegation and incentive provision decisions indicates that
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projects in closely-contested constituencies at the centralized tier still induce politicians
to provide some degree of informal incentives. The proper counterfactual within the
estimated system is a project from a close-constituency at the centralized tier without
politicians providing informal incentives. In this case, my model implies, and my results
support, that centralized organizations would deliver even more inferior project outputs
in such constituencies. Based on an incorrect counterfactual, the OLS coefficient on
decentralization is downwards biased.
The interpretation of these results suggested by the model is the following. Politi-
cians are interacting with decentralized organizations most intensively when they are
incentivized by political competition to deliver public projects in their constituency.32
However, since decentralized organizations are more effective than centralized ones, it is
the delegation margin along which political competition is having the most significant
impacts on project completion. Once the politician has delegated to the decentralized
organization, her efforts to provide incentives there are of second-order importance at
best. It is that political competition drives politicians to delegate the implementation of
public projects to more effective organizations of government that is driving improved
completion rates in politically competitive constituencies.
An obvious question implied by this line of reasoning is why politicians continue to
provide incentives when they are ineffective? It is quite plausible that politicians face
the same identification problem as the econometrician. The model of section 3.3 implies
that higher levels of political competition induce politicians to simultaneously delegate to
decentralized organizations and increase their incentive provision there. In equilibrium,
they do not observe the counterfactual of more delegation without an increase in incentive
provision. Unless they can effectively separate the impacts of delegation and incentive
provision, they interpret the impact of their efforts using a form of OLS, along the lines
of column 3 of Table 3.6. They may mistakenly interpret their efforts as having positive
impacts and thus undertake ineffective incentive provision.
To conclude this section, I turn to the question of why it is that decentralized
organizations are more productive than centralized ones. First I look at whether the
32As the results in section 3.5.1 show, politicians are centralizing to centralized organizations when they
face limited political competition. Given the formal influence politicians have over the centralized tier,
centralization may reflect politicians affecting the provision of public projects for personal consumption.
For example, Besley et al. (2004) find that politicians in charge of distributing fiscal transfer programs
and public projects are prone to directing resources towards themselves or their ethnic group. Pande
(2008) provides an overview of the determinants of political corruption in low income countries.
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formal rules governing the two sets of organizations are distinct. A natural counterpart
to the informal interactions politicians engage in with bureaucrats, is the formal rules
bureaucrats work under. In chapter 2, I formulate measures of the management practices
that make up the formal rules of some of the organizations studied here. Extending the
analysis there to the current setting, I do not find significant differences in the indices of
management across tiers of government.
Second, the literature on decentralization has argued that the staff of organizations
across tiers may differ. Using data from the survey of bureaucrats used in this chapter,
I can compare characteristics of officials in both centralized and decentralized organiza-
tions. Again, I find limited differences in basic characteristics. This is supported by my
findings in tables A6 and A7 that my results are robust to a basic set of organization-level
controls.
A classic claim in the decentralization literature is that bureaucrats at decentral-
ized organizations are closer, and therefore more accessible, to citizens. This may en-
able citizens to better hold bureaucrats to account. I find significant support for this
claim amongst the organizations I study. In the survey of bureaucrats I undertook, I
asked officials the nature of interactions they had with citizens on the projects they
implemented. Table A3.8 provides evidence that citizens are in fact more frequently
holding decentralized bureaucrats to account. Whilst both centralized and decentralized
bureaucrats engage with citizens in some way on roughly 40% of projects, the nature
of those interactions differ across tiers. Citizens are 57% more likely to threaten a
decentralized bureaucrat, 49% more likely to report the bureaucrat to her manager, and
almost 90% more likely to report her to an elected official than a centralized bureaucrat.
These differences provide support to the notion that decentralized bureaucrats are more
frequently held to account by citizens. Given that this difference is more significant
than other key margins I have investigated, it may be an important determinant of their
increased productivity.
3.6 Discussion and conclusions
This chapter aims to provide evidence on how politicians get bureaucrats to deliver public
projects that might win them votes. It establishes the extent to which politicians influence
the productivity of the bureaucracy along two specific margins: which bureaucrats they
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delegate the implementation of public projects to, and the incentives they provide those
bureaucrats. Using data from across the Federal Government of Nigeria, I find that
political competition motivates politicians to delegate the implementation of small-scale
public projects to more autonomous, decentralized organizations. A politician in a
closely-contested constituency is 21 percent more likely to delegate to decentralized
organizations than a politician in a completely safe seat. Political competition also
motivates politicians to interact more intensively with the bureaucrats to whom they
have delegated, so to provide them with informal incentives to deliver public projects.
A politician in a closely-contested constituency interacts with organizations 13 percent
more often than a politician in a completely safe seat.
These findings provide some of the first evidence on the causes and consequences
of political interference in the bureaucracy. A growing literature identifies the positive
impacts of political competition on government performance (Foster and Rosenzweig,
2004; Besley et al., 2010; Ferraz and Finan, 2011). However, the mechanisms through
which political competition affects bureaucratic implementation has largely remained
a puzzle. I show that politicians’ delegation decisions are the key margin by which
politicians improve the productivity of the bureaucracy. The 10% increase in bureaucratic
productivity attributable to political competition is primarily due to politicians choosing
more effective bureaucrats. Providing those bureaucrats with additional incentives has
second-order effects at best.
Understanding the determinants of the resource distribution across government, and
the drivers of public project completion, is essential for our ability to improve government
effectiveness. The findings of this chapter suggest that electoral accountability acts as a
powerful mechanism to align politicians’ decisions over public resources with citizen wel-
fare. By tying politicians’ electoral incentives to the effective delivery of public projects,
citizens may influence them to delegate to the most productive public organizations.33
A clear next step on this research agenda is to map out other margins of politicians’
preferences that would lead to decisions that improve the bureaucracy’s productivity.
Are there aspects of politicians’ relationships to their political parties, for example, that
influence their interactions with the bureaucracy?
Assessing politicians’ interactions with bureaucrats allows us to better understand
33For example, Banerjee et al. (2010) assess the provision of newspaper reports on legislator
performance in India. They find that access to such reports increases turnout, reduces cash-based vote
buying, and increases electoral gains for better-performing incumbents.
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the incentives under which bureaucrats work.34 I provide some of the first quantitative
evidence of the scale of political interference in the bureaucracy. The evidence from
Nigeria is that politicians personally engage with bureaucrats on over 10 percent of public
projects. This provides us with novel detail on the informal incentives under which
bureaucrats work. There is substantial scope for more clearly outlining the nature and
intensity of politicians’ interactions with the bureaucracy. Along which margins do these
interactions have significant impacts on government output, or as I find in this chapter,
more limited impacts?
That question can partly be addressed by identifying the features of organizations
within the public sector that manage the relationship between politicians and bureau-
crats. In my data, decentralized organizations are characterized by a higher intensity
of interaction with politicians and a higher level of productivity. My results imply that
building effective bureaucratic organizations within the public sector gives politicians the
opportunity to support public project delivery when they face the appropriate incen-
tives. Political competition in itself may be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for
improved public project delivery. The availability of effective public organizations for
politicians to delegate to is an important determinant of the responsiveness of politicians
to political competition.
When and how political competition improves the way government works has been
at the research frontier for many years. New efforts to collect novel data, like that used
in this chapter, will allow us to answer those questions with increasing clarity and depth.
Given the key role politicians and bureaucrats play in the public service, their interactions
will be central to this analysis.
Appendix
Model Appendix
The full derivation of the model is as follows. The preferences of politician A are:
34Incentives for bureaucrats instituted by politicians can be said to be ‘top-down’ in nature. The
literature on ‘bottom-up’ incentives for bureaucrats could be seen as a natural counterpart, for which
there is a more extensive literature. Examples of this literature are Besley and Burgess (2002) which
documents the benefits of media development on Indian local government performance, Reinikka and
Svensson (2005), which studies a newspaper campaign that empowered Ugandan citizens to monitor local
officials, and Olken (2007), which contrasted the impacts of community and audit monitoring efforts on
the quality of rural road implementation in Indonesia.
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I can use these facts to determine when the politician is incentivized to induce high
effort at the centralized tier,
V C1 ≥ V C0
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(
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And at the decentralized tier,
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Under what conditions in each of the effort settings would the politician delegate
to the decentralized organization over the centralized organization? For the high effort
equilibrium,
V D1 − V C1 ≥ 0
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Substitute in the optimal levels of corruption and simplify,
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Data Appendix
DA.1 Sample of projects
The Overview of Public Expenditure in NEEDS (OPEN) monitoring and evaluation
process forms the basis of the sample of projects selected for this study. The OPEN
evaluation was set up in 2006 and“was adopted as the mechanism to monitor and evaluate
public expenditure” (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2009a). The scheme intended to
monitor the implementation of projects to be funded by debt relief savings and evaluate
their outcomes. The evaluation reports from the first two rounds of this process act as
the basis for the data used in this chapter.
The President created an ‘OPEN office’ with a Presidential mandate to track and
report on the expenditure of the debt relief gains. Rather than set up a parallel orga-
nization to spend debt relief savings, as had been done elsewhere, OPEN was seen as
an opportunity to “find out where the most significant barriers to public expenditure
lay” (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2007a). Thus, it was decided to channel the funds
through standard institutions of government: the ministries, departments, and agencies
of the Federal Government. This enables us to use the OPEN evaluation as a window
into the workings of Nigeria’s government.
As background, it is worth understanding a little about the context in which the
OPEN initiative was started. In 1999, Nigeria transited to a democratic government
under President Olusegun Obasanjo after more than a decade and a half of military
dictatorship. The new administration inherited a huge external debt portfolio.35 Partially
motivated by the promise of debt relief, the newly-elected President began his second term
aiming to strengthen Nigeria’s economic position. A fiscal rule was introduced to de-link
public expenditures from volatility in oil-revenues, state institutions were privatized, and
35Nigeria’s Debt Management Office estimated that the nation owed external creditors US$36billion at
the end of 2004, which was roughly twice the value of annual government expenditures (Debt Management
Office, 2005).
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a number of sectors deregulated to encourage private sector participation. Based on the
thrust of the government’s reform agenda, the Paris Club granted Nigeria debt relief of
about US$18billion in September 2005. This translated to annual debt-service savings of
roughly US$1billion, US$750 million of which would accrue to the Federal Government.
The OPEN evaluation reports evaluate the effectiveness of the federal portion of these
savings.
The President directed that debt relief expenditures go to“core projects and programs
in the social sector” (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2007a). A comparison of the
distribution of funds in the OPEN program with that in the Federal Government budget
as a whole indicates that the sample is representative across sectors. The OPEN office
helped direct funds to a relatively representative sample of the nation’s small-scale
social-sector projects. All were suppose to take roughly 12 months to complete. This
implies they are not representative of the entire budget, which includes much recurrent
expenditure (salaries, materials and supplies, and so on) and the funding of large scale
dams, oil refineries and so on. However, they are representative of social-sector capital
expenditures.
In the survey of bureaucrats I use in this chapter, I was not able to undertake a survey
at the decentralized organization to which electrification projects can be delegated. I
therefore have to exclude all electrification projects for this analysis.
I hand-coded the information from the 21,000 documents and project files that made
up the monitoring and evaluation report of the OPEN initiative for 2006/7. This makes
up the set of representative evaluations of Federal Government public projects on which
I draw.
From this representative set, I defined a dummy variable that indicated whether a
project was inherently national in nature, or could be implemented by organizations at
different tiers of government. The analysis in this chapter focuses on projects that are
delegatable, rather than being specialized so that they could only be implemented at
a single tier of government. The projects excluded are those projects whose scope is
national or multi-jurisdictional (across many states for example).
The guidelines for excluding projects on the basis that they were not able to be
decentralized were the following. A project cannot be decentralized if: (i) it contains
components that require access to international policy inputs; (ii) it contains components
that require engagement with stakeholders at the national or international level; or, (iii)
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the scope of the project crosses multiple jurisdictions beyond the mandate of any single
decentralized organization.
An example of a project that was not delegatable or decentralizable is from the Min-
istry of Women Affairs. It was entered into the budget as ‘Development and production of
2000 copies of a National Gender Policy (NGP) and 2000 copies of its Strategic Implemen-
tation Framework for the sustenance of gender equality perspective in all sectors’. This
project requires international-level technical assistance, inputs from multiple sectors, and
national-level engagement with international donors and Nigerian stakeholders. Thus,
given the constraints on national and international engagements in the Public Service
Rules, it is infeasible that this would be implemented by any organization but the Ministry
of Women Affairs.
On the other hand, a borehole to be provided in Borno state could equally be imple-
mented by the Ministry of Water Resources or the Chad Basin River Basin Development
Authority. Such a project is specific to a single jurisdiction, has technical specifications
that can be handled by either organization, and is permissible for implementation at
either tier of government in the Public Service Rules.
DA.2 Politician characteristics
To effectively characterize the politicians studied in this chapter, I constructed biogra-
phies of each of the 360 representatives in the 5th (2003-7) National Assembly. I under-
took the following process.
I drew the list of winning politicians from the Independent National Electoral Com-
mission’s ‘Compendium of Results of the 2003 General Elections: Vol.1: Presidential
and National Assembly Elections’. Where there were electoral tribunals, I followed the
judicial process for each and noted where there was a change of representative and the
date on which the successful petitioner took up office. I also used National Assembly web
site records to identify any deaths amongst the congresspersons. This defined a complete
set of representatives relevant to the 2006 and 2007 budget processes.
For each politician, I then hand-coded basic demographic information (sex, age and
education) from the National Assembly’s ‘Nigeria Legislature 1861-2011: Compendium
of Members and Officials’. In the very small number of places where age was missing,
I either confirmed this using other sources or replaced their age with the mean of all
representatives and include a dummy indicating that age was missing in all specifications
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that include representative age.
I then built up a profile of the career of each representative and coded their relevant
experience into the sectors of the standing committees in the data. These represent all
the major social sectors. Only substantive experience in a sector over a sustained period
of time was counted as relevant experience. To give a brief overview of how I sorted
candidates into sectors, those with a training in finance or who had been a financial
officer at a large private firm or public organization were coded as having experience in
finance. Doctors or other health professionals such as nurses, pharmacists, or affiliates
of medical institutions were coded as having experience in health. Electrical or other
relevant engineers and those involved in contracting power facilities were coded as having
experience in the power sector. Mechanical engineers or those with experience in river
basins management were coded as having experience in the water sector. Farmers
and those involved in the agro-processing industry were coded as having experience
in the agriculture sector. Women and those who have engaged with gender-focused
organizations were coded as having experience in the women’s sector. Civil engineers or
those with experience in building large-scale urban infrastructure were coded as having
experience relevant to to the Committee on the Federal Capital Territory. Anyone
who had qualifications in environmental management or worked for an organization
with experience implementing environmental projects was coded as having experience
relevant to the environment sector. Architects and those involved in small-scale urban
development projects were coded as having experience in the housing sector.
The information for the biographies came first from the National Assembly web site,
and where relevant from the publication, ‘Nigeria’s 4th Republic Handbook 1999-2003’.
Where these did not yield sufficient detail, a comprehensive search of the AllAfrica archive
of all newspaper articles from major Nigerian newspapers was used to collect biographical
information. Finally, when this was insufficient, simple Google searches yielded biograph-
ical details. In roughly 15 percent of cases this did not yield an appropriate biography
of the individual. In such cases, I took the most conservative approach and coded that
individual as having no relevant experience.
I then used education regulations from Nigeria’s education sector to define years of ed-
ucation variables from the collection of qualifications that each representative had earned.
For the very small number of representatives for which educational qualifications were not
available, I replaced their years of education with the mean of all other representatives
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and include a dummy indicating that years of education is missing in all specifications
that include representative years of education.
DA.3 Process of defining committee membership
The Selection Committee of the House of Representatives selects those politicians they
deem fit to be members of the standing committees. Section XVII of the House Standing
Orders states that, “There shall be a Committee to be known as the Committee on Selec-
tion appointed at the commencement of every Assembly ... The Committee’s jurisdiction
shall cover nominating Members to serve on Standing and Special Committees” amongst
other duties.
The Selection Committee is required to select committee members such that each
committee is representative of Nigeria in terms of its six geo-political regions (North
Central, North East, North West, South East, South South, South Central) and the
strength of the parties in the House. For example, Order XIV of the House Standing
Orders states,“Members of Committees shall be nominated by the various political parties
and appointed by the Committee on Selection in accordance with their strength in the
House.”
The Selection Committee has a guiding principle to match representative’s qualifi-
cations with the committees on which they sit. For example, the vice chairman of the
Committee on Selection states, as reported in This Day newspaper, “The Selection Com-
mittee ... considered cognate experience, areas of specialization and zonal representation
in order to ensure that the chairman and vice chairman of a committee do not come from
the same geopolitical zone.” (This Day, 2007).
For each committee, the House Standing Orders outline the list of topics to which
the House delegates oversight responsibility. For example, the Health Committee’s juris-
diction covers specialist hospitals, teaching hospitals, medical research, federal medical
centers, and a host of other topics including ‘health matters generally’. The Selection
Committee therefore determine, for each committee, those members who have relevant
qualifications to provide appropriate oversight of the sector. They then choose individuals
from this set within each geo-political zone, and within the appropriate proportions of
the relative weights of the parties in the House.
Since I have only coded the committees relevant to the social sectors, I observe some
politicians sitting on no committees. They are likely to sit on a committee outside of
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the social sectors. Some representatives serve on multiple committees, and the maximum
number of committees a representative sits on is 4. To understand how this reconciles
with the need for sectoral knowledge, some politicians have qualifications/experience in
multiple sectors. For example, they may be a qualified doctor who is a professor of
medicine at a university. This individual would likely serve on both the health and
education committees. Where there are small changes to the committees over time, I use
the membership relevant to the 2006 and 2007 budgets.
As was seen in section 3.5.1 of the main text, there is strong evidence that the Selection
Committee does this based on the three factors of geo-political and party representation
and relevant qualifications and experience. In a number of fora, members of the Selection
Committee have stated that once they must find a doctor within the North-East zone
from the ruling party, there is typically very little room for other factors to play a role.
This was confirmed by interviews with the secretaries of the standing committees and
with external academics.
DA.4 Project controls
To control for a range of constituency-level characteristics, I use data from the largest
household survey ever undertaken in Nigeria, the 2005 Core Welfare Indicators Ques-
tionnaire (CWIQ). The CWIQ survey targeted 77,400 households, 100 in each local
government area. I define a battery of controls from the CWIQ survey along the following
lines. One might expect politicians to delegate to areas of need, where deprivation
is highest or where there are significant degrees of inequality. I therefore construct
constituency-level means and standard deviations of the following indices: the proportion
of poor in the constituency, measured by a national poverty index, the average years of
education of the household head, the proportion of constituents with access to potable
water, the average time in minutes to the nearest primary school, and the average journey
time in minutes to the nearest secondary school. These indices reflect the sectors under
which the majority of the projects in my data fall.
One may also expect politicians to respond to recent investments in their constituency.
For example, a politician may feel less inclined to invest in an area that has recently
received substantial public projects investments. To reflect the frequency with which
constituents have benefited from a public project of the named type in the five years
preceding the survey, I also construct indices of whether constituents have received:
125
CHAPTER 3. THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL
INTERFERENCE IN BUREAUCRATIC DECISION MAKING
construction of electrification infrastructure, rehabilitation of electrification infrastruc-
ture, a well/borehole, construction of piped water infrastructure, rehabilitation of piped
water infrastructure, sanitation, school construction project, school rehabilitation, health
facility construction, health facility rehabilitation, road construction, tarring/grading of
roads, transportation services, and agricultural-inputs schemes. Again, these indices
correspond to the sectors of the projects I study.
Finally, there may be complementarities between the economic environment and
public investments. For example, greater access to credit may lead citizens to demand
public projects that will facilitate their use of that credit. Politicians may therefore
respond to the economic dynamics of a constituency in their delegation decisions, and
so I create indicators of changes in opportunities for employment, the availability of
agricultural inputs, number of buyers of agriculture produce, the availability of extension
services, the availability of credit facilities, and the availability of consumer goods.
DA.5 Defining complexity indicators
Data on the complexity of government projects is not collected by the Nigerian Govern-
ment, nor is it a part of the OPEN data set. To create this data, I worked with a pair
of Nigerian engineers familiar with the OPEN projects and a number of international
researchers working on project technical complexity to define a relevant set of indicators.
I followed the perspectives on complexity suggested by Remington and Pollack (2007),
by asking the engineer-assessors to individually assess projects along the following five
topics, each with its own set of indicators.
Structural complexity stems from the scale of different interconnected tasks and activ-
ities. The indicators associated with this topic capture structural aspects such as project
size and the number of inputs required for production. They also capture issues in raw
material and labor supply, and the ease with which any necessary specialized skills and
equipment can be sourced. Temporally complex projects are those in which production
involves uncertainties. Hence there are indicators for uncertainties in design and imple-
mentation. Technically complex projects are those in which production have ambiguous
risks, namely their uncertainties are not well understood. Hence some indicators capture
ambiguities in design and implementation. Directional complexity refers to the potential
for preferences over the project to diverge. The engineer assessors were thus asked to rate
the managerial complexities of the project. Finally, there is a subjective assessment as to
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the overall complexity of the project. This allows any unassessed aspects of complexity
to be measured and provides a coherent picture of project complexity.
Two qualified and independent Nigerian engineers were then contracted to assess each
project in the OPEN data set along these margins. The process of aggregation between
engineers used in this project aimed to build a consensus. The first engineer coded
indicators for the entire data set. The codings of the first engineer were then provided to
the second engineer, who then constructed his own codings with reference to the codings
of the first. The aim was to anchor the coding of the second engineer in that of the first,
but give him freedom to disagree where he felt the coding was incorrect. Other methods
would have been to have them code independently and average the two data sets or to
have them work together. I decided that this approach was a balance between consensus
and subjectivity.
The two engineers were provided with project details and documents, and asked to
code a value for each indicator. The documents only contained information available
before implementation, such that there was no bias from the coding being done after the
projects were implemented.
Table A3.5 provides descriptive statistics for all 16 indicators from which the com-
plexity index is constructed, as well as how each is correlated with the other indicators.
Aggregate complexity is a subjective assessment of the overall complexity of the projects
by the two engineers, that includes ‘all factors that might influence the difficulty of
implementing the project, not only those assessed [by the other indicators]’. I asked the
engineers to take the distribution of complexity in the OPEN data set as a whole, with
the least complex project in the data having an aggregate complexity of zero and the
most complex project having an aggregate complexity of 100, and place each project
within this distribution.
I undertook a number of measures to check the complexity of the OPEN indicators
coded by the engineers. First, I inserted 200 randomly chosen repeated projects into the
data set provided to the engineers. Since the project characteristics of the original and
repeat projects are identical, I would expect that the codings of the two sets of projects
would be similar. Reassuringly, I find that in general the original and duplicate projects
are coded in similar ways. I compare the differences between these two sets by looking
at group and paired means, and distributional tests for each variable. The differences
are only statistically significant at conventional levels in a few cases, and the magnitude
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of the differences are relatively small. For example, the only variable that is statistically
significantly different below the 10 percent level in the mean-comparison t-test relates
to raw material storage. Here, despite a standard deviation of 0.2 in the originals, the
difference is 0.07 between the originals and the duplicates.
Second, I looked at the similarity of the codings of the two engineers. I find that the
second engineer’s codings are not dramatically different from the first engineer’s efforts.
Whilst there is a small number of differences, they are limited and rarely significant at
the usual levels, indicating that the re-coding left the overall picture relatively stable.
Finally, more than a year after he had completed the prompted codings, I asked
the second engineer to re-code a sub-sample of projects from scratch, this time without
prompting by the first engineer’s coding choices. The differences between these indepen-
dent codings and the consensus data on which I rely are again relatively minor. It seems
that once he had become accustomed to the broad parameters of the coding framework,
the second engineer’s coding was not dissimilar to the consensus generated by the two
engineers working one after the other.
There is therefore evidence of similar projects within the data set being coded in
a similar way; of the two engineers coding in similar ways both when prompted and
unprompted; and when there were deviations, of the deviations being quantitatively
small. Taken together, these checks reassure us that the complexity measures pick up
meaningful variation across projects, rather than merely picking up noise that should
have led to the multiple reports (either across engineers or over time) being uncorrelated.
These measures of complexity allow me to condition all the specifications on the
aggregate complexity of the project, which are likely to be important determinants of
project completion. They also allow me to define indices of local and national information
needs (akin to measures of whether a particular tier k has a higher increase in the
probability of project delivery when bureaucrats exert high effort; pikh − pikl > pik
′
h −
pik
′
l ). Given how important information has been to the study of delegation (Moe,
2005; Mookherjee, 2006), it is important to understand how I am controlling for the
informational demands of each project. The literature on delegation emphasizes the
possible importance of superior information at a tier of government as a rationale for
delegation. Some projects require a lot of local information to be implemented. For
example, they may require sourcing of materials from the local area or be characterized
by a high degree of uncertainty that requires local information to respond to. Similarly,
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some projects may require a lot of information more readily available at the national
level. For instance, sourcing international expertise is something national organizations
are likely to be better at procuring than local organizations.
I asked one of the engineers with whom I’d worked to define the complexity data
to allocate the complexity variables to one of three indices: (i) indicative of the project
requiring local information for successful implementation; (ii) indicative of the project
requiring national information for successful implementation; or, (iii) indicative of nei-
ther. This process led to three complexity indices being generated using z-scores of the
underlying variables. These indices were: (i) localized information index (containing the
variables ‘Storage of raw materials’,‘Requires local labor’,‘Access to construction equip-
ment’,‘Design uncertainty’,‘Implementation uncertainty’,‘Design ambiguity’ and ‘Imple-
mentation ambiguity’); (ii) national information index (containing the variables ‘Access
to raw materials’ and ‘Requires skilled labor’); and (iii) neither information index (con-
taining the variables ‘Project size’, ‘Number of inputs’, ‘Number of methods’, ‘Interde-
pendencies’, ‘Difficulty to manage’ and ‘Number of agencies involved’).
Results Appendix
RA.1 Robustness of delegation results
To assess the robustness of the baseline results in column 4 of Table 3.4, I undertake
a number of checks of this preferred specification in Table A3.6. I include the baseline
specification in column 1 of Table A3.6 for reference.
First, one may believe that decisions made by a politician relating to her constituency
are correlated. I am therefore motivated to cluster the results at the politician level.
Column 2 of Table A3.6 reruns the preferred specification clustering the standard errors
at the politician level. The core coefficients are both still significant at the 5 percent
level.
Second, I may be concerned that characteristics of the organization are driving the
decision to delegate projects across tiers. While I do not seek to explain the difference in
performance across tiers of government here, it is informative to understand whether my
results are robust to a number of basic controls that are said to be of first order importance
to delegation decisions. First, the decentralization literature has stated that centralized
organizations may have more highly educated bureaucrats. I therefore include the average
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years of education of officials at each organization. Second, I may be concerned that
officials at different tiers of government have different incentives to be in government. In
particular, the literature on decentralization emphasizes that bureaucrats may differ in
how intrinsically, rather than extrinsically, motivated they are. To proxy the degree of
intrinsic motivation of the bureaucrats I study, I use a question from the representative
survey of bureaucrats I undertook. To measure civil servant’s intrinsic motivation, I
asked bureaucrats which factor had most influenced them to originally enter the civil
service, and those that stated ‘the chance to serve Nigeria’ are coded as being intrinsically
motivated.36 Third, I include a proxy for the extent of sorting of bureaucrats across tiers.
The most closely related paper to the work in this chapter, Iyer and Mani (2012), shows
how Indian politicians move bureaucrats around the civil service for their own ends.
This does not seem to be feasible in Nigeria, due to the independence of the civil service
commission that defines bureaucratic postings. However, I include a variable from the
survey of bureaucrats to control for this. The variable I use is the proportion of officials
at the organization who state that their placement was ‘random’. Note that well over 90
percent of bureaucrats state that influence was not involved in their posting, and over
60 percent believe their posting was random. When I include these variables, the core
coefficients are still significant at the 5 percent level.
Now I turn to a concern that arises from a reading of another related economics
literature. In their studies of standing committees in the US Congress, Aghion et al.
(2005, 2009, 2010) and Cohen et al. (2011) emphasize the importance of the chair to the
decisions of a committee. They argue that a chair has additional power to implement
her political agenda through the committee. I can assess the extent to which this is true
in the context of this study, as well as whether the chairs of the committees are driving
the results.
First, I can include a chair dummy, which takes the value 1 when a project is
implemented in the constituency of a chair of the relevant sectoral committee. I include
such a dummy in column 4 of Table A3.6. I find evidence that the chair centralizes
36The question used to determine intrinsic motivation asked bureaucrats which factor had most
influenced them to originally enter the service from the following options: ‘I was interested in the type of
work’, ‘income prospects’, ‘the prestige associated with such a job’, ‘the stable career path that a job in
the service affords’, ‘the chance to serve Nigeria’, ‘it was the only employment I could get’, ‘educational
opportunities’, ‘other’. Roughly 40 percent stated, ‘the chance to serve Nigeria’, and it is the modal
answer. I then construct the fraction of intrinsically motivated bureaucrats for each organization. The
other two most frequent reasons were ‘I was interested in the type of work’ and ‘the stable career path
that a job in the service affords’, that were each given by around 20 percent of individuals.
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even more projects than other members of the committee. Comparing the coefficients on
the core variables to those in column 1, I find that the core coefficients do not change
substantially when I include a chair dummy.
I can also test for the impact of the chair by excluding projects from constituencies in
which the politician is chair of the relevant sectoral committee. Column 5 of Table A3.6
repeats the core specification excluding all projects in which the constituency politician
is chair of the committee corresponding to that project’s sector. I find that there is little
change in the coefficients of interest.
An aspect of congress that is often studied in economics and political science is
politician power. I therefore assess whether the results are driven by the most powerful
politicians in the House of Representatives. Following the political economy literature
for the US, and echoing similar work for Nigeria, an often used proxy for the relative
power of a congressperson is the number of terms she has served. Given that democracy
was instated in Nigeria in 1999, I can observe at most two-term representatives in the
National Assembly in 2006/7.37 I therefore define a dummy for projects implemented in
constituencies of two-term representatives.
Adding this dummy to the baseline specification in column 6 of Table A3.6, I find that
being a two-term politician does not impact on the pattern of delegation. The coefficient
on this variable is close to zero. I can also exclude projects in constituencies of two-term
politicians, as I do in column 7 of Table A3.6. I find the coefficients on the core variables
are similar to the baseline specification, although slightly larger.
Finally, I return to the discrepancy identified in the analysis of the determinants of
committee membership. It was seen in section 3.4.1 that constituency-level characteristics
had limited impact on committee selection for all sectors bar agriculture. However,
there seemed to be indications of selection for the agriculture committee. I therefore
exclude from the analysis agriculture projects in all constituencies where a member of
the Agriculture Committee does not have relevant qualifications or experience in the
agriculture sector. The results of this regression are reported in column 8 of Table A3.6.
I find that the core coefficients are very similar to the baseline specification and continue
to be significant at the 1 percent level.
Another way of checking the robustness of the approach taken in this chapter is
37Nigerian congresspersons serve 4 year terms and there are no term limits on the number of times a
politician can serve.
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to test other predictions of the moral hazard model. As described in section 3.4.2, I
had engineers code, for each project, the aggregate complexity of each project and its
informational demands at the national and local levels. These are proxies for pih and
pikh − pikl respectively, implying I can test the comparative statics of equation (3.12) with
respect to these quantities. I see that an increase in complexity (a reduction in pih)
leads to greater centralization. One interpretation of the model I present is that different
pikh − pikl across tiers implies national (local) information requirements induce politicians
to delegate projects to the centralized (decentralized) tiers. In column 1 of Table A3.6,
I include the coefficients on the complexity and information indices estimated in the
baseline specification. I see that both the complexity and information indices display the
correct signs and are all significant at the 1 percent level, as predicted by the model.
RA.2 Robustness of informal incentive provision results
To assess the robustness of the baseline results in column 4 of Table 3.5, I undertake
a number of checks of this preferred specification in Table A3.7. Column 1 repeats the
preferred specification of Table 3.5 for comparison.
In column 2, I check whether the results are robust to clustering at the politician
level. The coefficient on the interaction continues to be significant at the 1 percent level,
but the coefficient on the distance variable itself is no longer significant.
Column 3 checks whether the results are robust to a number of key organization
controls: the average years of education of officials at each organization, the degree of
intrinsic motivation of the bureaucrats, and the degree to which officials were posted
to the organization under influence of politicians. Once I include these variables in the
baseline specification, the coefficients change slightly, but they are similar in magnitude
to the baseline specification and still significant at the 1 percent level.
I now turn to the potential impact of the most powerful members of the legislature. As
described above, committee chairs are said to be powerful members of the US Congress,
and thus I introduce a dummy to the baseline specification in column 4 of Table A3.7 that
indicates whether the project is in the constituency of the relevant chair to the project.
Chairs may have additional authority to engage bureaucrats that other members may
not, and it may be important to understand their role in the observed patterns. The
coefficient on the dummy is significant at the 10 percent level, indicating that chairs do
in fact interact more intensively with the bureaucracy. However, the core coefficients are
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the same as in the baseline specification, indicating that chairs do not play a significant
role in explaining the patterns of engagement I observe. This interpretation is supported
by the finding in column 5 that excludes projects in the constituencies of chairs. I see
that the core coefficients are similar to those of the baseline.
Politicians with experience in the National Assembly may better understand how to
work with the bureaucracy and affect the change they desire. I therefore test whether the
results are driven by those politicians who have more experience by defining a dummy for
projects implemented in constituencies of two-term representatives. Adding this dummy
to the baseline specification in column 6 of Table A3.7, I find that being a two-term
politician is associated with a slightly higher level of engagement with the bureaucracy.
However, again the core coefficients are unchanged. Excluding projects in constituencies
of two-term politicians, as I do in column 7 of Table A3.7, I find a similar pattern of
coefficients to the baseline specification.
Finally, I return again to the discrepancy identified in the analysis of the determinants
of committee membership. It was seen in section 3.4.1 that constituency-level character-
istics had limited impact on committee selection for all sectors bar agriculture. In case
the agriculture sector is distinct in ways that impact on engagements between politicians
and bureaucrats, I test the robustness of the baseline specification to the exclusion of
projects in constituencies where a member of the Agriculture Committee does not have
relevant qualifications or experience for the agriculture sector but is on the committee.
The results of this regression are reported in column 8 of Table A3.7, and the results are
similar to the baseline specification.
I can also run a similar set of checks on the engagement specifications using other
predictions of the moral hazard model as I did for the delegation specification. From
the model, I see that complexity decreases the degree of incentive provision, and thus
interaction, while greater tier-related information leads to greater interaction due to the
higher returns to providing incentives. Column 1 of Table A3.7 reports the coefficients
corresponding to the complexity and information indices for the baseline specification. I
see that they are all of the correct sign and significant at the 1 percent level.
133
Chapter 4
Conclusions
This thesis has investigated the determinants of public sector productivity in a developing
country setting, Nigeria. Its lessons could be interpreted as being broader than that
context given the limited empirical understanding we have of this topic across the world.
The research I have undertaken implies that the form and incentives of the public
sector play a key role in determining public sector outcomes. The measurements
of public sector effectiveness I have collected across communities and organisations show
that there is significant variation in public sector productivity. In some organisations
and communities, the Nigerian Government provide basic public goods to a high quality.
In others, they initiate none of the projects they have been legislated to implement. The
analysis of public organisations in my thesis papers indicates that economic incentives
explain a significant proportion of the variance in these measures of public sector effect-
iveness. Both organisational design and politically-motivated incentives matter for the
bureaucracy’s productivity.
Second, both formal and informal incentives matter in defining the pro-
ductivity of government. The chapter on management implies that formal rules create
constraints on bureaucratic behaviour. These constraints influence the efficacy with which
bureaucrats go about implementing the public projects over which they have responsib-
ility. The chapter on political interference also has implications for the incentives under
which bureaucrats implement public projects. Politicians use their capacity for informal
influence to change the organisations that implement projects in their constituencies. I
study how politicians move projects across centralised organisations with a direct line of
responsibility to the National Assembly and decentralised, mainly regional, organisations
with their own board of directors and budget line. As a project is moved from one
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organisation type to another, the incentives under which it is implemented vary. Thus,
the incentives under which a project is implemented are determined by the formal rules
the organisation that implements a project and the informal actions of politicians that
sort projects across organisations.
Finally, my thesis provides some of the first empirical evidence on the
optimal nature of incentives inside public bureaucracies. The results of chapter
2 indicate that bureaucrats in public sector settings may have distinct responses to
economic incentives than their private sector counterparts. For example, the finding
that public sector productivity is negatively correlated with the use of performance
management is distinct from the bulk of findings on performance management in private
sector settings. The results are in line with existing theories of the public sector, but
provide some of the first evidence on the empirical validity of these theories. Similarly,
the economics literature has little discussion of how informal influences in bureaucracies
(public or private) may impact on organisational performance. I document how political
competition incentivises politicians to improve the productivity of the bureaucracy using
their informal powers. The exploration of incentives in public sector bureaucracies
provides a distinct institutional framework from most existing applied work on organisa-
tions. It expands our understanding of how agents respond to incentives across distinct
organisational settings. Understanding how the civil service works is also crucial for
strengthening the state’s capacity to service citizens in both the developing and developed
worlds.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Evidence on Project Types
Project Type
(1) Number of 
Projects 
[Proportion]
(2) Number of 
Implementing 
Organizations
(3) Median 
Budget Allocation 
(US$000s)
(4) Proportion 
Never Started
(5) Average 
Completion 
Rate
(6) Proportion 
Completed 
Conditional on 
Being Started
(7) Proportion 
Fully 
Completed
(8) Proportion With 
Satisfactory Quality
Borehole 1348 [0.29] 18 29 0.44 0.47 0.84 0.37 0.85
Building 806 [0.17] 32 120 0.37 0.50 0.79 0.34 0.81
Electrification 751 [0.16] 2 93 0.14 0.56 0.65 0.25 0.87
Dam 624 [0.13] 14 18 0.79 0.15 0.74 0.10 0.50
Procurement 345 [0.07] 41 87 0.30 0.58 0.83 0.47 0.85
Road 217 [0.05] 4 167 0.12 0.52 0.59 0.22 0.79
Training 189 [0.04] 26 80 0.20 0.60 0.74 0.42 0.84
Financial project 157 [0.03] 8 17 0.38 0.49 0.79 0.35 0.84
Research 122 [0.03] 21 67 0.11 0.63 0.72 0.52 0.99
Advocacy 86 [0.02] 23 49 0.24 0.61 0.80 0.47 0.94
Canal 76 [0.02] 12 347 0.70 0.14 0.45 0.05 0.92
Notes: The “project type” classification refers to the primary classification for each project. Other project classifications exist. The median budget allocation in Column 3 is in thousands of US Dollar (assuming an exchange rate of US$1:
Naira 150). The sample of projects covers those which have a positive budget allocation and for which the proportion completed evaluation variable and management scores are available. The project quality variable in Column 8 is not
available for all projects. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Figures are rounded to two decimal places where relevant.
Table 2.2: Descriptive Evidence on Largest Civil Service Implementing Organizations
Civil Service Organization
(1) Number 
of Projects
(2) Number 
of Unique 
Project 
Types
(3) Budget 
Allocation 
(US$mn)
(4) Proportion 
Never Started
(5) Proportion 
Completed
(6) Proportion 
Completed 
Conditional on 
Being Started
(7) Proportion 
Fully 
Completed
(8) Proportion 
With Satisfactory 
Quality
Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 797 9 144 0.54 0.29 0.63 0.14 0.76
Federal Ministry of Power and Steel 750 1 490 0.14 0.56 0.25 0.65 0.87
Federal Ministry of Water Resources 520 4 426 0.95 0.04 0.77 0.03 0.69
National Primary Health Care Development 447 4 56 0.19 0.64 0.79 0.42 0.75
Sokoto Rima River Basin Development Authority 277 2 23 0.22 0.66 0.85 0.51 0.76
Upper Benue River Basin Development Authority 169 3 13 0.11 0.89 1.00 0.89 0.25
Ogun/Oshun River Basin Development Authority 165 4 22 0.55 0.32 0.71 0.24 0.89
Chad Basin River Basin Development Authority 148 3 16 0.43 0.56 1.00 0.56 1.00
Lower Benue River Basin Development Authority 143 3 16 0.45 0.42 0.77 0.17 0.86
Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development 
Bank
133 2 8 0.42 0.46 0.80 0.34 0.81
 
Notes: The sample covers the ten largest civil service organizations ranked by number of projects from our overall sample of projects. The “project type” classification refers to the primary classification for each project. Other project classifications exist. The budget
allocation in Column 3 is in millions of US Dollars (assuming an exchange rate of US$1: Naira 150). The sample of projects covers those which have a positive budget allocation and for which the proportion completed evaluation variable and management scores are
available. The project quality variable in Column 8 is not available for all projects. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Figures are rounded to two decimal places where relevant.
Table 2.3: Management Practices and Public Sector Service Delivery
Standard Errors: Clustered by Project Type Within Organization
OLS Estimates
(1) Unconditional
(2) Organization 
Controls
(3) Project 
Controls
(4) Project Type 
Fixed Effects
(5) Quality-Adjusted 
Completion Rate
(6) Interaction
CS-Autonomy 0.11** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.11** 0.23***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
CS-Incentives -0.06* -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.14*** -0.08*** -0.15***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CS-Other 0.10*** 0.05 0.05 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CS-Autonomy x CS-Incentives 0.06**
(0.02)
Organization Controls (capital, general, noise) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects None None None Project Type Project Type Project Type
Observations (clusters) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 2206 (144) 4721 (201)
Project Completion Rates
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered by project type within organization throughout. All columns report OLS
estimates. The dependent variable in Columns 1 to 4 and 6 is the proportion of the project completed (that is a continuous measure between zero and one). The dependent variable in Column 5 is the
product of the proportion completed variable and the dummy variable for quality. The sample of projects in Column 5 is limited to those for which project completion and quality data is available. Project
Type fixed effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as a financial, training, advocacy, procurement, research, electrification, borehole, dam, building, canal or road project.
Project controls comprise project-level controls for the project budget, whether the project is new or a rehabilitation, and an assessment of its aggregate complexity by Nigerian engineers. Capital
controls comprise organization-level controls for the logs of number of employees, total budget, and capital budget. General controls comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce
with degrees, and the share of the workforce with postgraduate qualifications. Noise controls are four interviewer dummies, indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of the managers who
responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, a dummy variable indicating whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan, the
duration of the interview, and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Note that no quality information is available for organizations surveyed on a Saturday, and thus
the dummy variable indicating a survey took place on a Saturday is omitted in Column 5. Total and capital budget figures are an average of organization budget figures for the years 2006-10. Figures
are rounded to two decimal places.
Dependent Variable: Project Completion Rate
Standard Errors: Clustered by Project Type Within Organization
Interactions in Deviation from Mean in Columns 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6
OLS Estimates
(1) Project 
Complexity
(2) Non-modal 
Project
(3) Facilities (4) Tenure
(5) Intrinsic 
Motivation
(6) Observe 
Corrupt Practices
CS-Autonomy 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.16***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CS-Incentives -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.17*** -0.17***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CS-Other 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
CS-Incentives x Project Complexity -0.19***
(0.06)
CS-Incentives x Non-modal Project Type -0.05*
(0.03)
CS-Incentives x CS-Facilities 0.03*
(0.02)
CS-Other (Without Facilities) 0.09***
(0.03)
CS-Facilities 0.01
(0.02)
CS-Incentives x Average Tenure of Bureaucrats -0.02***
(0.004)
CS-Incentives x Proportion of Bureaucrats Intrinsically Motivated 0.54**
(0.22)
CS-Incentives x Proportion of Projects that Bureaucrats Report Observing Corrupt Practices On 0.25
(0.28)
Project Complexity -0.01 0.05
(0.11) (0.12)
Project of Non-modal Type for Organization -0.04
(0.03)
Average Tenure of Bureaucrats -0.01
(0.01)
Proportion of Bureaucrats Intrinsically Motivated -0.47
(0.33)
Proportion of Projects that Bureaucrats Report Observing Corrupt Practices On -1.09***
(0.37)
Organization Controls (capital, general, 
noise)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type
Observations (clusters) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered by project type within organization throughout. All
columns report OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the proportion of the project completed (that is a continuous measure between zero and one). Project Type fixed
effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as a financial, training, advocacy, procurement, research, electrification, borehole, dam, building, canal or
road project. Project controls comprise project-level controls for the project budget, whether the project is new or a rehabilitation, and an assessment of its aggregate
complexity by Nigerian engineers. Capital controls comprise organization-level controls for the logs of number of employees, total budget, and capital budget. General controls
comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce with degrees, and the share of the workforce with postgraduate qualifications. Noise controls are four
interviewer dummies, indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of the managers who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the
interview was conducted, a dummy variable indicating whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan, the duration of the interview, and an indicator of the reliability of
the information as coded by the interviewer. Total and capital budget figures are an average of organization budget figures for the years 2006-10. In Column 1, the aggregate
complexity is a project-level subjective assessment by Nigerian engineers of the relative difficulty of the project within the population of OPEN projects. In Column 2, the non-
modal project type is a binary indicator as to whether the project is of a different project type (as defined above) as the modal project type at the organisation. In Column 4,
tenure is an organization-level average for the number of years officials have worked at the implementing organization. In Column 5, intrinsic motivation is an organization-level
proportion of employees at an organization that answered 'The chance to serve Nigeria' to the question 'What most influenced you to take up a career in the service?' in the
Civil Servants Survey. In Column 6, observation of corrupt practices is an organization-level average of the proportion of projects officials at an organization stated on which 'I
observed others breaking the service rules for their own benefit' in the Civil Servants Survey. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table 2.4: Heterogeneous Impacts of Management Practices Related to Incentives and 
Monitoring
Figure 2.1: Project Ambiguity and the Response to CS-Incentive Management Practices
Notes: The horizontal axis measures the ambiguity of projects of a given type. We measure this design ambiguity using subcomponents of the complexity indictor described in Table
A3. In particular we construct a z-score based on the design uncertainty, implementation uncertainty, design ambiguity and implementation ambiguity components of the project
complexity metric. We then take the average of this over all projects of type j, denoting the average ambiguity of projects of type j by σj. We then estimate a specification analogous to
our baseline regression model for a given project type j (excluding project fixed effects). We do so for five project types: boreholes, buildings, dams, procurement and training. For
each project type j we then obtain an estimate of the partial correlation between CS-incentives and project completion rates, γ2j, conditional on CS-autonomy. Figure 1 then plots the
five (γ2j,σj) pairs, as well as a cubic best fit.
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Table A2.1: Federal Civil Service Organizations Under Study
Civil Service Organization Sector
Annual Budget 
(US$)
Number 
of Staff
Level of 
Centralization
Anambra/Imo River Basin Development Authority Water 26,651,696 324 Deconcentrated
Benin Owena River Basin Development Authority Water 17,637,829 333 Deconcentrated
Chad Basin River Basin Development Authority Water 15,781,353 399 Deconcentrated
Cross River River Basin Development Authority Water 18,823,211 318 Deconcentrated
Citizenship and Leadership Training Centre Youth 3,510,409 601 Deconcentrated
Federal College of Education, Gombe Education 5,319,472 608 Deconcentrated
Federal College of Education, Gusau Education 4,665,009 379 Deconcentrated
Federal College of Education, Omuku Education 5,887,740 699 Deconcentrated
Federal Government Girls College, Gboko Education 1,233,030 161 Deconcentrated
Federal Government Girls College, Lejja Education 1,325,661 122 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Abeokuta Health 6,459,959 1,646 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Asaba Health 4,957,423 777 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Bayelsa State Health 5,026,215 725 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Bida Health 4,135,214 709 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Ebute Metta Health 5,358,665 958 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Gombe Health 5,640,897 1,518 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Kebbi State Health 3,560,097 528 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Makurdi Health 7,120,460 955 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Nasarawa State Health 4,572,968 785 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Owerri Health 8,709,623 1,722 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Owo Health 8,219,773 1,119 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Umuahia Health 7,157,419 1,306 Deconcentrated
Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Agriculture 144,055,160 5,789 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Education Education 44,055,244 2,776 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Environment Environment 20,324,048 2,093 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Federal Capital Territory Administration Education 473,280,702 18,987 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Health Health 170,406,214 3,871 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Housing and Urban Development Housing 58,610,300 7,837 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Youth Development and Special Duties Youth 11,233,012 392 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Power and Steel Power 490,123,985 580 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Water Resources Water 425,805,770 740 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Women Affairs Women 14,934,361 577 Concentrated
Federal Polytechnic, Bida Education 4,766,557 1,025 Deconcentrated
Federal Polytechnic, Ede Education 5,111,209 706 Deconcentrated
Federal Polytechnic, Idah Education 7,643,274 987 Deconcentrated
Federal Polytechnic, Nasarawa Education 6,431,211 810 Deconcentrated
Federal Polytechnic, Nekede Education 9,104,663 1,282 Deconcentrated
Federal Polytechnic, Offa Education 5,397,664 673 Deconcentrated
Federal Polytechnic, Oko Education 11,266,398 1,627 Deconcentrated
Federal Staff Hospital, Apo-Abuja Health 2,439,537 471 Deconcentrated
Hadejia-Jama'are River Basin Development Authority Water 32,758,143 589 Deconcentrated
Jos University Teaching Hospital Health 19,008,930 2,261 Deconcentrated
Lower Benue River Basin Development Authority Water 16,307,146 347 Deconcentrated
Lower Niger River Basin Development Authority Water 18,954,248 436 Deconcentrated
Mass Literacy Commission Education 6,706,812 154 Deconcentrated
National Action Committee on Aids Health 12,554,883 243 Deconcentrated
National Arbovirus and Vector Research Health 301,502 207 Deconcentrated
National Board for Technical Education Education 10,956,835 460 Deconcentrated
National Centre for Women Development Women 1,430,538 135 Deconcentrated
National Commission for Colleges of Education Education 5,633,851 222 Deconcentrated
National Commission for Nomadic Education Education 4,159,863 195 Deconcentrated
National Primary Health Care Development Health 56,036,340 646 Deconcentrated
National Tuberculosis and Leprosy Referred Hospital and Training Centre, Zaria Health 3,000,639 153 Deconcentrated
National Teachers Institute Education 33,613,921 728 Deconcentrated
National Youth Service Corps Youth 121,389,773 103,686 Deconcentrated
Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority Water 18,600,953 406 Deconcentrated
Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development Bank Agriculture 7,798,094 474 Deconcentrated
Ogun/Oshun River Basin Development Authority Water 22,259,121 285 Deconcentrated
Sokoto Rima River Basin Development Authority Water 23,430,400 566 Deconcentrated
Specialist Hospital, Gwagwalada Health 10,953,476 1,275 Deconcentrated
Universal Basic Education Commission Education 50,549,049 393 Deconcentrated
Upper Benue River Basin Development Authority Water 12,822,263 272 Deconcentrated
Upper Niger River Basin Development Authority Water 21,951,907 239 Deconcentrated
Notes: The budget figures are averages for 2006 to 2010. They are in US Dollars exchanged at a rate of US$1: Naira 150. Staff numbers come from administrative data for 2010. In the few cases
we do not have the staff numbers explicitly, we estimate them from the personnel expenditures, which have are correlated with staff numbers with a coefficient of over 0.9. Concentrated
organizations refer to the central organizing authority for the sector, with a direct line of responsibility to the President and the National Assembly. Deconcentrated organizations refer to those whose
day-to-day running is largely independent of the central authority. They have boards of governors that make decisions over policy and operation and a separate budget line to the central ministries.
Table A2.2: Defining Management Practices Using the CS Indices
Management Practice Topic Specific Questions Related to this Topic
CS-Autonomy Roles
Can most staff above SGL 7 in your organization make substantive contributions to the policy formulation and 
implementation process?
Can most staff above SGL 15 in your organization make substantive contributions to the policy formulation and 
implementation process?
To what extent do the employees in this organization have the ability to determine how they carry out the 
assignments in their daily work?
Flexibility
Does your organization make efforts to redefine its standard procedures in response to the specific needs and 
peculiarities of a community?
How flexible would you say your organization is in terms of responding to new practices, new techniques, and 
regulations?
At your organization, how efficiently is best practice shared between departments?
Given past experience, how effectively would a conflict within your organization be dealt with?
CS-Incentives Given past experience, how would under-performance be tolerated?
Given past experience, what happens if there is a part of your organization that isn’t achieving agreed results?
What percentage of workers  were rewarded when targets were met?
What percentage of managers/directors  were rewarded when targets were met?
Given past experience, are members of this organization disciplined for breaking the Public Service Rules?
Given past experience, what would most likely happen to a person in this organization who accepted money or a 
present from someone who came to them with a problem?
Monitoring In what kind of ways does your organization track how well it is delivering services?
If have performance indicators, how often are these indicators collected?
If have performance indicators, how often are these indicators reviewed by Minister or Permanent Secretary?
If have performance indicators, how often are these indicators reviewed by non managerial staff?
Does the organization use performance or quality indicators for tracking the performance of its employees?
At your organization, how highly regarded is the collection and use of data in planning and implementing projects?
CS-Other Facilities During a typical working day (8 hours from 8am to 4pm), how many hours is there electricity (PHCN or generator)?
Out of the five [5] working days, how many days is the network (GSM) coverage working for 50% of calls or more?
Out of the five [5] working days, how many hours is their internet access good enough to check e-mail?
Out of every ten [10] officers above SGL 7, how many have access to a computer (desktop or laptop)?
Out of every ten [10] officers above SGL 7, how many have access to a vehicle (privately owned or otherwise) that 
can be used for work?
Skills Out of every ten [10] officers above SGL 7, how many can use a computer to write a memo?
Out of every ten [10] officers above SGL 7, how many can use a computer to create a PowerPoint presentation?
Out of every ten [10] officers above SGL 7, how many can use a computer to create an Excel spreadsheet?
On which topics have trainings been performed at your organization in the last five [5] years?  Technical trainings.
On which topics have trainings been performed at your organization in the last five [5] years?  Laws and regulations.
On which topics have trainings been performed at your organization in the last five [5] years?  Legal rights of the 
public.
On which topics have trainings been performed at your organization in the last five [5] years?  Good relations with the 
public.
On which topics have trainings been performed at your organization in the last five [5] years?  Ethics.
On which topics have trainings been performed at your organization in the last five [5] years?  What to do with 
presents.
Out of every ten [10] officers above SGL 7 at your organization, how many have had some form of training over the 
last five [5] years?
Staffing Do you think the most senior staff of your organization talk about attracting and developing talented people?
Do you think the most senior staff of your organization then actually goes about attracting and developing talented 
people?
If two people both joined your organization five years ago and one was much better at their work than the other, 
would he/she be promoted through the service faster?
Given past experience, if there is a ‘top performing’ civil servant, does your organization do their best to keep 
him/her?
Is the burden of achieving the organization's targets evenly distributed across its different departments, or do some 
groups consistently shoulder a greater burden than others?
How do you feel the number of staff in your organization relates to the activities undertaken there?
What percentage of staff is doing most of the work at your organization?
Thinking about all the projects that your organization has been involved in since your appointment here, would you 
say that senior staff try to use the right staff for the right job?
Targeting Does your organization have a clear set of targets derived from its mission and goals?
How tough are the targets of the organization?
When you arrive at work each day, do you and your colleagues know what your organization is trying to achieve on 
that particular day?
Culture How effectively would you say your organization is in making the bulk of its staff feel valued?
To what extent would you say employees of your organization trust each other?
If you think about the way that employees of this organization respond to a standard work challenge, would you say 
that there is a set of ‘shared values’ amongst all the staff?
Out of every ten [10] officers above SGL 7, how many people from this organization participate in groups, committees 
and activities with other people from this organization outside of the formal structure of government (for example, in 
community or social organizations)?
Performance 
Incentives
Table A2.3: Correlation of Subcomponents of the Project Complexity Indicator
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Project size 0.27 0.45 1.00
Number of inputs 6.82 4.13 0.06 1.00
Number of methods 5.04 2.29 0.33 0.61 1.00
Interdependencies 0.65 0.48 -0.03 0.13 0.07 1.00
Access to raw materials 0.25 0.43 -0.11 -0.24 -0.09 0.04 1.00
Storage of raw materials 0.04 0.21 0.19 -0.05 0.07 0.07 -0.05 1.00
Requires local labor 0.45 0.50 0.31 -0.03 0.48 0.04 0.23 0.14 1.00
Requires skilled labor 0.45 0.50 -0.16 -0.02 -0.21 0.53 0.21 -0.03 0.00 1.00
Access to construction equipment 0.21 0.41 -0.01 -0.24 0.06 0.36 0.62 0.12 0.53 0.53 1.00
Design uncertainty 0.70 0.46 0.10 0.18 0.12 0.77 -0.08 0.02 0.26 0.45 0.31 1.00
Implementation uncertainty 0.78 0.41 0.06 0.26 0.20 0.58 -0.16 -0.01 0.35 0.42 0.24 0.78 1.00
Design ambiguity 0.66 0.47 -0.08 0.08 -0.01 0.84 -0.01 0.08 0.04 0.60 0.35 0.73 0.63 1.00
Implementation ambiguity 0.65 0.48 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.85 0.02 0.11 0.07 0.56 0.36 0.75 0.58 0.89 1.00
Difficulty to manage 0.28 0.45 0.15 -0.16 0.24 0.38 0.47 0.19 0.64 0.37 0.81 0.36 0.27 0.43 0.43 1.00
Number of agencies involved 3.54 0.51 -0.01 0.12 -0.05 0.21 0.11 -0.02 0.25 0.55 0.21 0.39 0.54 0.30 0.26 0.22 1.00
Aggregate complexity 24.98 17.92 0.36 0.24 0.50 0.25 -0.21 0.16 0.39 -0.09 0.03 0.35 0.37 0.29 0.32 0.33 -0.05 1.00
Observations (projects) 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721
Notes: The sample used is those projects in our core analysis for which we have complexity and project completion data. 'Project size' is a binary variable that aims to gauge the physical size of the
project. It takes the value 1 if it is classified as equivalent to a medium scale build or larger. 'Number of inputs' counts the number of distinct product classes the finished project contains. 'Number of
methods' counts the number of distinct disciplines or methods involved in implementing the project. 'Interdependencies' is a binary variable reflecting the extent of interdependencies between the
activities involved in the project. It takes a value of 1 if the project is classified as highly interdependent. 'Access to raw materials' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if raw materials could not
be sourced within the state of implementation. 'Storage of raw materials' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if some of the raw materials could not be easily stored or transported. 'Requires
local labor' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if local labor was useful or critical. 'Requires skilled labor' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if specialized skills were necessary and
difficult to obtain. 'Access to construction equipment' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the equipment required is difficult to obtain, heavy duty, or difficult to transport to the site. 'Design
uncertainty' is a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if the design of the project is context specific. 'Implementation uncertainty' is a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if there are substantial
risks involved in implementation. 'Design ambiguity' is a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if there is a risk of redesign late on in the project. 'Implementation ambiguity' is a binary variable that
takes on the value 1 if the technical risks of the project cannot be fully understood at implementation. 'Difficulty to manage' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the project is seen have
elements that require project management skills of above average level. 'Number of agencies involved' is simply a count of the estimated number of agencies involved in the project cycle. 'Aggregate
complexity' is a subjective assessment as to the overall complexity of the project by the coding engineers. This variable is an assessment of the interaction of the other variables as well as any
unassessed aspects of complexity and provides a coherent picture of the complexity of the projects by a specialist. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A2.4: Standard Errors
Dependent Variable: Project Completion Rate
OLS Estimates
(1) Unconditional
(2) Organization 
Controls
(3) Project 
Controls
(4) Project Type 
Fixed Effects
CS-Autonomy 0.11 0.18 0.17 0.18
Robust standard errors (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Errors clustered by project type within organisation level (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Errors clustered by organisation (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
P-value of clustered coefficients [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Wild cluster bootstrap p-value of clustered coefficients [0.08] [0.02] [0.02] [0.00]
CS-Incentives -0.06 -0.11 -0.11 -0.14
Robust standard errors (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Errors clustered by project type within organisation level (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Errors clustered by organisation (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
P-value of clustered coefficients [0.08] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Wild cluster bootstrap p-value of clustered coefficients [0.20] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
CS-Other 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.08
Robust standard errors (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Errors clustered by project type within organisation level (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Errors clustered by organisation (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
P-value of clustered coefficients [0.00] [0.20] [0.17] [0.00]
Wild cluster bootstrap p-value of clustered coefficients [0.01] [0.28] [0.26] [0.01]
Organization Controls (capital, general, noise) No Yes Yes Yes
Project Controls No No Yes Yes
Fixed Effects None None None Project Type
Observations 4721 4721 4721 4721
Notes: Standard errors are in round parentheses, and are robust, clustered by project type within organization, and by organization respectively under the
coefficients corresponding to a management index. Standard p-values and wild cluster bootstrap p-values are in square parentheses below these. All columns
report OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the proportion of the project completed (that is a continuous measure between zero and one). Project Type fixed
effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as a financial, training, advocacy, procurement, research, electrification, borehole, dam,
building, canal or road project. Project controls comprise project-level controls for the project budget, whether the project is new or a rehabilitation, and an
assessment of its aggregate complexity by Nigerian engineers. Capital controls comprise organization-level controls for the logs of number of employees, total
budget, and capital budget. General controls comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce with degrees, and the share of the workforce with
postgraduate qualifications. Noise controls are four interviewer dummies, indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of the managers who responded, the day
of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, a dummy variable indicating whether the interview was conducted during
Ramadan, the duration of the interview, and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Total and capital budget figures are an
average of organization budget figures for the years 2006-10. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A2.5: Robustness Checks 
Dependent Variable: Project Completion Rate
Standard Errors: Clustered by Project Type Within Organization
OLS Estimates
(1) Largest Org. 
by Total Exp.
(2) Org. With 
Most Projects
(3) Ten Orgs. 
with Smallest 
Total Exp.
(4) Ten Orgs. 
with Smallest 
No. of Projects
(5) Orgs. Below 
5% or Above 95% 
of CS-Autonomy 
Scale
(6) Orgs. Below 5% 
or Above 95% of CS-
Performance Scale
(7) Construction 
Projects
(8) Non-
Construction 
Projects
(9) Centralized (10) Decentralized
(11) State-
level Controls
(12) Northern 
Projects
(13) Southern 
Projects
(14) Weighted 
Topics in CS 
Indices
(15) Fractional 
Regression
CS-Autonomy 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 1.02***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.17)
CS-Incentives -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.24*** -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.06* -0.24*** -0.01 -0.14*** -0.12** -0.30*** -0.14*** -0.96***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.10) (0.02) (0.16)
CS-Other 0.09*** 0.05 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06** 0.11** 0.06* 0.18*** -0.03 0.08*** -0.03 0.10* 0.08*** 0.49***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.02) (0.15)
Organization Controls 
(capital, general, noise)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type
Observations (clusters) 4201 (197) 3924 (192) 4601 (176) 4711 (191) 3810 (145) 4209 (181) 3822 (82) 899 (119) 2434 (53) 2287 (148) 4269 (63) 2049 (91) 1895 (104) 4721 (201) 4721 (201)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered by project type within organization throughout. All columns bar 15 report OLS estimates. Column 15 reports estimates from a fractional regression model. The dependent variable is the proportion of the project completed (that is a continuous measure
between zero and one). Column 1 excludes those projects implemented by the largest organization in terms of total expenditures. Column 2 excludes projects implemented by the largest organization in terms of number of projects. Columns 3 and 4 remove the 10 smallest organizations by expenditures and number of projects respectively. Columns 5 and 6 exclude
organizations at the top and bottom of the CS-autonomy and CS-performance management scales respectively. Column 7 includes only construction projects (borehole, building, electrification, dam, road and canal) and Column 8 includes only non-construction projects. Column 9 restricts our specification to those projects implemented by centralized ministries. Column
10 restricts our specification to those projects implemented by decentralized agencies. In Column 11, "State-level Controls" comprise 'poverty controls', the proportion of households in a state who have difficulty meeting their food needs and the proportion of households that self-classify as poor; 'educational controls', literacy rates for adults and youth, and primary and
secondary net enrolment and completion rates; and 'infrastructure controls', indicators of access to secure tenure, safe water, safe sanitation, improved waste disposal, medical services, vaccinations, electricity, computers, mobile phones and credit facilities, as well as the unemployment rate for over 15s. Column 3 restricts our specification to those projects for which we
have location data and that are implemented in Northern Nigeria, where we exclude the Saturday dummy. Column 4 restricts our specification to those projects for which we have location data and that are implemented in Southern Nigeria. In Column 14 we construct CS-Autonomy and CS-Performance measures by weighting each topic (rather than each variable) equally.
Project Type fixed effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as a financial, training, advocacy, procurement, research, electrification, borehole, dam, building, canal or road project. Project controls comprise project-level controls for the project budget, whether the project is new or a rehabilitation, and an assessment of its aggregate complexity by
Nigerian engineers. Capital controls comprise organization-level controls for the logs of number of employees, total budget, and capital budget. General controls comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce with degrees, and the share of the workforce with postgraduate qualifications. Noise controls are four interviewer dummies, indicators of the
seniority, gender, and tenure of the managers who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, a dummy variable indicating whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan, the duration of the interview, and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Total and capital
budget figures are an average of organization budget figures for the years 2006-10. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A2.6: Management Practices and the Assignment of Projects to Organizations
Dependent Variable: Binary Variable Indicating Organization Implementing Project
Standard Errors: Clustered by Project Type Within Organization
Conditional Logit Model
(1) Unconstrained 
Pairs
(2) Feasible Pairs 
by Sector
(3) Feasible Pairs 
by Complexity
(4) Organization 
Controls
(5) Project 
Interactions
CS-Autonomy 0.35 0.53* 0.37 0.35 0.40
(0.22) (0.27) (0.24) (0.29) (0.31)
CS-Incentives -0.17 -0.33 -0.26 -0.26 -0.34
(0.26) (0.33) (0.36) (0.45) (0.45)
CS-Other -0.36 -0.02 0.37 0.57 0.63
(0.30) (0.23) (0.31) (0.45) (0.48)
Senior Bureaucrat's Span of Control -0.22 -0.34
(0.35) (0.40)
Tenure of Senior Bureaucrats 0.03 0.05
(0.17) (0.18)
Tenure of Low-tier Bureaucrats -0.03 -0.04
(0.09) (0.09)
Proportion of Senior Bureaucrats That Report Being Intrinsically Motivated -4.82 -4.6
(4.17) (4.37)
Proportion of Low-tier Bureaucrats That Report Being Intrinsically Motivated -0.35 0.06
(3.49) (3.22)
Proportion of Projects that Senior Bureaucrats that Report Observing Corrupt Practices On -0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.04)
Proportion of Projects that Low-tier Bureaucrats that Report Observing Corrupt Practices On 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.04)
Organization Controls (capital, general, noise) No No No Yes Yes
Interactions of Project and Organizational Characteristics No No No No Yes
Project-Organization Paired Observations (clusters) 297423 (63) 44429 (59) 33480 (59) 33370 (58) 33370 (58)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered by project type within organization throughout. All Columns report conditional logit
estimates. The data is set up as follows. For each project, we associate a binary variable with 63 values corresponding to the 63 organizations in the core analysis of the paper. This variable takes the value
one if the project is implemented at that organization, and zero otherwise. Thus, for each of our 4721 projects, we have 63 'project-organization' observations. These 297,423 observations are what makes
up the 'unrestricted pairs' specification in Column 1. The 'feasible pairs' specification in Column 2 restricts the set of organizations associated with a project to only those in the same sector. Those 847
projects implemented at the only organization in the sector drop out in this specification, leaving us with 44,429 project-organization observations. In Columns 4 and 5 as we do not have data for one
organization on the proportion of senior bureaucrats that report observing corrupt practices, this organization drops out, leaving 33,370 project-organization pairs. In Column 5 we restrict the feasible pairs
further by assuming projects can only potentially be assigned to organizations in the same sector that are observed being tasked to implement at least one project of similar or greater complexity. Capital
controls comprise organization-level controls for the logs of number of employees, total budget, and capital budget. General controls comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce with
degrees, and the share of the workforce with postgraduate qualifications. Noise controls are four interviewer dummies, indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of the managers who responded, the
day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, a dummy variable indicating whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan, the duration of the interview,
and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Total and capital budget figures are an average of organization budget figures for the years 2006-10. We follow the grading
system of the Federal Government by defining senior bureaucrats as those on grade level 12 and above. The proportion of staff intrinsically motivated refers to the fraction of employees at an organization
that answered 'The chance to serve Nigeria' to the question 'What most influenced you to take up a career in the service?' in the Civil Servants Survey. The percentage of staff who observed corruption
refers to the average proportion of projects officials at an organization stated on which 'I observed others breaking the service rules for their own benefit' in the Civil Servants Survey. Figures are rounded to
two decimal places.
Robust Standard Errors
OLS Estimates
(1) Number of 
Projects Assigned 
to Organization
(2) Number of 
Unique Project 
Types Assigned to 
Organization
(3) Project 
Complexity
(4) Log Organizational 
Budget
CS-Autonomy 22.17 0.21 1.56 0.03
(19.57) (0.27) (1.89) (0.05)
CS-Incentives 10.07 -0.01 -0.47 0.05
(24.87) (0.40) (1.53) (0.07)
CS-Other -19.92 -0.01 -2.10 0.03
(28.30) (0.37) (1.66) (0.05)
Organization Controls (capital, general, noise) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 63 63 63 63
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All columns report OLS estimates. The dependent variable in
Column 1 is a count measure of the number of projects assigned to an organization. In Column 2 it a count variable of the number of unique project types assigned to the
organization, where the projects are assigned a primary classification of the following type: a financial, training, advocacy, procurement, research, electrification, borehole,
dam, building, canal or road project. The dependent variable in Column 3 is the average complexity of projects assigned to the organization. The dependent variable in
Column 4 is the log of the average total organizational budget, averaged over 2006 to 2010. In Columns 1 to 3, capital controls comprise organization-level controls for the
logs of number of employees, total budget, and capital budget. In Column 4, we drop total organizational budget as a control as the log of organizational budget is the
dependent variable. General controls comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce with degrees, and the share of the workforce with postgraduate
qualifications. Noise controls are four interviewer dummies, indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of the managers who responded, the day of the week the interview
was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, a dummy variable indicating whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan, the duration of the
interview, and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Total and capital budget figures are an average of organization budget figures for
the years 2006-10. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A2.7: Management Practices and Public Sector Service Delivery at the 
Organization Level
Table A2.8: Decomposing the Impacts of Management Practices
Dependent Variable: Proportion Project Completed
Standard Errors: Clustered by Project Type Within Organization
OLS Estimates
(1) Roles (2) Flexibility
(3) Performance 
incentives
(4) Monitoring (5) Culture (6) Targeting (7) Facilities (8) Skills (9) Staffing (10) All (11) Management
CS-Roles 0.27*** 0.33***
(0.06) (0.04)
CS-Flexibility 0.18*** 0.11**
(0.05) (0.04)
CS-Performance Incentives -0.08* -0.07
(0.04) (0.06)
CS-Monitoring -0.21*** -0.28***
(0.05) (0.06)
CS-Culture 0.02 0.01
(0.04) (0.03)
CS-Targeting 0.03 0.07
(0.04) (0.05)
CS-Facilities 0.13*** 0.06
(0.04) (0.04)
CS-Skills 0.08 0.14**
(0.07) (0.06)
CS-Staffing -0.06 0.08
(0.07) (0.06)
CS-Management 0.03
(0.03)
H0: CS-Autonomy Components Equal [p-value] [0.00]
H0: CS-Incentives Components Equal [p-value] [0.06]
Organization Controls (capital, 
general, noise)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type
Observations (clusters) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered by project type within organization throughout. All columns report OLS estimates. The dependent variable in all columns is the proportion
of the project completed (that is a continuous measure between zero and one). All of the index component variables in the table are z-scores which are centered at 0. The variable 'facilities' measures the quality of infrastructure at an organization and the
equipment available to staff. The variable 'skills' measures the skills and training opportunities embodied in the staff body. The variable 'staffing' measures the effective utilization of that body of staff. The variable 'targeting' examines the extent of use of targets.
The variable 'flexibility' measures the extent to which the organization is able to respond to best practice and project peculiarities. The variable 'roles' measures the extent to which staff can play a role in defining the direction of the organization. The variable
'culture' measures whether the organization inculcates a productive work culture. Together these components make up our autonomy variable. The variable 'monitoring' focuses on the tracking of performance of individuals and projects. The variable
'performance' examines the use of incentives both to reward success and punish failure. Project Type fixed effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as a financial, training, advocacy, procurement, research, electrification, borehole,
dam, building, canal or road project. Project controls comprise project-level controls for the project budget, whether the project is new or a rehabilitation, and an assessment of its aggregate complexity by Nigerian engineers. Capital controls comprise
organization-level controls for the logs of number of employees, total budget, and capital budget. General controls comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce with degrees, and the share of the workforce with postgraduate qualifications.
Noise controls are four interviewer dummies, indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of the managers who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, a dummy variable indicating whether
the interview was conducted during Ramadan, the duration of the interview, and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Total and capital budget figures are an average of organization budget figures for the years 2006-10. At
the foot of the table we report the p-value on the null that the coefficients in Column 10 on the variables that make up the CS-Autonomy measure (those associated with roles and flexibility) are of equal magnitude. We also report the p-value on the null that the
coefficients in Column 10 on the variables that make up the CS-Incentives measure (those associated with performance incentives and monitoring) are of equal magnitude. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A2.9: Bureaucrat Characteristics and Management Practices
Means, standard deviations and regression coefficients
(1) Mean
(s.d.)
(2) Coefficient 
on CS-
Autonomy
(3) Coefficient 
on CS-
Incentives
Proportion of Bureaucrats Who Knew Direct Boss Before Starting Posting 0.00 - -
(0.01)
Proportion of Bureaucrats Who Knew Managers Before Starting Posting 0.00 - -
(0.01)
Average Number of Close Colleagues Known Before Starting Posting 4.40 -0.06 -0.04
(3.18) (0.42) (0.42)
Proportion of Bureaucrats Being the First Family Member to Join Service 0.48 0.02 -0.01
(0.1) (0.01) (0.01)
Tenure of Senior Bureaucrats 15 0.42 -0.49
(5) (0.65) (0.65)
Tenure of Low-tier Bureaucrats 10 0.00 -0.48
(4) (0.59) (0.59)
Proportion of Senior Bureaucrats Intrinsically Motivated 0.31 0.00 -0.02
(0.12) (0.02) (0.02)
Proportion of Low-tier Bureaucrats Intrinsically Motivated 0.39 0.01 -0.02
(0.13) (0.02) (0.02)
0.35 -0.02 0.01
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01)
0.41 -0.02 -0.01
(0.11) (0.01) (0.01)
Joint Regression Coefficients
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Columns 2 to 3 report OLS estimates. In Column 1, standard deviations are in parentheses.
In all other columns, standard errors are in parentheses. Proportion of bureaucrats who knew their direct boss before starting their posting is an organization-
level average of those bureaucrats who answered positively to a question outlining possible connections to the officials boss before they came to work at the
organization. Proportion of bureaucrats who knew their managers before starting their posting is an organization-level average of those bureaucrats who
answered positively to a question outlining possible connections to the officials' managers before they came to work at the organization. Average number of
close colleagues known before starting their posting is an organization-level average of the number of colleagues an official stated that they had connections
with before they came to work at the organization. Proportion of bureaucrats being the first family member to join service is an organization-level average of
those bureaucrats who answered 'Yes' to the question 'Are you the first member of your family to enter the Federal service'. Tenure of bureaucrats refers to the
number of years they have served in the organization for. The proportion of staff intrinsically motivated refers to the fraction of employees at an organization
that answered 'The chance to serve Nigeria' to the question 'What most influenced you to take up a career in the service?'. The percentage of staff who
observed corruption refers to the average proportion of projects officials at an organization stated on which 'I observed others breaking the service rules for
their own benefit'. These variables are all elicited from the Civil Servants Survey we conducted. When we control for the proportion of projects that senior
bureaucrats that report observing corrupt practices on, we lose one organization (that implemented a single project) in which no senior bureaucrat answered the
question. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Proportion of Projects that Senior Bureaucrats that Report Observing Corrupt 
Practices On
Proportion of Projects that Low-tier Bureaucrats that Report Observing Corrupt 
Practices On
Dependent Variable: Project Completion Rate
Standard Errors: Clustered by Project Type Within Organization
Interactions in Deviation from Mean
OLS Estimates
(1) Capital to Total 
Budget Ratio
(2) Variance of Ambiguity in 
Portfolio of Projects
CS-Autonomy 0.17*** 0.20***
(0.04) (0.03)
CS-Incentives -0.17*** -0.17***
(0.04) (0.04)
CS-Other 0.07*** 0.04
(0.02) (0.04)
CS-Autonomy x Capital to Total Budget Ratio 0.07
(0.10)
CS-Incentives x Capital to Total Budget Ratio 0.10
(0.12)
CS-Autonomy x Var (Project Ambiguity) 0.00
(0.02)
CS-Incentives x Var (Project Ambiguity) -0.04
(0.03)
Capital to Total Budget Ratio 0.70
(0.54)
Var (Project Ambiguity) -0.01
(0.03)
Organization Controls (capital, general, noise) Yes Yes
Project Controls Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Project Type Project Type
Observations 4721 (201) 4721 (201)
Table A2.10: Endogenous Management Practices
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered by
project type within organization throughout. All columns report OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the proportion of the
project completed (that is a continuous measure between zero and one). Project Type fixed effects relate to whether the primary
classification of the project is as a financial, training, advocacy, procurement, research, electrification, borehole, dam, building,
canal or road project. Project controls comprise project-level controls for the project budget, whether the project is new or a
rehabilitation, and an assessment of its aggregate complexity by Nigerian engineers. Capital controls comprise organization-level
controls for the logs of number of employees, total budget, and capital budget. General controls comprise organization-level
controls for the share of the workforce with degrees, the share of the workforce with postgraduate qualifications, and the span of
control at the organization. Noise controls are four interviewer dummies, indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of the
managers who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, a
dummy variable indicating whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan, the duration of the interview, and an indicator of
the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Total and capital budget figures are an average of organization budget
figures for the years 2006-10. The capital to total budget Ratio is a variable that divides an organization's capital budget by its total
budget. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Fig. A2.1: Area of Covariances in Which Coefficients are Underestimated in Absolute Terms
Fig. A2.2: Impact of Management Practices For Different Thresholds of Project Success
Notes: We define a threshold completion rate of p% and then consider all potential thresholds from 1% to 100% in increments of 1%. We then use this to define a
dummy variable for our main empirical specification, where the outcome is a dummy variable equal to one if the project completion rate is above the threshold p%,
and zero otherwise. For any given threshold p the coefficients of interest on CS-Autonomy and CS-Incentives are shown above and their associated 95% confidence
interval.
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Table 3.1: Investigating Differences in Constituency Characteristics by Level of Competition
Means, standard deviations and p-values of differences
(1) All 
constituencies
(2) 10% most 
competitive 
constituencies
(3) 10% least 
competitive 
constituencies
(4) p-value of 
difference 
between 2/3
Sex [female=1] 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.38
(0.23) (0.24) (0.33)
Politician age 47.70 46.71 49.17 0.13
(6.93) (4.34) (8.13)
Politician years of education 16.17 16.26 15.62 0.06
(1.58) (1.09) (1.61)
Tenure in house [second term=1] 0.27 0.23 0.15 0.39
(0.44) (0.43) (0.36)
Proportion of constituency population in extreme poverty 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.47
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
Standard deviation of poverty index 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.22
(0.1) (0.08) (0.11)
Proportion of constituents with access to potable water 0.48 0.37 0.52 0.01
(0.27) (0.24) (0.24)
Standard deviation of access to potable water 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.17
(0.1) (0.09) (0.07)
Average hours of electricity in a day 4.46 3.69 4.80 0.21
(3.89) (3.03) (4.19)
Standard deviation of hours of electricity 5.37 5.50 5.48 0.98
(2.25) (2.5) (2.49)
Time in minutes to nearest primary school 20.33 22.25 19.43 0.07
(7.27) (5.86) (6.6)
Standard deviation of time to nearest primary school 14.39 14.88 14.78 0.92
(4.26) (3.6) (4.53)
Time in minutes to nearest secondary school 33.43 35.05 33.15 0.40
(10.04) (7.66) (10.71)
Standard deviation of time to nearest secondary school 16.63 16.95 17.21 0.72
(3.37) (2.41) (3.43)
OPEN funds allocated per constituency (US$) 1,100,000 1,500,000 1,100,000 0.28
(1,900,000) (1,600,000) (1,000,000)
Average level of progress of constituency projects 0.46 0.50 0.38 0.03
(0.25) (0.23) (0.24)
Observations 345 35 35
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Politician characteristics are a dummy variable indicating the sex of a politician, which takes the value 1 when the poltician is 
female, the age in years and years of education of the relevant politician, and whether they were in congress in the 1999-2003 National Assembly (before which Nigeria was ruled 
by a military government).  In the very small number of cases in which age or years of education are missing, I replace the missing value with the mean of the rest of the politicians 
and include a dummy variable to indicate the missing data.  Constituency characteristics are comprised of the means and standard deviations of the following indices: the proportion 
of poor in the constituency, measured by a national poverty index, the average years of education of the household head, the proportion of constituents with access to potable 
water, the average time in minutes to the nearest primary school, and the average time in minutes to the nearest secondary school.  T-tests are performed under the assumption of 
equal variances when the chi-squared test statistic is less than or equal to 3.84, and under the assumption of unequal variances otherwise.  Figures are rounded to two decimal 
places or significant figures where relevant.  I have weighted constituencies equally.
Politician characteristics
Constituency characteristics
OPEN projects
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Nigeria's Federal Organizations, by Tier
Means, standard deviations, and p-values of differences with centralized organizations
(1) Centralized (2) Decentralized
p-value of 
difference 
between (1)/(2)
Number of organizations 7 47 -
- -
Total budget (millions of US$) 190 11 0.05
(187) (11)
Capital budget (millions of US$) 130 7 0.07
(150) (11)
Personnel budget (millions of US$) 17 3.6 0.04
(13) (2.8)
Overheads budget (millions of US$) 11 0.41 0.16
(17) (0.26)
Number of staff at organization 5,700 720 0.09
(6,400) (480)
Distance to Abuja (km) 0 310 0.00
(0) (170)
Federal constituencies served in OPEN data 48 15 0.08
(88) (38)
Number of projects 822 2,187 -
- -
Average project budget (millions of US$) 0.18 0.11 0.00
(0.53) (0.48)
Average project complexity 0.40 0.23 0.00
(0.24) (0.17)
Proportion focused on rehabilitation 0.27 0.18 0.00
[0.14] [0.19]
Proportion focused on construction 0.82 0.85 0.07
[0.56] [0.57]
Proportion never started 0.50 0.31 0.00
[0.36] [0.30]
Average level of progress of organization projects 0.34 0.57 0.00
[0.49] [0.56]
Proportion completed conditional on being started 0.68 0.83 0.00
[0.49] [0.56]
Proportion fully completed 0.20 0.44 0.00
[0.34] [0.39]
Proportion started with satisfactory quality 0.73 0.83 0.00
[0.37] [0.56]
Notes: Standard deviations are in round parentheses.  In square parentheses are corresponding averages for the variable in question weighted by the 
project budget.  Abuja is the capital city of Nigeria.  Organization budget data are an average of organization budget figures for the years 2006-7.  
Data on number of staff are mainly from administrative data.  In the few cases where I do not have the staff numbers explicitly, I estimate them from 
the personnel expenditures, which are correlated with staff numbers with a magnitude of over 0.9.  Centralized organizations are main ministries 
which act as the central organizing authority for the sector.  Decentralized organizations are 'parastatals', with day-to-day running largely independent 
of the central authority.  Figures are rounded to two decimal places.  T-tests are performed under the assumption of equal variances when the chi-
squared test statistic is less than or equal to 3.84, and under the assumption of unequal variances otherwise.  I have weighted organizations equally.
Organization characteristics
OPEN projects
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Political Interactions with Bureaucrats, by Tier
Means, standard deviations, and p-values of differences with centralized organizations
(1) All 
organizations
(2) Centralized (3) Decentralized
(4) p-value of 
difference 
between (2)/(3)
Proportion of bureaucrats who state politicians impact projects significantly 0.54 0.38 0.60 0.00
(0.16) (0.08) (0.13)
Proportion of managers who state politicians impact projects significantly 0.52 0.40 0.57 0.00
(0.16) (0.04) (0.16)
Proportion of non-managers who state politicians impact projects significantly 0.53 0.27 0.63 0.00
(0.24) (0.15) (0.18)
Proportion of projects involving personal engagement of member of National Assembly 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.00
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
Organizations 54 7 47
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Decentralized organizations are 'parastatals', with day-to-day running largely independent of the central authority.  Figures are rounded to two decimal places.  T-tests 
are performed under the assumption of equal variances when the chi-squared test statistic is less than or equal to 3.84, and under the assumption of unequal variances otherwise.  I have weighted organizations by the 
number of projects they implement in the OPEN data set so to reflect the intensity of interaction between politicians and bureaucrats.
Table 3.4: Delegation by Politicians to Centralized and Decentralized Organizations
Robust Standard Errors
OLS Estimates
(1) No interaction (2) Interaction
(3) Politician 
controls
(4) Constituency 
controls
(5) Reduced form
(6) Total 
constituency 
resources
(7) Number of 
projects in 
constituency
Politician member of relevant committee [yes=1] 0.00 -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.06*** -52.3 3.29
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (96.10) (2.23)
Level of political competition 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -5.86 2.21
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (94.20) (1.51)
Politician member of relevant committee x level of political competition 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.08*** 138 -3.48
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (145) (3.02)
Project controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Politician controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constituency controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 173 9
Adjusted R-squared 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.61 0.81 0.31 0.27
Observations 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 345 345
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  All columns report OLS estimates.  The analysis in columns 1-5 is at the project level.  The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is a binary variable reflecting 
whether a project is decentralized or not, which takes the value 1 when the project is implemented by a decentralized organization.  Decentralization refers to whether the organization is an agency, with day-to-day running largely independent of the central authority, rather 
than a centralized ministry, the central organizing authority for the sector.  The dependent variable in column 5 is the total resources allocated to a constituency in the OPEN data in millions of Nigerian Naira.  The level of political competition is measured as one minus the 
difference between the winner's vote share and the runner's up vote share.  Project controls are comprised of project-level controls for the log of the project budget; binary variables indicating whether the project is new or a rehabilitation, and whether it was implemented in 
2006 or 2007; assessments of its aggregate complexity, national and local information requirements by Nigerian engineers; and project type fixed effects.  Project type fixed effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as an advocacy, building, 
borehole, canal, dam, financial, procurement, research, road or training project.  The analysis in columns 5 and 6 is at the constituency level.  In column 6, the dependent variable is the total number of projects allocated to a constituency in the OPEN data.  The committee 
membership variable is defined as that proportion of projects within the constituency where the politician sits on the relevant committee.  Project controls are comprised of constituency-level averages for the log of the project budget, binary variables indicating whether the 
project is new or a rehabilitation, and whether it was implemented in 2006 or 2007, assessments of its aggregate complexity, national and local information requirements by Nigerian engineers, and the fraction of projects in the constituency classed as an advocacy, building, 
borehole, canal, dam, financial, procurement, research, road or training project.  For both sets of specifications, politician controls are comprised of constituency-level controls for the sex, age, years of education and tenure in congress of the relevant politician.  In the very 
small number of cases in which age or years of education are missing, I replace the missing value with the mean of the rest of the politicians and include a dummy variable to indicate the missing data.  Constituency characteristics are comprised of the means and standard 
deviations of the following indices: the proportion of poor in the constituency measured by a national poverty index, the average years of education of the household head, the proportion of constituents with access to potable water, the average time in minutes to the nearest 
primary school, and the average time in minutes to the nearest secondary school.  Means and standard deviations of the following indices are also included to reflect the frequency with which constituents benefit from a public project of the named type in the five years 
preceding 2006: construction of electrification infrastructure, rehabilitation of electrification infrastructure, well/borehole, construction of piped water infrastructure, rehabilitation of piped water infrastructure, sanitation, school construction project, school rehabilitation, health 
facility construction, health facility rehabilitation, road construction, tarring/grading of roads, transportation services, and agricultural-inputs schemes.  Finally, constituency characteristics include a set of indicators of the economic dynamics of the constituency, comprised of 
indicators of improvements in opportunities for employment, the availability of agricultural inputs, number of buyers of agriculture produce, the availability of extension services, the availability of credit facilities, and the availability of consumer goods.  All specifications 
include an indicator of the 'grade' of the committee under which the project falls, which is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the committee is perceived to be of high political weight or 0 otherwise.  Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Dependent Variable Columns 1-4: Indicator of decentralization [decentralization=1]; Column 5: Sum of project budgets within relevant federal constituency
(in millions of Naira); Column 6: Count of projects within relevant federal constituency
Table 3.5: Interactions between Politicians and Bureaucrats
Dependent Variable: Proportion of implementing organization bureaucrats who state politicians impact projects significantly
Robust Standard Errors
OLS Estimates
(1) No interaction (2) Interaction
(3) Politician 
controls
(4) Constituency 
controls
(5) Decentralized 
organizations
(6) Reduced form
Distance to Abuja (net of distance to state capital) 0.028*** 0.010** 0.009* 0.010** -0.057*** 0.010**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Level of political competition 0.045*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.041*** 0.027*** 0.030***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Distance to Abuja x level of political competition 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.038*** 0.031***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Project controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Politician controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constituency controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.60 0.54
Adjusted R-squared 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.68 0.66 0.68
Observations 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 2,187 3,009
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  All columns report OLS estimates.  The dependant variable in all specifications is a continuous variable on the 
unit interval that reflects the proportion of bureaucrats at the organization in which the project is implemented who state that politicians have a significant impact on the implementation of projects there.  The distance to Abuja is 
a variable constructed as follows: I measure the geodesic distance between the organization and the capital city of Nigeria, Abuja, where the Parliament sits.  I then regress this on the geodesic distance between the 
organization implementing the project and the capital city of the state in which the organization sits, and take the residuals of that regression as the measure used here.  The level of political competition is measured as one 
minus the difference between the winner's vote share and the runner's up vote share.  Project controls are comprised of project-level controls for the log of the project budget; binary variables indicating whether the project is 
new or a rehabilitation, and whether it was implemented in 2006 or 2007; assessments of its aggregate complexity; national and local information requirements by Nigerian engineers; and project type fixed effects.  Project type 
fixed effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as an advocacy, building, borehole, canal, dam, financial, procurement, research, road or training project.  Politician controls are comprised of 
constituency-level controls for the sex, age, years of education and tenure in congress of the relevant politician.  In the very small number of cases in which age or years of education are missing, I replace the missing value with 
the mean of the rest of the politicians and include a dummy variable to indicate the missing data.  Constituency characteristics are comprised of the means and standard deviations of the following indices: the proportion of poor 
in the constituency, measured by a national poverty index, the average years of education of the household head, the proportion of constituents with access to potable water, the average time in minutes to the nearest primary 
school, and the average time in minutes to the nearest secondary school.  Means and standard deviations of the following indices are also included to reflect the frequency with which constituents benefit from a public project of 
the named type in the five years preceding 2006: construction of electrification infrastructure, rehabilitation of electrification infrastructure, well/borehole, construction of piped water infrastructure, rehabilitation of piped water 
infrastructure, sanitation, school construction project, school rehabilitation, health facility construction, health facility rehabilitation, road construction, tarring/grading of roads, transportation services, and agricultural-inputs 
schemes.  Finally, constituency characteristics include a set of indicators of the economic dynamics of the constituency, comprised of indicators of improvements in opportunities for employment, the availability of agricultural 
inputs, number of buyers of agriculture produce, the availability of extension services, the availability of credit facilities, and the availability of consumer goods.  Columns 1 to 4 utilize the full sample of projects in my data, whilst 
column 5 restricts the sample to those projects implemented by decentralized organizations only.  Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table 3.6: Consequences of Delegation and Engagement at Different Levels of Political Competition
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Project Completed
Robust Standard Errors
OLS Estimates in Columns 1 to 3; IV Estimates in Columns 4 and 5
(1) Decentralized (2) Incentives (3) Both (OLS) (4) IV (influence) (5) IV (engage)
Decentralization [decentralized=1] 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.40*** 0.48***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09)
Degree of politician influence on project implementation 0.51*** 0.17** -0.08 -0.01
(0.07) (0.08) (0.66) (0.01)
Level of political competition -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Project, politician and constituency controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Adjusted R-squared 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.33
F-statistic - - - 140 328
Observations 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  The dependant variable in all specifications is the proportion of the project completed 
(that is a continuous measure between zero and one).  Decentralization refers to whether the organization is a 'parastatal', with day-to-day running largely independent of the central authority, rather 
than a centralized ministry, the central organizing authority for the sector.  The degree of politician influence on project implementation is an organizational-average of the bureaucrat responses to the 
question 'Rate the influence you think [member(s) of the National Assembly] have on the success of a typical project implemented by your organization' where I code a bureaucrat's response as 1 if 
they answer 'Significant influence' or 'Most influence' and 0 otherwise.  The level of political competition is measured as one minus the difference between the winner's vote share and the runner's up 
vote share.  Project controls are comprised of project-level controls for the log of the project budget; binary variables indicating whether the project is new or a rehabilitation, and whether it was 
implemented in 2006 or 2007; assessments of its aggregate complexity; national and local information requirements by Nigerian engineers; and project type fixed effects.  Project type fixed effects 
relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as an advocacy, building, borehole, canal, dam, financial, procurement, research, road or training project.  Politician controls are comprised 
of constituency-level controls for the sex, age, years of education and tenure in congress of the relevant politician.  In the very small number of cases in which age or years of education are missing, I 
replace the missing value with the mean of the rest of the politicians and include a dummy variable to indicate the missing data.  Constituency characteristics are comprised of the means and standard 
deviations of the following indices: the proportion of poor in the constituency, measured by a national poverty index, the average years of education of the household head, the proportion of 
constituents with access to potable water, the average time in minutes to the nearest primary school, and the average time in minutes to the nearest secondary school.  Means and standard deviations 
of the following indices are also included to reflect the frequency with which constituents benefit from a public project of the named type in the five years preceding 2006: construction of electrification 
infrastructure, rehabilitation of electrification infrastructure, well/borehole, construction of piped water infrastructure, rehabilitation of piped water infrastructure, sanitation, school construction project, 
school rehabilitation, health facility construction, health facility rehabilitation, road construction, tarring/grading of roads, transportation services, and agricultural-inputs schemes.  Finally, constituency 
characteristics include a set of indicators of the economic dynamics of the constituency, comprised of indicators of improvements in opportunities for employment, the availability of agricultural inputs, 
number of buyers of agriculture produce, the availability of extension services, the availability of credit facilities, and the availability of consumer goods.  All specifications include an indicator of the 
'grade' of the committee under which the project falls, which is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the committee is perceived to be of high political weight or 0 otherwise.  The F-statistics reported for the 
instrumental variables specifications in columns 4 and 5 is the lower of the two first stage regressions corresponding to the two endogenous variables.  Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Means and standard deviations
Constituencies
Number of constituencies 345
-
Number of local governments in a constituency 2.03
(0.79)
Population (2006) 370,000
(130,000)
Winning vote share (2003 elections) 0.62
(0.15)
Runner's up vote share (2003 elections) 0.29
(0.12)
Proportion of constituencies run by ruling party 0.63
-
Proportion of constituencies ruling party is runner up 0.34
-
OPEN funds per constituency (US$) 1,100,000
(1,900,000)
Number of OPEN projects by constituency 9
(7.1)
Number of OPEN project types by constituency 3
(1.5)
Number of sectors in constituency 3
(0.9)
Average project budget (US$) 130,000
(150,000)
Average project complexity (proportion) 0.29
(0.10)
Proportion of constituency projects never started 0.41
(0.25)
Average level of progress of constituency projects 0.46
(0.25)
Level of progress conditional on being started 0.76
(0.22)
Proportion of constituency projects fully completed 0.32
(0.28)
Proportion started with satisfactory quality 0.78
(0.31)
Proportion implemented by decentralized organizations 0.73
(0.24)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  In the OPEN data, I do not observe projects in 15 of 
Nigeria's 360 federal constituencies, so the descriptives provided here are for the restricted set of 345 
constituencies only.  Population data is from the 2006 Census.  Election data is from the Independent 
National Electoral Commission official record for the 2003 election.  Centralized organizations are 
ministries which act as the central organizing authority for the sector.  Decentralized organizations are 
agencies whose day-to-day running is largely independent of the central authority.  Budget figures 
originally in Nigerian Naira are converted to US dollars at a rate of US$1:N150.  Figures are rounded to two 
decimal places where relevant.  I have weighted constituencies equally.
OPEN projects
Table A3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Nigeria's Political 
Constituencies
Table A3.2: Politician Characteristics across Committees
OLS Estimates
(1) Age of 
politician
(2) Sex of 
politician 
[female=1]
(3) Years of 
education
(4) Political 
competition in 
constituency
(5) Index of 
poverty in 
constituency
Constant 47.35*** 0.03** 16.22*** 0.69*** 0.23***
(0.61) (0.01) (0.14) (0.02) (0.01)
Finance Committee -0.37 -0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.01
(1.21) (0.03) (0.28) (0.04) (0.03)
Appropriation Committee 0.12 -0.05* 0.29 -0.01 0.00
(1.16) (0.03) (0.27) (0.04) (0.02)
Water Committee 1.50 -0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.01
(1.11) (0.03) (0.25) (0.04) (0.02)
Agriculture Committee 1.28 0.02 -0.42 -0.05 -0.01
(1.19) (0.03) (0.27) (0.04) (0.03)
Health Committee -0.79 0.02 -0.13 0.04 0.02
(1.23) (0.03) (0.28) (0.05) (0.03)
Education Committee 2.83** 0.00 0.31 0.01 -0.02
(1.19) (0.03) (0.27) (0.04) (0.03)
Environment Committee 0.21 -0.03 0.29 -0.09** 0.01
(1.2) (0.03) (0.27) (0.04) (0.03)
Housing Committee -0.24 -0.04 0.08 -0.07* -0.03
(1.11) (0.03) (0.26) (0.04) (0.02)
Women and Youth Committee 0.22 0.63*** -0.53 0.05 -0.04
(1.46) (0.04) (0.33) (0.05) (0.03)
FCT Committee -1.69 -0.01 -0.41 0.03 0.00
(1.2) (0.03) (0.28) (0.04) (0.03)
H0: All coefficients equal [p-value] 0.27 0.00 0.28 0.34 0.91
H0: All coefficients bar Women and 
Youth equal [p-value]
- 0.51 - - -
Observations 345 345 345 345 345
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  All columns report OLS estimates.  The dependent 
variable in column 1 is the age of the politician.  In column 2, it is a binary variable reflecting the sex of the politician, which takes the value 1 if the politician is female.  In 
column 3, the dependent variable is the years of education of the politician.  In column 4, it is my measure of political competition (one minus the difference between the 
winner and runner up vote shares) in the constituency that the politician represents. In column 5, it is the proportion of poor in the politician's constituency, measured by a 
national poverty index.  The 'FCT Committee' refers to the Federal Capital Territory Committee that has jurisdiction over the building of infrastructure within the Federal 
Capital Territory, the municipal area in which the capital, Abuja, sits.  At the foot of the table, I report the p-value on the null that the coefficients in each column are of 
equal magnitude.  I also report the p-value on the null that the coefficients in column 2, excluding that on the Women Affairs and Youth committee, are of equal 
magnitude.  Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A3.3: Investigating the Determinants of Committee Membership
Dependent Variable: System of Ten Equations in Membership of Sectoral Committees
Robust Standard Errors
Estimates by Maximum Likelihood to Fit a SUR Model
Member of 
Finance 
Committee
Member of 
Appropriation 
Committee
Member of 
Water 
Committee
Member of 
Agriculture 
Committee
Member of 
Health 
Committee
Member of 
Education 
Committee
Member of 
Environment 
Committee
Member of 
Housing 
Committee
Member of 
Women/Youth 
Committee
Member of 
FCT 
Committee
Politician has relevant qualifications/experience [yes=1] 0.30*** 0.36*** 0.50*** 0.54*** 0.77*** 0.54*** 0.69*** 0.65*** 0.17** 0.79***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Level of political competition 0.09 0.02 -0.04 -0.20*** 0.06 -0.03 0.05 -0.10 0.07 0.06
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Index of poverty 0.35 -0.15 0.02 -0.55*** -0.26 -0.24 -0.21 0.22 0.17 -0.01
(0.29) (0.26) (0.33) (0.2) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.3) (0.21) (0.21)
Politician and constituency controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Correlation of residuals in SUR system:
Appropriation -0.22
Water -0.01 0.07
Agriculture -0.11 0.02 -0.10
Health -0.04 -0.09 0.01 -0.07
Education 0.02 -0.05 -0.13 -0.21 -0.04
Environment 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.09 0.06
Housing 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.02
Women/Youth -0.02 0.18 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.15 -0.14
FCT 0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00
Observations 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Columns report maximum likelihood estimates to fit a SUR model for the ten sectoral committees.  The dependent variable in all specifications is a binary variable reflecting whether a 
politician is a member of the committee for the named sector, taking the value 1 when the politician is a member.  The 'FCT Committee' refers to the Federal Capital Territory Committee that has jurisdiction over the building of infrastructure within the Federal Capital Territory, the municipal area in 
which the capital, Abuja, sits.  Politician controls are comprised of constituency-level controls for the sex, age, years of education and tenure in congress of the relevant politician.  In the very small number of cases in which age or years of education are missing, I replace the missing value with 
the mean of the rest of the politicians and include a dummy variable to indicate the missing data.  Constituency characteristics are comprised of the means and standard deviations of the following indices: the proportion of poor in the constituency, measured by a national poverty index, the 
average years of education of the household head, the proportion of constituents with access to potable water, the average time in minutes to the nearest primary school, and the average time in minutes to the nearest secondary school.  Means and standard deviations of the following indices 
are also included to reflect the frequency with which constituents benefit from a public project of the named type in the five years preceding 2006: construction of electrification infrastructure, rehabilitation of electrification infrastructure, well/borehole, construction of piped water infrastructure, 
rehabilitation of piped water infrastructure, sanitation, school construction project, school rehabilitation, health facility construction, health facility rehabilitation, road construction, tarring/grading of roads, transportation services, and agricultural-inputs schemes.  Finally, constituency characteristics 
include a set of indicators of the economic dynamics of the constituency, comprising indicators of improvements in opportunities for employment, the availability of agricultural inputs, number of buyers of agriculture produce, the availability of extension services, the availability of credit facilities, 
and the availability of consumer goods.  All specifications include dummies for five of the six geo-political zones and an indicator of the 'grade' of the committee under which the project falls, which is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the committee is perceived to be of high political weight or 0 
otherwise.  Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A3.4: Investigating the Determinants of Politicians' Qualifications and Experience
Dependent Variable: System of Nine Equations in Sector of Politician's Qualifications and Experience
Robust Standard Errors
Estimates by Maximum Likelihood to Fit a SUR Model
Finance 
Sector
Water Sector
Agriculture 
Sector
Health Sector
Education 
Sector
Environment 
Sector
Housing 
Sector
Women/Youth 
Sector
FCT (city 
building) 
Sector
Level of political competition 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 -0.10 -0.23*** -0.03 0.03
(0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08)
Index of poverty -0.44 0.23 0.08 0.46 -0.26 -0.05 0.14 -0.03 0.31
(0.35) (0.29) (0.08) (0.31) (0.25) (0.17) (0.29) (0.03) (0.29)
Proportion of constituents with access to potable water 0.19 -0.04 -0.02 -0.10
(0.14) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06)
Time in minutes to nearest secondary school 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Existing tarred road infrastructure investments 0.08 -0.01
(0.28) (0.22)
Politician and constituency controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Correlation of residuals in SUR system:
Water 0.13
Agriculture -0.12 0.11
Health -0.12 -0.05 -0.08
Education 0.10 -0.03 -0.09 -0.06
Environment -0.02 0.17 0.24 -0.15 -0.04
Housing 0.06 0.31 0.09 -0.04 -0.05 0.12
Women/Youth 0.13 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05
FCT 0.09 0.28 0.06 -0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.23 -0.02
Observations 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Columns report maximum likelihood estimates to fit a SUR model for the nine sectors.  The dependent variable in all specifications is a binary variable reflecting 
whether a politician has qualifications and/or experience in the named sector, taking the value 1 when the politician has relevant qualifications and/or experience.  The 'FCT Committee' refers to the Federal Capital Territory Committee that has jurisdiction over the building of 
infrastructure within the Federal Capital Territory, the municipal area in which the capital, Abuja, sits.  Politician controls are comprised of constituency-level controls for the sex, age and years of education of the relevant politician.  In the very small number of cases in which 
age or years of education are missing, I replace the missing value with the mean of the rest of the politicians and include a dummy variable to indicate the missing data.  Constituency characteristics are comprised of the means and standard deviations of the following 
indices: the proportion of poor in the constituency, measured by a national poverty index, the average years of education of the household head, the proportion of constituents with access to potable water, the average time in minutes to the nearest primary school, and the 
average time in minutes to the nearest secondary school.  Means and standard deviations of the following indices are also included to reflect the frequency with which constituents benefit from a public project of the named type in the five years preceding 2006: construction 
of electrification infrastructure, rehabilitation of electrification infrastructure, well/borehole, construction of piped water infrastructure, rehabilitation of piped water infrastructure, sanitation, school construction project, school rehabilitation, health facility construction, health 
facility rehabilitation, road construction, tarring/grading of roads, transportation services, and agricultural-inputs schemes.  Finally, constituency characteristics include a set of indicators of the economic dynamics of the constituency, comprising indicators of improvements in 
opportunities for employment, the availability of agricultural inputs, number of buyers of agriculture produce, the availability of extension services, the availability of credit facilities, and the availability of consumer goods.  Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A3.5: Correlation of Subcomponents of the Project Complexity Indicator
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Project size 0.32 0.46
Number of inputs 7.48 4.71 0.08
Number of methods 5.27 2.63 0.38 0.62
Interdependencies 0.58 0.49 0.06 0.14 0.08
Access to raw materials 0.08 0.27 -0.17 -0.11 -0.13 -0.30
Storage of raw materials 0.06 0.23 0.16 -0.10 0.04 0.13 0.00
Requires local labor 0.42 0.49 0.47 0.06 0.56 -0.11 -0.23 0.22
Requires skilled labor 0.45 0.50 -0.22 0.04 -0.36 0.59 -0.27 0.00 -0.48
Access to construction equipment 0.08 0.27 0.12 -0.19 0.10 0.23 -0.08 0.33 0.29 0.26
Design uncertainty 0.68 0.46 0.30 0.18 0.15 0.75 -0.43 0.11 0.19 0.42 0.18
Implementation uncertainty 0.79 0.41 0.19 0.29 0.24 0.52 -0.54 0.03 0.34 0.39 0.14 0.72
Design ambiguity 0.61 0.49 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.82 -0.36 0.14 -0.14 0.67 0.21 0.64 0.55
Implementation ambiguity 0.59 0.49 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.85 -0.35 0.17 -0.10 0.62 0.23 0.69 0.47 0.89
Difficulty to manage 0.18 0.38 0.35 -0.07 0.34 0.27 -0.13 0.41 0.49 -0.04 0.60 0.26 0.13 0.36 0.37
Number of agencies involved 3.58 0.50 -0.03 0.21 -0.16 0.16 -0.34 -0.07 -0.09 0.35 -0.34 0.35 0.57 0.28 0.19 -0.22
Aggregate complexity 27.48 20.33 0.49 0.18 0.56 0.26 -0.09 0.20 0.56 -0.13 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.29 0.32 0.61 -0.10
Observations (projects) 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009
Notes: 'Project size' is a binary variable that aims to gauge the physical size of the project. It takes the value 1 if it is classified as equivalent to a medium scale build or larger. 'Number of inputs'
counts the number of distinct product classes the finished project contains. 'Number of methods' counts the number of distinct disciplines or methods involved in implementing the project.
'Interdependencies' is a binary variable reflecting the extent of interdependencies between the activities involved in the project. It takes a value of 1 if the project is classified as highly interdependent.
'Access to raw materials' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if raw materials could not be sourced within the state of implementation. 'Storage of raw materials' is a binary variable that takes
the value 1 if some of the raw materials could not be easily stored or transported. 'Requires local labor' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if local labor was useful or critical. 'Requires skilled
labor' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if specialized skills were necessary and difficult to obtain. 'Access to construction equipment' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the
equipment required is difficult to obtain, heavy duty, or difficult to transport to the site. 'Design uncertainty' is a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if the design of the project is context specific.
'Implementation uncertainty' is a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if there are substantial risks involved in implementation. 'Design ambiguity' is a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if
there is a risk of redesign late on in the project. 'Implementation ambiguity' is a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if the technical risks of the project cannot be fully understood at
implementation. 'Difficulty to manage' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the project is seen to have elements that require project management skills of above-average level. 'Number of
agencies involved' is simply a count of the estimated number of agencies involved in the project cycle. 'Aggregate complexity' is a subjective assessment as to the overall complexity of the project by
the coding engineers. This variable is an assessment of the interaction of the other variables as well as any unassessed aspects of complexity, and provides a coherent picture of the complexity of
the projects by a specialist. The variables 'interdependencies', 'access to raw materials', 'requires local labor', 'requires skilled labor', 'access to construction equipment', 'design uncertainty',
'implementation uncertainty', 'design ambiguity', 'implementation ambiguity' and 'difficulty to manage' are binary variables reflecting the variation in these previously categorical variables. Figures are
rounded to two decimal places.
Table A3.6: Robustness of Delegation Findings
Dependent Variable: Indicator of decentralization [decentralization=1]
Robust Standard Errors in All Columns Bar 2 and Clustered at the Politician Level in Column 2
OLS Estimates
(1) Baseline 
specification
(2) Clustering at 
politician level
(3) Organization 
controls
(4) Chairperson 
dummy
(5) Excluding 
chairperson 
projects
(6) Two-term 
dummy
(7) Excluding two-
term projects
(8) Excluding 
unqualified 
agriculture
Politician member of relevant committee [yes=1] -0.11*** -0.11** -0.05** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.17*** -0.09***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Level of political competition -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Politician member of relevant committee x level of political competition 0.18*** 0.18** 0.08** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.25*** 0.17***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Chairpersons [yes=1] -0.14***
(0.04)
Politician in second term at congress [yes=1] 0.01
(0.01)
Aggregate complexity index -0.46***
(0.06)
National information index -0.08***
(0.01)
Local information index 0.08***
(0.02)
Project, politician and constituency controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.61 0.61 0.71 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.60
Observations (clusters) 3,009 3,009 (345) 3,009 3,009 2,962 3,009 2,161 2,980
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  They are robust in all columns bar 2 and clustered by politicians in Column 2.  The dependent variable in all specifications is a binary variable reflecting whether a project is 
decentralized or not, which takes the value 1 when the project is implemented by a decentralized organization.  Decentralization refers to whether the organization is a 'parastatal', with day-to-day running largely independent of the central authority, rather than a centralized ministry, the 
central organizing authority for the sector.  The level of political competition is measured as one minus the difference between the winner's vote share and the runner's up vote share.  In Column 3 we include organizational-level variables that measure the average years of education of 
bureaucrats, a proxy for their intrinsic motivation, and a measure of what determined their posting at the organization that implements the project.  In Column 4, we include a dummy for whether the project is located in a constituency represented by the chair of the relevant sectoral 
committee for that project.  Column 5 restricts our specification to those projects that are not implemented in constituencies in which the politician is the chair of the relevant sectoral committee.  In Column 6 we include a dummy for whether the project is located in a constituency in which 
the politician is in their second term at congress.  Column 7 restricts our specification to those projects that are not implemented in constituencies in which the politician is in their second term of congress.  Column 8 restricts our specification to those projects that are not implemented in 
constituencies in which the politician did not have relevant qualifications or experience in agriculture, but was a member of the agriculture committee.  Project controls are comprised of project-level controls for the log of the project budget, binary variables indicating whether the project is 
new or a rehabilitation, and whether it was implemented in 2006 or 2007, assessments of its aggregate complexity, national and local information requirements by Nigerian engineers, and project type fixed effects.  Project type fixed effects relate to whether the primary classification of the 
project is as an advocacy, building, borehole, canal, dam, financial, procurement, research, road or training project.  Politician controls comprise constituency-level controls for the sex, age, years of education and tenure in congress of the relevant politician.  In the very small number of 
cases in which age or years of education are missing, I replace the missing value with the mean of the rest of the politicians and include a dummy variable to indicate the missing data.  Constituency characteristics are comprised of the means and standard deviations of the following 
indices: the proportion of poor in the constituency, measured by a national poverty index, the average years of education of the household head, the proportion of constituents with access to potable water, the average time in minutes to the nearest primary school, and the average time 
in minutes to the nearest secondary school.  Means and standard deviations of the following indices are also included to reflect the frequency with which constituents benefit from a public project of the named type in the five years preceding 2006: construction of electrification 
infrastructure, rehabilitation of electrification infrastructure, well/borehole, construction of piped water infrastructure, rehabilitation of piped water infrastructure, sanitation, school construction project, school rehabilitation, health facility construction, health facility rehabilitation, road 
construction, tarring/grading of roads, transportation services, and agricultural-inputs schemes.  Finally, constituency characteristics include a set of indicators of the economic dynamics of the constituency, comprised of indicators of improvements in opportunities for employment, the 
availability of agricultural inputs, number of buyers of agriculture produce, the availability of extension services, the availability of credit facilities, and the availability of consumer goods.  All specifications include an indicator of the 'grade' of the committee under which the project falls, 
which is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the committee is perceived to be of high political weight or 0 otherwise.  Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A3.7: Robustness of Engagement Findings
Dependent Variable: Proportion of implementing organization bureaucrats who state politicians impact projects significantly
Robust Standard Errors in All Columns Bar 2 and Clustered at the Politician Level in Column 2
OLS Estimates
(1) Baseline 
specification
(2) Clustering at 
politician level
(3) Organization 
controls
(4) Chairperson 
dummy
(5) Excluding 
chairperson 
projects
(6) Two-term 
dummy
(7) Excluding two-
term projects
(8) Excluding 
unqualified 
agriculture
Distance to Abuja (net of distance to state capital) 0.010** 0.01 0.012*** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.019*** 0.009**
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Level of political competition 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.022** 0.041***
(0.008) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Distance to capital city x level of political competition 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.022*** 0.033***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Chairpersons [yes=1] 0.023*
(0.013)
Politician in second term at congress [yes=1] 0.009**
(0.004)
Aggregate complexity index -0.042***
(0.015)
National information index 0.034***
(0.004)
Local information index 0.023***
(0.004)
Project, politician and constituency controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.68 0.72 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.68
Observations (clusters) 3,009 3,009 (345) 3,009 3,009 2,962 3,009 2,161 2,980
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  They are robust in all columns bar 2 and clustered by sectors within each constituency in Column 2.  The dependent variable in all specifications is a continuous 
variable on the unit interval that reflects the proportion of bureaucrats at the organization in which the project is implemented who state that politicians have a significant impact on the implementation of projects there.  The distance to Abuja is a variable constructed as 
follows: I measure the geodesic distance between the organization and the capital city of Nigeria, Abuja, where the Parliament sits.  I then regress this on the geodesic distance between the organization implementing the project and the capital city of the state in which 
the organization lies and take the residuals of that regression as the measure used here.  In Column 3 we include organizational-level variables that measure the average years of education of bureaucrats, a proxy for their intrinsic motivation, and a measure of what 
determined their posting at the organization that implements the project.  In Column 4, we include a dummy for whether the project is located in a constituency represented by the chair of the relevant sectoral committee for that project.  Column 5 restricts our specification 
to those projects that are not implemented in constituencies in which the politician is the chair of the relevant sectoral committee.  In Column 6 we include a dummy for whether the project is located in a constituency in which the politician is in their second term at 
congress.  Column 7 restricts our specification to those projects that are not implemented in constituencies in which the politician is in their second term of congress.  Column 8 restricts our specification to those projects that are not implemented in constituencies in 
which the politician did not have relevant qualifications or experience in agriculture but was a member of the agriculture committee.  Project controls are comprised of project-level controls for the log of the project budget, binary variables indicating whether the project is 
new or a rehabilitation, and whether it was implemented in 2006 or 2007, assessments of its aggregate complexity, national and local information requirements by Nigerian engineers, and project type fixed effects.  Project type fixed effects relate to whether the primary 
classification of the project is as an advocacy, building, borehole, canal, dam, financial, procurement, research, road or training project.  Politician controls are comprised of constituency-level controls for the sex, age, years of education and tenure in congress of the 
relevant politician.  In the very small number of cases in which age or years of education are missing, I replace the missing value with the mean of the rest of the politicians and include a dummy variable to indicate the missing data.  Constituency characteristics are 
comprised of the means and standard deviations of the following indices: the proportion of poor in the constituency, measured by a national poverty index, the average years of education of the household head, the proportion of constituents with access to potable water, 
the average time in minutes to the nearest primary school, and the average time in minutes to the nearest secondary school.  Means and standard deviations of the following indices are also included to reflect the frequency with which constituents benefit from a public 
project of the named type in the five years preceding 2006: construction of electrification infrastructure, rehabilitation of electrification infrastructure, well/borehole, construction of piped water infrastructure, rehabilitation of piped water infrastructure, sanitation, school 
construction project, school rehabilitation, health facility construction, health facility rehabilitation, road construction, tarring/grading of roads, transportation services, and agricultural-inputs schemes.  Finally, constituency characteristics include a set of indicators of the 
economic dynamics of the constituency, comprised of indicators of improvements in opportunities for employment, the availability of agricultural inputs, number of buyers of agriculture produce, the availability of extension services, the availability of credit facilities, and 
the availability of consumer goods.  All specifications include an indicator of the 'grade' of the committee under which the project falls, which is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the committee is perceived to be of high political weight or 0 otherwise.  Figures are rounded 
to two decimal places.
Table A3.8: Descriptive Statistics of Organizational Characteristics, by Tier
Means, standard deviations, and p-values of differences with centralized organizations
(1) All 
organizations
(2) Centralized (3) Decentralized
(4) p-value of 
difference 
between (2)/(3)
How often, if at all, do you personally engage with project communities? 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.72
(0.12) (0.08) (0.13)
Proportion of citizens who threaten bureaucrat 8.66 5.81 9.10 0.05
(4.15) (2.47) (4.20)
Proportion of citizens who report bureaucrat to manager 10.16 7.13 10.62 0.02
(3.81) (1.88) (3.83)
Proportion of citizens who report bureaucrat to elected official 6.44 3.66 6.87 0.04
(3.94) (1.98) (4.00)
Organizations 54 7 47
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Decentralized organizations are 'parastatals', with day-to-day running largely independent of the central authority.  Figures are rounded to two decimal places.  T-tests 
are performed under the assumption of equal variances when the chi-squared test statistic is less than or equal to 3.84, and under the assumption of unequal variances otherwise.  I have weighted organizations 
equally.
Fig. 3.2A: Histogram of Difference Between Winner and Runner Up Vote Share
Notes: This is a histogram of the difference between the winning vote share in a constituency and that of the runner up. The sample used to
construct the histogram is those constituencies for which I observe the implementation of public projects.
Figure 3.2B: Map of Political Competition Across Nigeria
Notes: This is a choropleth map of one minus the difference between the winning vote share in a constituency and that of the runner up. The
choropleth map is colored such that the deeper the intensity of shading, the higher the level of political competition.
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Figure 3.3: Map of Building Capacity Across Nigeria
Notes: This is a choropleth map of an index of the intensity of building capacity across Nigeria. The index is a function of the number of
building materials markets in a local government. The striped section indicates the Federal Capital Territory, in which the capital city, Abuja,
sits.  The choropleth map is colored such that the deeper the intensity of shading, the higher the number of building materials markets.
